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Summary 
Climate change has become a growing concern worldwide. The projected consequences 
include rising average surface temperature, sea level rise, melting glaciers, changing 
precipitation patterns, more extreme weather events and changes in ecological and 
economic systems. However, climate change mitigation is a global public good and, 
therefore, suffers from underprovision due to free-riding incentives. The economics of 
climate protection – costs and benefits, uncertainty, and the regional distribution of 
effects – make the provision thereof one of the biggest challenges for the international 
community. Furthermore, the historical development of the problem and countries’ 
differences in responsibility, wherewithal, and vulnerability give leeway for different 
perceptions of fair burden sharing.  
This thesis provides an experimental and theory based analysis of the voluntary 
provision of global public goods with a special focus on climate change mitigation. It 
comprises a selection of essays on public good provision and the elicitation of other-
regarding preferences. Each chapter provides a stand-alone analysis featuring an 
introduction to the research question of interest, the contribution to existing literature 
and the methodological approach. The dissertation is structured along two thematic 
lines: Following a general introduction, Part I presents the results of three lab 
experiments simulating the climate change mitigation problem. The first two chapters in 
this part analyze a dilemma game and test theory on the formation of coalitions with 
different institutions implemented in the coalition. The third chapter examines a 
coordination game in which players face catastrophic climate change if their emission 
abatement falls short of a certain threshold. Players in this game differ with respect to 
wealth and historical responsibility and they have the opportunity to communicate via 
non-binding pledges. Part II investigates other-regarding preferences as a motivation to 
contribute to public goods. The first chapter in this part presents the results of an online 
experiment that elicits the social preferences of climate negotiators. The negotiators’ 
behavior is compared to corresponding student behavior in lab experiments. The 
experiment, furthermore, considers cross-country differences between negotiators. The 
following two chapters present the results of a framed field experiment with citizens 
who had the opportunity to donate for various charitable purposes. Using a non-student 
subject pool allows the analysis of socio-economic variables as potential determinants 
of the willingness to contribute to a public good. These studies provide also some 
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methodological insights by suggesting improvement opportunities for the elicitation of 
other-regarding preferences by simple experimental games. 
The experiments in the second part show that climate negotiators and citizens are 
willing to share their endowments with strangers even under completely anonymous 
conditions. Therefore, under certain conditions people may also be willing to pay for 
climate protection. Although we do not know countries’ guiding principles in 
international climate negotiations, these findings suggest that governments may not act 
completely selfishly but may move beyond the unilaterally rational level. Therefore, 
theoretical as well as experimental findings should be taken into account in the analysis 
of climate negotiations and the respective policy advice. 
In this spirit, the experiments in the first part analyze the consequences of real (and 
possibly other-regarding) preferences for the players’ ability to solve the dilemma or 
coordination problem. The most important finding stems from the experiments that 
allow for the voluntary formation of coalitions to overcome the free-rider problem: 
Independently from the institution in place, the players do not come close to the social 
optimum. The implications thereof are important for the ongoing policy discussions. 
The widely believed hypothesis that the United Nations process, involving many 
different countries each endowed with a veto, impedes effective cooperation is not 
supported by the experimental data. The fact that even small groups consisting of few 
symmetric players under different institutions, are not able to secure the efficient public 
good provision level, indicates that, first and foremost, the prevailing free-riding 
incentives impede effective cooperation. 
The experimental literature in the field of coalition formation and catastrophe avoidance 
is still at the beginning and needs further development. The experimental results, so far, 
support the view that small changes in the process might not be enough, but that more 
radical changes might be needed: The ‘targets and timetables’ approach as implemented 
in all previous climate resolutions does not show great promise for reducing global 
greenhouse gas emissions. The prospects for an effective global agreement are thin from 
all perspectives: real world experience, theory, and experiments. Therefore, besides 
working on a global top-down agreement, countries should aim for bottom-up solutions 
such as sectoral or small multi-track agreements. 
P a g e  | iii 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Der Klimawandel wird mittlerweile weltweit als ein ernstzunehmendes Problem 
wahrgenommen. Die zu erwartenden Folgen des Klimawandels umfassen 
durchschnittlich steigende Oberflächentemperatur, steigende Meeresspiegel, 
schmelzende Gletscher, veränderte Niederschlagsmuster, zunehmende 
Extremwetterereignisse sowie Veränderungen in Öko- und Wirtschaftssystemen. Der 
Schutz des Klimas ist jedoch ein globales öffentliches Gut und leidet daher unter 
Freifahreranreizen. Die Ökonomie des Klimaschutzes – Kosten und Nutzen, 
Unsicherheit und regionale Verteilung der Effekte – macht die Vermeidung von 
Treibhausgasemissionen zu einer der größten Herausforderungen für die internationale 
Gemeinschaft. Darüber hinaus führen die historische Entwicklung des Problems und die 
Unterschiede zwischen Staaten hinsichtlich ihrer Verantwortung, ihrer wirtschaftlichen 
Leistungsfähigkeit und ihrer Betroffenheit durch den Klimawandel zu verschiedenen 
Auffassungen von fairer Lastenverteilung.  
Die vorliegende Dissertation bietet eine experimentelle und theoretisch fundierte 
Analyse der freiwilligen Bereitstellung globaler öffentlicher Güter mit besonderem 
Schwerpunkt auf Klimaschutz. Sie enthält eine Auswahl an Aufsätzen zur 
Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter und zur Erhebung sozialer Präferenzen. Jedes Kapitel 
enthält eine eigenständige Analyse, die eine Einleitung zur entsprechenden 
Fragestellung, ihren Beitrag zur bestehenden Literatur und den methodischen Ansatz 
aufweist. Die Struktur der Dissertation folgt zwei thematischen Linien: Nach einer 
allgemeinen Einleitung werden in Teil I drei Experimente präsentiert, in denen das 
Klimaproblem im Labor simuliert wird. Die beiden ersten Kapitel dieses Teils 
analysieren ein Dilemmaspiel und testen Theorien zur Koalitionsbildung mit 
verschiedenen Institutionen, die die Emissionsminderung innerhalb der Koalition 
bestimmen. Das dritte Kapitel widmet sich der Untersuchung eines Koordinationsspiels, 
in dem die Spieler katastrophalen Klimaschäden ausgesetzt sind, wenn ihre 
Emissionsminderungen unter eine bestimmte Grenze fallen. Die Spieler unterscheiden 
sich hinsichtlich ihrer historischen Verantwortung für das Problem und ihrer 
Anfangsausstattung. Im Spiel haben sie die Möglichkeit, über unverbindliche 
Absichtserklärungen miteinander kommunizieren und so das Koordinationsproblem zu 
lösen. 
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In Teil II der Arbeit werden soziale Präferenzen als potentielle Determinanten für 
individuelle Beiträge zu öffentlichen Gütern untersucht. Im ersten Kapitel dieses Teils 
werden die Ergebnisse eines Online-Experiments zur Erhebung der sozialen 
Präferenzen von Klimaverhandlern vorgestellt. Das Verhalten der Verhandler wird mit 
Verhalten von Studenten in gleichartigen Laborexperimenten verglichen. Weiterhin 
geht es in diesem Experiment um regionsspezifische Unterschiede zwischen 
Verhandlern. In den zwei nachfolgenden Kapiteln werden die Ergebnisse eines 
Spendenexperiments mit nicht-studentischen Versuchspersonen vorgestellt. Ein Ziel ist 
dabei, sozioökonomische Variablen als potentielle Bestimmungsfaktoren für die 
Bereitschaft, zu einem öffentlichen Gut beizutragen, zu analysieren. Diese Studien 
liefern auch methodische Einblicke, indem sie Verbesserungsmöglichkeiten für die 
Erhebung sozialer Präferenzen durch einfache experimentelle Spiele aufzeigen.  
Die Experimente im zweiten Teil zeigen, dass sowohl Klimaverhandler als auch Bürger 
bereit sind, selbst unter vollständig anonymen Bedingungen ihr Budget mit Fremden zu 
teilen. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass unter bestimmten Bedingungen Menschen bereit sein 
könnten, etwas für Klimaschutz zu bezahlen. Dies könnte Regierungen wiederum die 
Möglichkeit geben, mehr Klimaschutz als das unilateral rationale und eigennützige 
Niveau zu betreiben. Aus diesem Grund sollten sowohl theoretische als auch 
experimentelle Erkenntnisse bei der Analyse der Klimaverhandlungen und der 
entsprechenden politischen Implikationen betrachtet werden.  
In diesem Sinne demonstrieren die Experimente im ersten Teil der Arbeit die Folgen 
realer (möglicherweise sozialer) Präferenzen für die Fähigkeit der Spieler, das 
Dilemma- oder Koordinationsproblem zu lösen. Die wichtigsten Erkenntnisse stammen 
aus den Experimenten zur freiwilligen Koalitionsbildung: Unabhängig von der 
Institution, die innerhalb der Koalition eingesetzt wird, kommen die Spieler nicht an das 
soziale Optimum heran. Dies hat wichtige Implikationen für die internationale 
Klimapolitik. Die weitverbreitete Hypothese, dass vor allem der Prozess der Vereinten 
Nationen mit vielen unterschiedlichen Staaten, die jeweils ein Vetorecht haben, eine 
effektive Kooperation verhindert, wird von den experimentellen Daten nicht gestützt. 
Dass auch kleine Gruppen von wenigen symmetrischen Spielern mit unterschiedlichen 
Institutionen nicht die effiziente Lösung umsetzen können, deutet darauf hin, dass die 
vorhandenen Freifahreranreize das Haupthindernis für effektive Kooperation sind. 
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Die experimentelle Literatur in den Bereichen Koalitionsbildung und Vermeidung von 
katastrophalen Klimaschäden steht noch am Anfang und bedarf weiterer Entwicklung. 
Die bisherigen Ergebnisse unterstützen die Ansicht, dass kleine Änderungen im Prozess 
nicht  ausreichen könnten, sondern dass radikale Änderungen vorgenommen werden 
müssten: Der Ansatz von ‚Reduktionszielen und Zeitplänen‘, wie er in allen bisherigen 
Klimabeschlüssen umgesetzt ist, erscheint nicht zielführend, um die globalen 
Treibhausgasemissionen nachhaltig zu begrenzen. Die Erfolgsaussichten für ein 
effektives globales Abkommen sind aus allen Perspektiven gering: reale Erfahrungen, 
Theorie und Experimente. Daher sollten Staaten neben den Verhandlungen um ein 
globales ‚top-down‘ Abkommen parallel ‚bottom-up‘ Lösungen wie beispielsweise 
sektorale Abkommen oder ein System von mehreren kleinen Abkommen anstreben. 
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1 General introduction  
The change of the global climate has become a growing concern worldwide. The 
projected consequences include rising average surface temperature, sea level rise, 
melting glaciers, changing precipitation patterns, more extreme weather events, and 
changes in ecological and economic systems. In its last assessment report, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reemphasized the urgency of 
political action by stating that “continued greenhouse gas emissions at or above current 
rates would cause further warming and induce many changes in the global climate 
system during the 21st century” (IPCC 2007). However, climate change mitigation is a 
global public good. If provided, no country can be excluded from enjoying the benefits 
of mitigation and a country enjoying the benefits does not impinge on the consumption 
opportunities of other countries. Like many global public goods, climate change 
mitigation is universally desirable but suffers from free-riding incentives because its 
provision is beneficial for every country, even for those that do not help providing it. 
The economics of climate protection make the provision thereof one of the biggest 
challenges for the international community. In particular, the following characteristics 
appear to be critical: First, reducing global greenhouse gas emissions depends on the 
aggregate effort of all countries. Contributions by individual countries do hardly matter 
and they do not induce other countries to join them. Second, it is costly to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions substantially. Doing so will increase other risks, such as those 
associated with the expansion of nuclear power or the use of carbon capture and storage, 
and will divert investments in other causes. Third, climate change damages will be 
mostly gradual, giving agents the time to adapt. Catastrophic damages are highly 
uncertain and will probably take centuries to unfold. Fourth, different countries will be 
affected in different ways. Some regions may benefit while others may lose. The 
countries most likely to be adversely affected are the poorest countries which are least 
able to mitigate and adapt to climate change. For these reasons, countries either do not 
have the incentive or the wherewithal to act (Barrett 2007).  
There is another obstacle that has received less attention in the economic literature: the 
perceptions of fair burden sharing. Since the beginning of the industrial era, greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere have been increased by about one third. Average 
global temperature has also risen and according to the IPCC most of this warming is 
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attributable to human activities. More precisely, these effects have been caused by the 
economic activities of the industrialized countries. The differences in responsibility 
together with differences in vulnerability and wherewithal pose the question how the 
burden of climate change mitigation is to be shared between countries, particularly 
between the developed countries and the newly industrializing economies. If the burden 
sharing is to be accepted by all countries, it obviously needs to be perceived as fair. 
However, different parties in climate negotiations refer to different fairness principles of 
burden sharing. Developing countries often call attention to the fact that industrialized 
countries have much higher per capita CO2 emissions. They often refer to the 
egalitarian principle, which may be interpreted in the sense that every citizen has the 
same right to pollute. Consequently, they demand an equalization of per capita 
emissions at least in the long run. Other equity rules refer either to the responsibility or 
the ability to cope with the problem of climate change. The polluter-pays rule, for 
example, claims that abatement costs should be distributed in proportion to a country’s 
share in global emissions. Another principle, in the past favored mainly by the United 
States, is the sovereignty rule. It represents the idea of an equal percentage emission 
reduction for all countries, implying substantial abatement efforts for important growing 
developing countries such as China or India. All these principles stem from different 
views on equity and fairness. These different views seem to reflect a ‘self-serving’ bias 
of fairness perceptions: Countries prefer an equity principle that is in their best interest, 
meaning that the implementation of that principle would generate least costs for them 
(Lange et al. 2010). 
Against this background, what has actually been done to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions? Although the topic has received a lot of public attention and a huge amount 
of diplomatic energy in international climate negotiations, so far only little has been 
done to mitigate global climate change. In 1992, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) established the objective of the stabilization 
of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous climate change (UNFCCC 1992). The Convention came into force two years 
later. By the end of 1997, the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention was 
negotiated (UNFCCC 1997). Subsequent negotiations filled in many of the agreement’s 
details. The treaty was completed by November 2001 and came into force in February 
2005. The Kyoto Protocol commits industrialized countries to reduce their greenhouse 
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gas emissions by 5.2% on average between 2008 and 2012 relative to the 1990 levels. 
Though it principally allows the commitments to be fulfilled economically through the 
use of flexible market-based mechanisms, the agreement has been criticized for several 
design faults: It imposes only short-term emission reduction targets for only a limited 
number of countries. Some of these countries are given ‘hot air’, i.e. targets that allow 
emissions beyond the business-as-usual scenario. Kyoto does not deter non-
participation and it does not promote compliance. As a consequence, the United States 
withdrew from the agreement and Canada is not complying with the agreement. A 
follow-up agreement was negotiated in Copenhagen at the end of 2009, the Copenhagen 
Accord. The Accord allows participating countries to express their emission reduction 
targets in a variety of ways. For example, developed countries pledged different 
reduction targets relative to different base years by 2020. The pledges of developing 
countries include reduction targets relative to business-as-usual projections, reductions 
in emissions per unit of gross domestic product, expansion in forest cover, and 
investments in energy efficiency. Though the Accord tries to overcome one of the 
critical shortcomings of Kyoto – the exclusion of developing countries – the agreement 
is not legally binding and the individual pledges cannot be expected to improve much 
upon unilateralism. The voluntary pledges of the participating countries were officially 
adopted at the subsequent climate conference in Cancún in December 2010. The 
negotiations of an international agreement that involves legally binding and long-term 
emission reduction targets were postponed.  
Many alternative climate policy architectures have been suggested. They try to 
overcome the Kyoto Protocol’s shortcomings, for example, by incorporating emission 
reduction targets that are modest in short-term but become more ambitious over time, 
mechanisms intended to increase developing country participation, and market-based 
instruments. Some proposals are quite radical and drop the approach of targets and 
timetables entirely. More recent proposals suggest bottom-up approaches, involving for 
example agreements between smaller groups of countries, sectoral agreements, or 
systems of smaller multi-track agreements (e.g. Baron et al. 2008, Barrett 2008, 
Bodansky 2010). The main problem is that the approaches seeking for cost-effective 
mitigation are unlikely to induce countries’ participation and compliance while the 
approaches addressing these issues are not cost-effective (Barrett and Stavins 2003). 
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Conceptual approach 
This thesis provides an experimental and theory based analysis of the voluntary 
provision of global public goods with a special focus on climate change mitigation. The 
conceptual approach is twofold: In a nutshell, the first conceptual dimension deals with 
games designed to simulate the climate change problem. The second dimension deals 
more broadly with other-regarding behavior which cannot be explained by the standard 
economic theory and which may be analyzed in experimental games. In the following, 
both dimensions will be explained in greater detail. 
The first conceptual dimension aims at analyzing strategies and outcomes in public 
good games. The game theoretical models on public good provision and international 
environmental agreements (IEA) constitute the backbone of this part by providing 
predictions of agents’ behavior. Climate change mitigation is usually modeled as an n-
player dilemma game, in which players decide on how much of a given endowment 
they want to contribute to the public good. The players in the games are the countries 
themselves as represented by their national governments. Countries are assumed to be 
monolithic actors that in most cases care only about their own payoff. Players in the 
games must choose a strategy which leads to a certain outcome and a certain payoff for 
each player. The payoffs are utility measures and can be thought of as being expressed 
in monetary terms or welfare. The players must act without knowing how the others will 
act but they do know the choice set, the payoffs associated with every outcome, and the 
preferences of all players. Furthermore, all of this is common knowledge. What makes 
the game a dilemma is that the unique Nash equilibrium, in which no player can do 
better by deviating unilaterally, is inefficient. Independently from the other players’ 
choices, it is the dominant strategy for each player to defect even though all players 
would be better off if they cooperated. 
Using the above game as baseline, the theoretical IEA literature models climate change 
mitigation usually as an n-player dilemma game with multiple stages. In the first stage, 
all countries choose whether to be a signatory to an IEA or not while the corresponding 
contributions to the public good are determined in subsequent stages. The essential 
feature of IEAs is that they must be self-enforcing because sovereign countries cannot 
be forced to sign an IEA. This feature is incorporated by the concept of internal and 
external stability. An IEA is internally stable if no signatory wants to leave the 
agreement unilaterally and it is externally stable if no non-signatory wants to join the 
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agreement unilaterally. The IEA literature also derives rather pessimistic predictions. If 
the difference in payoffs between the non-cooperative and full cooperative outcomes is 
large, only few countries are predicted to form a self-enforcing IEA. Hence, when the 
potential cooperative efficiency gains are large, a self-enforcing IEA may only 
marginally improve upon the non-cooperative outcome (e.g. Barrett 1994, Hoel 1992, 
Carraro and Siniscalco 1993). An IEA may attract more participants by lowering the 
public good provision required from the signatories. That is, an IEA which does not 
maximize the collective payoff by fully internalizing mutual benefits of the signatories 
but only partially internalizes benefits may be acceptable to more countries and thereby 
generate efficiency gains (Finus and Maus 2008). However, this setting does not allow 
countries to reach the social optimum. 
Differently from the above literature, climate change mitigation has been also modeled 
as a coordination game (Milinski et al. 2008). In this game players face abrupt and 
catastrophic climate change if their contributions to the public good fall short of a 
certain threshold. This game involves multiple equilibria including the full cooperative 
outcome. The difficulty for the players is, therefore, to coordinate on the efficient 
outcome rather than to cooperate. This problem is much easier to be solved than the 
above mentioned dilemma problem, particularly if the players have the opportunity to 
communicate. However, coordination may still be difficult if players differ in 
responsibility and wherewithal and for that reason cannot agree on fair burden sharing. 
Based on these theoretical considerations, the thesis presents different climate change 
mitigation games experimentally tested in the lab. Some models are directly tested 
while others are extended by certain design features. Inspired by real-world climate 
change negotiations, these added features include different institutions to determine the 
terms of an IEA, differences between players with respect to responsibility and 
wherewithal, and a non-binding ‘pledge and review’ mechanism. 
The second conceptual dimension of the thesis deals with the question what may drive 
voluntary contributions to public goods which go beyond the individually rational and 
selfish level. The underlying theoretical models in this part go beyond the standard 
assumption of payoff-maximizing actors and allow for ‘other-regarding’ or social 
preferences. For example, the models on inequity aversion assume that people suffer 
from differences between their own payoff and other people’s payoff (Fehr and Schmidt 
1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). The models on social norms assume that people 
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suffer from non-compliance with social norms and feel morally obliged to act in a 
certain way (Levitt and List 2007). The term ‘warm glow’ describes preferences, where 
individuals derive positive utility from the mere act of contributing (Andreoni 1990). 
The phenomenon of conditional cooperation predicts that individuals are more willing 
to contribute if they know that others contribute (Fischbacher et al. 2001). Although 
these models have been developed to explain the behavior of individuals, they may also 
be suited to capture the guiding principles or ‘preferences’ of countries. Governments 
form some kind of collective preference to reach a decision. This preference formation 
is a complex matter influenced by many factors like preferences of voters, delegates, 
and influential interest groups. It is not possible to describe and explain this complex 
process. In general, countries can be expected to act more selfishly than individuals. 
Most experiments find that groups are closer to the standard equilibrium choice than 
individuals (e.g. Bornstein et al. 2004, Gillet et al. 2009). Furthermore, social 
consciousness and social norms often occur within families, communities and societies. 
They are less distinct and, therefore, less likely to guide behavior in international 
relations. However, it seems reasonable to expect drivers of individual behavior to be 
guiding also government decisions to some extent.  
Based on these theoretical considerations, the thesis presents in this part different 
experiments which elicit social preferences and study the determinants of private 
contributions to public goods. The subjects in these experiments are not students but 
people involved in real-world climate change negotiations and citizens. As for the 
former – the experiment with climate negotiators – the aim is, on the one hand, to 
compare the climate negotiators’ behavior with student experiments. On the other hand, 
the experiment aims at investigating whether climate negotiators’ preferences differ 
between regions and whether the differences (if existent) help to explain different 
positions in international climate policy. As for the latter – the experiment with citizens 
– the aim is to examine the determinants of private contributions to public goods and to 
explore insights in the measurement of social preferences by economic experiments. 
Unlike all other chapters in this thesis, the public good examined in these experiments 
does not refer to climate change mitigation but to charitable donations. There are 
several reasons to do so: First, charitable donations, for example to development aid, are 
well suited to measure the willingness to contribute to a specific public good. In contrast, 
it is very difficult to elicit the individual willingness to pay for climate protection 
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because these contributions often take the form of behavior modifications, i.e. 
opportunity costs, instead of direct payments. Second, people are used to being asked 
for charitable donations, i.e. the decision about a donation is not new to them. Therefore, 
they are more likely to have existing and stable preferences which can be elicited in an 
experiment. Third, the purposes of charitable donations and climate change mitigation 
often coincide. Poverty reduction, protection of species, and emergency aid after natural 
disasters may serve as examples. Therefore, the analysis of charitable donations also 
provides some insights for the willingness to contribute to climate protection. 
The two conceptual dimensions of the thesis are inseparably interlinked: Standard 
economic theory assumes that players’ preferences coincide precisely with their own 
payoff and that players do not cooperate in games where free-riding on others’ efforts is 
possible. The assumption of other-regarding preferences changes the nature of the game. 
In the extreme case in which all players have a strong positive regard for the well-being 
of others the free-riding incentives disappear and the problem of non-cooperation does 
not exist. Any assumption between these two extremes produces a trade-off between the 
agents’ egoistic and the non-egoistic preference components. The consequences of this 
conflict for the climate change game are not clear and depend on the existence and 
weight of the preference components. The literature on the economics of international 
environmental agreements mostly assumes standard, i.e. purely egoistic, preferences. 
Exceptions include a preference for equity (Lange and Vogt 2003, Lange 2006, Kosfeld 
et al. 2009). A recent idea suggests that countries get a ‘warm-glow’ from contributing 
to solve the problem (Kolstad 2010). Which preference modeling approach is best 
suited to capture the guiding principles in international relations is ultimately an 
empirical question. This thesis aims at providing some information and data on these 
issues. 
 
Methodological approach 
In order to conduct the conceptually twofold analysis mentioned above, three different 
types of experiments are employed. First, conventional lab experiments with students 
constitute the basis of the analysis by providing insights into subjects’ behavior when 
facing a dilemma or coordination problem. They show the consequences arising from 
real (and possibly other-regarding) preferences for the ability to solve the dilemma or 
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coordination problem. The general result is that, depending on the problem and the 
available institutions, the achieved degree of cooperation and coordination does not 
always correspond to the theoretically predicted level. This suggests that there are 
forces driving the behavior that are not captured by standard economic theory. But do 
these forces also guide the behavior of countries? We do not know and probably never 
will. The nearest we can come to answering that question is to run experiments with 
governments, delegates, and voters. Therefore, the second type of experiments 
presented in this thesis is an online experiment with delegates involved in climate 
negotiations. It is one of the very few studies using real-world relevant decision makers 
as experimental subjects (e.g. Bohm 1997a, 1997b, Bohm and Carlén 1999, Fatas et al. 
2007). For many reasons, experiments with real decision makers are particularly hard to 
carry out but they provide valuable insight into the question if and how the behavior of 
students and that of decision makers vary. The delegates in this experiment show social 
preferences similar to those observed in comparable student experiments. However, the 
results also indicate that these individual preferences for fairness are more pronounced 
than the expected collective preferences of countries. Third, framed field experiments 
with citizens drawn from a random sample of a German city complete the 
methodological approach. The behavior of these subjects is also in the range of 
comparable student experiments. These experiments confirm that it is at least plausible 
to assume that countries do not only care about their own self-interest but also to some 
extent about the well-being of other countries. 
Two broad branches of experimental literature are related to this thesis. The first branch 
includes public goods game while the second includes all games designed to elicit and 
examine other-regarding preferences. In the following, I will give a short overview of 
both areas. 
The first branch of experimental literature includes public goods games and all 
variations of that game. In the last few years, hundreds of public goods experiments 
have been conducted to better understand the free-rider problem and the institutions 
which may solve it. These experiments may be classified as first-generation, second-
generation, and third-generation (Rockenbach and Wolff 2009). In the first generation 
of experiments, subjects were exogenously exposed to the experimenter-determined 
rules. The most prominent rule features examined include punishment opportunities (e.g. 
Fehr and Gächter 2000), communication (e.g. Brosig et al. 2003), leadership (e.g. Sturm 
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and Weimann 2008), and reputation opportunities (e.g. Milinski et al. 2006). The 
general finding in these studies is that in the standard version of the game cooperation 
starts out being relatively high in the first periods of repeated play but deteriorates 
thereafter. However, the introduction of certain rule features, such as punishment or 
communication, can boost cooperation even if they should not have an effect according 
to the standard theory. The second generation of public goods experiments examines the 
acceptance of different experimenter-given institutions. The first type of studies 
analyzes the self-selection of individuals into groups with an exogenously given 
institution. These experiments demonstrate that individuals voting with their feet 
between different institutional frameworks can considerably increase efficiency in 
public goods provision (e.g. Gürerk et al. 2006, Rockenbach and Milinski 2006). The 
second type considers fixed groups that self-select the institution that shall apply to their 
interaction. These studies show that endogenously imposed institutions work better than 
identical, but exogenously imposed institutions (e.g. Tyran and Feld 2006, Sutter et al. 
2010). In the third generation of public goods experiments, subjects act as lawmakers 
empowered to freely shape the institutional environment of the game (e.g. Rockenbach 
and Wolff 2009). As this generation of experiments is still in its infancy, it is difficult to 
derive a general conclusion. It seems that there is no clear ‘winner’ institution, though 
subjects make extensive use of punishment. 
All these public goods experiments provide illuminating insights into the provision of 
public goods, as well as the development and performance of different institutions. 
They show that, even though the number of players is limited and disturbing effects 
outside the game are suppressed in the lab, the mere existence of free-riding 
possibilities prevent players from reaching the social optimum. At the same time, the 
experiments show, for example, that punishment is an important facet of human 
behavior, which potentially secures the provision of many public goods, even if it is not 
credible from a theoretical viewpoint. Similarly, communication has been shown to 
work, even if it is ‘cheap talk’. However, not all of these findings can be applied to 
climate change mitigation. For example, most of the first-generation public goods 
experiments with punishment implement one-way sanctions without counter-
punishment opportunities. In real-world negotiations, sanctions can only be 
implemented if countries voluntarily accept them. Other punishment opportunities, such 
as trade restrictions or import tariffs, are difficult to implement for many reasons, 
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including impracticability and legitimacy, and they may provoke retaliatory measures. 
The second-generation experiments which examine collective rule choices by voting-
with-feet or ballot voting do not capture the provision of global public goods because no 
country can leave the planet and no country can be forced to accept institutional 
decisions of a majority or even to take part in the negotiations. Similarly, the third-
generation experiments cover global public goods only insofar the endogenously 
developed institutions are in line with customary international law. Summing up, the 
economics of climate change, the sovereignty of countries, and the customary 
international law constitute the rules of the game. These basic conditions are fixed at 
any point in time. Therefore, countries have only a limited number of strategies 
available including pledges, voluntary contributions, and the formation of coalitions, 
which are all subject of this thesis. In the long run it may be possible to change the 
economics of climate change and the nature of the game for example by adaptation and 
technological progress. But this shall not be discussed in this thesis. 
The second branch of experimental literature related to this thesis includes studies 
addressing the question whether social preferences measured in experiments are 
predictive of behavior in other games or other contexts. There are three different types 
of studies: First, several lab experiments use context-free games to measure individual 
social preferences and relate the observed behavior to the performance in another 
context-free game by means of within-subject tests (e.g. Ashraf et al. 2006, Blanco et al. 
forthcoming, Brosig et al. 2007). These studies mostly test theories of other-regarding 
behavior. The experimental results are mixed indicating that individual behavior is not 
reliably consistent across games. The second type of studies deals with the 
consequences of context for decision making within economic experiments. These 
studies aim, for example, at comparing dictator game allocations with charitable 
donations (e.g. Eckel and Grossman 1996, Bettinger and Slonim 2006, Brañas-Garza 
2006). They generally find that people give more to charities than to peers in a dictator 
game. Other studies in this class compare behavior in context-free social dilemma 
games with contributions to naturally occurring public goods using within-subject tests 
(e.g. Laury and Taylor 2008, de Oliveira et al. 2008). The experimental results indicate 
that cooperative behavior across multiple contexts tends to be stable, albeit the relation 
is not always incontrovertible. The third type of studies tests whether individual other-
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regarding behavior in the lab and in the field correlates (e.g. Benz and Meier 2008, Fehr 
and Leibbrandt 2008, Carpenter and Myers 2010) which often is the case. 
All these experiments confirm that a substantial share of experimental subjects does not 
act selfishly, but shares their endowment, rewards pro-social behavior, and contributes 
to public goods. More importantly, they test whether other-regarding preferences are 
stable across games or contexts. The results are ambiguous indicating the complexity 
and sensitivity of preferences but also the difficulty to elicit ‘true’ preferences by simple 
experimental games. The thesis adds to this literature by analyzing other-regarding 
preferences of climate negotiators and citizens. These subject pools allow for 
investigating socio-economic characteristics such as age, education, religion and – in 
case of the climate negotiators – nationality as potential determinants of other-regarding 
preferences. Moreover, the thesis contributes to a methodological improvement in the 
elicitation of preferences by demonstrating the difference between existing and 
constructed preferences. 
 
Structure of the dissertation 
This dissertation comprises a selection of essays on the provision of global public goods 
and the elicitation of other-regarding preferences with a special focus on climate change 
mitigation. Each chapter provides a stand-alone analysis featuring an introduction to the 
research question of interest, the contribution to existing literature and the 
methodological approach. The majority of essays was written in collaboration with co-
authors and simultaneously prepared for submission to academic journals. Against this 
background, a schematic overview of the thesis (including employed methodology, co-
authors, and status of submission) is provided in Table 1.1 subsequent to the 
introduction. The dissertation is structured along two thematic lines: Following this 
introduction, Part I presents the results of three lab experiments simulating the climate 
change mitigation problem: Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 analyze a dilemma game and test 
theory on the formation of coalitions with different institutions. These institutions are 
compared to a standard voluntary contribution mechanism and institutions that govern 
not only coalition members but all players. Chapter 4 examines a coordination game in 
which players face catastrophic climate change damage if their emission abatement falls 
short of a certain threshold. Players in this game differ with respect to wealth and 
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responsibility and they have the opportunity to communicate via non-binding pledges. 
Part II examines other-regarding preferences as a motivation to contribute to public 
goods: Chapter 5 presents the results of an online experiment that elicits the social 
preferences of climate negotiators. The negotiators’ behavior is compared to 
corresponding student behavior. The experiment, furthermore, focuses on cross-country 
differences between negotiators. Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 present the results of a framed 
field experiment with residents of Mannheim, Germany, in which subjects had the 
opportunity to donate for various charitable purposes. Using a non-student subject pool 
allows the analysis of socio-economic variables as potential determinants of the 
willingness to contribute to a public good. Chapter 6 examines how providing potential 
donors with information about the revenues of a charity affects charitable contributions. 
It adds to the literature by analyzing the effects of third-party contributions on one’s 
own contribution to a public good. Chapter 7 compares subjects’ donation decisions 
with their behavior in a conventional dictator game and, therewith, adds to the literature 
examining the stability of preferences across games and contexts. This chapter also 
provides some methodological insights by suggesting an explanation why experimental 
subjects often do not behave consistently across games. As the closing section of this 
thesis, Chapter 8 summarizes its central findings and concludes.  
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Table 1.1: Schematic overview of the dissertation 
Part Chapter Method Co-Authors Status 
I. 
Climate 
change 
mitigation 
games 
The formation of 
international 
environmental agreements 
Lab 
experiment 
Andreas Lange 
(University of Hamburg) 
Bodo Sturm 
(HTWK Leipzig) 
NBER working paper
Voting in international 
environmental agreements 
Lab 
experiment – 
Forthcoming in: 
Strategic Behavior 
and the Environment
The role of inequality and 
pledges in a climate 
change coordination game 
Lab 
experiment 
Andreas Löschel 
(ZEW Mannheim) 
Alessandro Tavoni 
(LSE London) 
Forthcoming in: 
Proceedings of the 
National Academy of 
Sciences 
II. 
Other-
regarding 
preferences 
The social preferences of 
climate negotiators 
Online 
experiment 
Bodo Sturm 
(HTWK Leipzig) 
Carsten Vogt 
(HS Bochum) 
Published in: 
Environmental and 
Resource Economics
The effects of third-party 
input on voluntary public 
goods contributions 
Framed 
field 
experiment 
Bodo Aretz 
(ZEW Mannheim) 
Sarah Borgloh 
(ZEW Mannheim) 
ZEW working paper
The construction of social 
preferences in experiments 
Framed 
field 
experiment 
Bodo Aretz 
(ZEW Mannheim) 
Sarah Borgloh 
(ZEW Mannheim) 
ZEW working paper
 
  
 Part I 
Climate change mitigation games 
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2 The formation of international environmental agreements 
2.1 Introduction 
The provision of global public goods relies on voluntary contributions and international 
cooperation. In the absence of enforcement mechanisms to deter countries from free-
riding, it is challenging to design institutions that facilitate the provision of public goods 
while also being voluntarily accepted by the relevant countries. Climate change policy 
serves as one of the most prominent examples. After decade long negotiations countries 
still debate the right way to move forward: to have negotiations involving all or many 
countries, to establish smaller coalitions that formulate their own agreements or just 
lower the requirements to achieve unanimous decisions. International environmental 
agreements (IEA), for example, may be ratified by only a subset of countries: While 
some countries form a coalition to cooperate, others may free-ride on the coalition's 
efforts. The game theory literature usually models IEAs as an n-country dilemma game 
with multiple stages. In the first stage, all countries choose whether to be a signatory to 
an IEA or not. In the second stage, signatories determine their emission abatement 
levels with the objective of maximizing their collective payoff. In the third stage non-
signatories choose their abatement levels independently with the goal of maximizing 
their individual payoff. If the underlying game involves dominant strategies, the final 
two stages could also be turned into a single stage because signatories cannot influence 
the behavior of the non-signatories by choosing a certain action. The essential feature of 
IEAs is that they must be self-enforcing because sovereign countries cannot be forced to 
sign an IEA. This feature is incorporated by the concept of internal and external stability. 
An IEA is internally stable if no signatory would like to leave the agreement unilaterally. 
It is externally stable, if no non-signatory would like to join the agreement unilaterally. 
Forming an IEA thereby involves (at least) two challenges: On the one hand, the 
institutional arrangement needs to attract members to the coalition (‘extensive margin’). 
On the other hand, any given coalition should be able to internalize the mutual benefits 
among its members, i.e. increase the provision of the global public good (‘intensive 
margin’). In this chapter, the abilities of different institutions to address these two issues 
are compared. Theory on the formation of coalitions is tested in a laboratory experiment 
and we compare the resulting provision level of the public good with those achieved by 
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institutions that do not allow for the formation of subgroups, like a voluntary 
contribution mechanism.  
The experiment is guided by a series of theoretical papers on IEA formation (Barrett 
1994, Hoel 1992, Carraro and Siniscalco 1993) that was inspired by theories on cartel 
formation (d’Aspremont et al. 1983). The IEA literature derives rather pessimistic 
predictions: As individual countries have a strong incentive to free-ride on the provision 
of the public goods by others, only a few countries are predicted to form a coalition 
when the coalition maximizes the mutual benefits of its members. Consequently, no 
substantial efficiency gains compared to a voluntary contributions mechanism are 
predicted. Finus and Maus (2008) suggest that a coalition can attract more members by 
lowering the required public good provision levels. That is, an IEA that only partially 
internalizes the mutual benefits among its signatories, may be acceptable to more 
countries and thereby generate efficiency gains. This leads to a trade-off between the 
extensive and intensive margin, i.e. between the number of signatories and the degree to 
which they internalize their benefits and provide the global public good. This chapter 
provides a first experimental test of this literature. 
The extent to which different institutions within IEAs are able to generate gains in the 
provision of global public goods along the intensive and extensive margins has so far 
not received much attention in the experimental literature. Most experiments involve 
some form of voting to determine whether a coalition is to be implemented, but do not 
allow coalition members to negotiate and to agree on a (possibly suboptimal) effort 
level. 
Burger and Kolstad (2009) consider a ten-person linear public goods game with binary 
choice where subjects must allocate either all or none of their endowment to the public 
good. They introduce a coalition formation mechanism where subjects start the game by 
electing to either join the coalition or not. After being informed about the coalition size, 
all coalition members vote to determine the joint action. If a majority votes to contribute 
the coalition’s entire endowment is allocated to the public good; otherwise the 
endowment is allocated to private consumption. The coalition cannot subdivide its 
collective endowment. The experiment demonstrates that the possibility to form a 
coalition increases the overall provision of the public good. Contrary to theory, the 
coalition size increases with higher return on the public good. 
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Kosfeld et al. (2009) use a four-person linear public goods game with three stages. In 
the first stage, each player decides whether to participate in a costly organization or not. 
After being informed about the numbers of players willing to participate, each 
participant decides whether to implement the organization. Using a unanimity rule, the 
organization is only implemented if all participants agree with the implementation. In 
the final stage, members of the organization are bound to contribute their full 
endowment to the public good if the organization has been implemented before and they 
are free in their choice if the organization has not been implemented before. Non-
members are free to choose the amount of their contributions independently from the 
implementation of the organization. An additional control treatment (presented in the 
web appendix) allows for non-compliance in the contribution stage: Members are free 
in their contribution decision, even if the organization has been implemented before, but 
face an effective punishment if they do not contribute everything to the public good. 
The experimental results show that the possibility to form a coalition enhances social 
welfare. However, players are unwilling to form coalitions which govern only a subset 
of players, even if these rejections are costly. Therefore, most of the implemented 
coalitions are grand coalitions. 
McEvoy et al. (2010) consider a ten-person linear public goods game with a coalition 
formation mechanism where members have the possibility to violate their contribution 
commitments. The control treatment with costless enforcement of members’ 
compliance involves only one stage in which each player decides whether to join a 
coalition or not. Members contribute one indivisible unit to the public good if the 
coalition size is equal or greater than the theoretically stable size; otherwise they do not 
contribute. Non-members do not contribute to the public good independent of there 
being a coalition or not. Two stages are added to the treatments with costly enforcement 
of compliance. Provided that enough subjects have entered the coalition, coalition 
members must decide whether to comply with the agreement, i.e. contribute to the 
public good, or not. Non-compliant members face a sanction (in expected values) in the 
final stage. Contrary to theory, costly enforcement of compliance leads to lower public 
good provision than costless enforcement. The frequency of coalition formation and the 
overall provision of the public good, however, increase if all subjects are required to 
join a coalition for it to form. 
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The present experiment is also related to a number of recent studies dealing with the 
theme of how institutions can improve efficiency in social dilemmas. The first branch of 
this literature studies the self-selection of individuals into groups with an exogenously 
given institution. These experiments demonstrate that individuals voting with their feet 
between different institutional frameworks can considerably increase efficiency in 
public goods provision (Gürerk et al. 2006, Rockenbach and Milinski 2006).1  The 
second branch considers fixed groups that self-select the institution that shall apply to 
their interaction. These studies show that endogenously determined institutions work 
better than identical but exogenously determined institutions (Tyran and Feld 2006, 
Sutter et al. 2010). However, participation in these institutions is not voluntary. 
The experiment presented in this chapter tests the ability of three different institutions to 
attract members. They all involve an initial decision of players to join or abstain from a 
coalition, i.e. the agreement allows for partial and voluntary participation. The 
institutions differ in the way public good provision is required from members of the 
coalition: First, a setting where coalition members are exogenously bound to fully 
internalize their mutual benefits is considered. This treatment directly tests the IEA 
literature (e.g. Barrett 1994). The second treatment considers if lowering the 
institutional requirements from coalition members, e.g. reducing the required public 
good provision level, can attract more members and thereby lead to efficiency gains 
(thereby testing Finus and Maus 2008). The third treatment considers an institution in 
which members can each suggest a minimum public good provision level. The smallest 
suggested level is then binding for all members. This idea of players agreeing on the 
smallest common denominator closely follows many real world IEAs. International 
agreements often codify uniform obligations among countries (Barrett 2003) and, since 
each participating country needs to sign and ratify the agreement, the player with the 
smallest proposal is pivotal. Any country can, however, voluntarily go beyond its 
obligations.  
These different institutions on coalition formation are compared with institutions that 
involve all players: a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) and a mechanism in 
which all players are subject to the minimum proposal institution, i.e. participation is 
                                                 
1 Similar results are provided by experiments that allow the subjects to change the group membership by 
regrouping, expulsion or other mechanisms (e.g. Page et al. 2005, Cinyabuguma et al. 2005, Brosig et al. 
2005, Charness and Yang 2008). 
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exogenous. Orzen (2008) studies the latter institution in a repeated four-person public 
good game and finds that it is very effective, often reaching full efficiency in the final 
period.  
All treatments consider a payoff structure that is linear in the total public good provision 
level, but non-linear in the individual contributions. At the individual level, this reflects 
increasing marginal provision costs to the public good which may arise from budget 
constraints, i.e. decreasing marginal utility from numeraire consumption. This 
specification allows a direct test of the above mentioned IEA literature. The experiment 
confirms the rather pessimistic conclusions from the theory: Only few players form a 
coalition and only minor efficiency gains relative to the VCM result when members are 
required to fully internalize their mutual benefits. Contrary to theory, coalitions that try 
to reduce the free-riding incentives by requiring less provision from their members, 
cannot attract additional members. That is, the predicted trade-off between intensive and 
extensive margin generally fails. However, efficiency gains occur from larger coalition 
sizes when coalition members can each suggest a minimum contribution level with the 
smallest common denominator being binding. The experiment thereby shows that the 
way how terms of an IEA are reached matters for the acceptance of such an agreement. 
More agents are willing to enter the coalition when they have a possibility to influence 
the public good provisions requirements in the coalition. The experimental results are 
thereby in line with findings in the literature that show that endogenizing institutional 
features improves upon public good provision compared to exogenously implemented 
institutions. The experiment however shows an advantage of endogenous institutions 
that has not received much attention so far: They increase the willingness to join if 
participation is voluntary. However, not all players participate in the coalition. The 
coalition structure therefore suffers from manifesting inequality between insiders and 
outsiders and thereby lowers the willingness of signatories to provide the global public 
good. In contrast, the smallest common denominator structure frequently achieves close 
to efficient public good provision levels when it involves all players.  
The results of the experiment have implications for public policy. Forming IEAs to 
provide global public goods can be beneficial compared to just relying on voluntary 
contributions from individual countries. However, the terms of institutionalizing the 
provision requirements from signatories are crucial for the capacity to attract members: 
Following an exogenous rule that specifies the required contribution levels from 
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members (full or partial internalization of benefits) is less effective in inducing players 
to join the coalition than an institution that allows potential cooperators to endogenously 
determine the rules. If agents are only bound to the smallest common denominator, 
more players are willing to accept the coalition. While these institutions with partial 
coverage can thereby generate efficiency gains, it appears worthwhile to explore an 
institutional setting in which all agents participate in making minimum proposals.2 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 provides a short 
theory of coalition formation and public goods provision which generates the 
predictions for the experiment. The experimental design is reported in Section 2.3, 
before results are presented in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 finally concludes.  
 
2.2 Theoretical background 
A world is considered with 1,...,i n  identical players (countries) with utility functions 
of the form 
i iu y Q           (2.1) 
where iy  is a numeraire, 1
n
jj
Q q   represents the total provision level of the global 
public good and   denotes the (constant) marginal utility from the public good. Players 
can allocate their initial income w  to consumption or global public good provision iq  
with the budget constraint given by 
2
i iy q w           (2.2) 
The payoff structure given by (2.1) and (2.2) is used to derive analytic predictions for 
the experiment.3 Throughout this chapter, interior solutions which requires / 2w n  
are assumed. 
                                                 
2 The institution could formally be made incentive-compatible by requiring players to deposit a bond 
covering the level of their own minimum proposal. When the smallest common denominator is 
determined the difference between this bond and the binding minimum can be returned. Agents have an 
incentive to carry out their obligations in order to regain their deposit. For a possible implementation of 
such a deposit mechanism, see Gerber and Wichard (2009).  
3 This specification deviates from a large part of the literature on voluntary public good provision which 
largely considers linear provision costs and implies a dominant strategy of giving zero in the Nash 
equilibrium such that any variance in the data could mistakenly be interpreted as altruism (Ledyard 1995). 
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2.2.1 Voluntary contribution mechanism and social optimum 
Individual utility maximization immediately yields the individual Nash provision level 
2NEiq   with the total contributions given by 2NEQ n . It should be noted that the 
Nash equilibrium involves a dominant strategy such that each player’s actions do not 
depend on the provision levels chosen by the remaining players. The social optimum 
maximizes total payoff and is given by 2SOiq n  ( 2maxSOi qq n q nq     ) and 
2 2SOQ n  .  
The IEA institutions all involve two stages. In the first stage, each player decides about 
participation in the coalition. The set of players who are members of the coalition is 
denoted by S  with k  ( nk 1 ) being its size. In the second stage, the global public 
good is provided. Non-members are free to choose their public good provision level. 
Due to the assumed linearity of the public good, their payoff-maximizing decision does 
not depend on the coalition efforts and is again given by 2NCiq  . For the choice of 
public good provision by the k  signatories to the IEA in this second stage, different 
institutions are compared. 
 
2.2.2 Payoff maximizing coalition 
If members of the coalition fully internalize their mutual benefits, the payoff-
maximizing individual provision level given coalition size k  is 2/)( kkqCi   
( 2( ) maxCi qq k q kq     ) for all members of the coalition. This treatment is denoted 
by ‘COALfull’. 
 
2.2.3 Partial internalization of benefits inside the coalition 
This setting assumes that members of the coalition are not able to fully internalize their 
mutual benefits, but only internalize at a ratio of 1  . That is, the provision level 
given coalition size k  is 2/),( kkqCi    for all members of the coalition. This 
                                                                                                                                               
Differently, the non-linear structure used here generates positive Nash contributions. It corresponds to the 
utility function that has been used in a large part of the IEA literature (e.g. Carraro and Siniscalco 1993, 
Barrett 1994) 
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institution has been suggested by Finus and Maus (2008) and is denoted by 
‘COALpartial’. 
 
2.2.4 Smallest common denominator inside the coalition 
This setting finally considers an institution for negotiations inside the coalition that 
splits the second stage into to steps: First, members of the coalition are requested to 
suggest a minimum public good provision level. Second, after these minimum proposals 
min
iq  are received from all participating parties, the agreement will require all 
signatories to provide at least the smallest suggested level minmin j S jq . That is, 
signatories are bound to provide min minmini j S jq q q  . This institution is denoted by 
‘COALmin’. 
When limited to provide min minmini j S jq q q  , the individually payoff-maximizing 
provision level at this last stage is clearly given by minmax , / 2iq q      as no player 
has an incentive to provide more than is required if minq  exceeds the individual’s 
payoff-maximizing level. When making their minimum proposal miniq , the signatories 
therefore need to recognize their potential impact on the provision levels of all k  
members of the coalition. Note that this implies that a player should suggest a minimum 
provision level of min / 2iq k  if all other players in the coalition suggest min / 2jq k  
as suggesting a smaller level would lower the binding minimum and hence negatively 
affect profits. With the same logic, a player should not propose a minimum below 
min
,min j S j i jq   if some other player suggests 
min / 2jq k . It follows that it is a weakly 
dominant strategy for a player to suggest min / 2iq k . However, there are other 
equilibria in weakly dominated strategies: Any binding minimum min / 2q k  is 
established as equilibrium if at least two players suggest that level while other players 
suggest a larger minimum.  
In summary, if players inside the coalition are requested to suggest a minimum 
provision level and negotiations implement the smallest minimum level as a binding 
provision level, the collective optimum is obtained in weakly dominant strategies. Any 
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other provision level  / 2, / 2q k   for each player can be sustained as a subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium. This logic immediately implies that the equilibrium in the 
minimum stage inside coalition coincides with the full internalization (COALfull) if all 
agents play weakly dominant strategies. Furthermore, it implies that the social optimum 
can be reached in weakly dominant strategies if all players participate in the minimum 
stage. This prediction will be explicitly tested in the experiment by combining a 
voluntary contribution mechanism with the minimum stage in one treatment 
(‘VCMmin’). 
In general, however, players may not be able to coordinate on their collective optimum 
and may implement other equilibria instead. For any given coalition, those would 
correspond to only a partial internalization of mutual benefits and therefore would 
endogenously determine some internalization factor 1   as discussed in COALpartial. 
 
2.2.5 Membership game 
Let us now turn to the decisions of players in the first stage, i.e. the choice joining the 
coalition or not. All the second stage institutions for deciding the provision level inside 
the coalition lead to specific incentives of players to join the coalition. Consequently, 
different coalition sizes may result. The results are discussed in turn. 
In general, the payoff to members of the coalition given a coalition size of k  and 
institution I  shall be denoted by ( , )C k I , the payoff to non-members shall be denoted 
by ( , )NC k I . Using the terminology from the IEA literature (Barrett 1994, Carraro and 
Siniscalco 1993), a coalition of size k  is externally stable if no non-member has an 
incentive to join unilaterally, i.e. if ( , ) ( 1, )NC Ck I k I    .4 The coalition of size k  is 
internally stable if no member has an incentive to leave unilaterally, i.e. if 
( , ) ( 1, )C NCk I k I    .  
For the institutions COALfull and COALpartial the following result can be derived: A 
coalition that is internally and externally stable satisfies  
                                                 
4 It is assumed that a player would join the coalition if he or she is indifferent as this increases payoffs to 
all other agents.  
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2 3 2k 
   and 2 3 21k 
   . 
The proof involves a straightforward comparison of payoffs which follow from (2.1) 
and (2.2) with  
2 2( , ) [ ( / 2) [ / 2 ( ) / 2]C k k k n k             
and  
2 2( 1, ) ( / 2) [ ( 1) / 2 ( 1) / 2]NC k k n k              . 
For the standard coalition game (COALfull) in which the coalition fully internalizes 
their mutual benefits ( 1  ), this implies that only 3 players form the coalition ( 3k  ). 
Figure 2.1 shows how the predicted size of stable coalitions depends on  . The 
decreasing relation corresponds to a trade-off between intensive and extensive margins: 
For example, coalitions of 6k   players could be stabilized for 0.5   while only 3 
players form a coalition when mutual benefits are fully internalized. The increased 
coalition size can thereby also generate efficiency gains, i.e. increases in total payoff to 
all agents and in the payoff to the average coalition member. The example of 6k   and 
0.5   illustrates this result: Compared to the 3k   solution when 1  , the same 
total provision level results while the provision efforts are being distributed across more 
players. Due to the increasing marginal provision costs, gains in total payoffs result.  
Let us now consider the institution in which members can make their minimum 
suggestion (COALmin). Since the weakly dominant strategy in the subgame following 
the membership decision involves full internalization of mutual benefits, the only 
subgame perfect equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies equals the 3k   result in 
COALfull. However, other equilibria exist in the minimum stage that lead to less than 
full internalization (  / 2, / 2q k  . As a result, potentially larger coalition sizes could 
be stabilized. To see this, the incentive of a player to leave a coalition is considered. The 
equilibrium contribution levels that result in a coalition S  is denoted by 
 ( ) / 2, / 2q S k  . The payoff to a player i  inside coalition S  of size k  is given by 
2( , ) ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ]C NCS COALmin q S kq S n k q           
and compares to a payoff when leaving the coalition of 
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2( \{ }, ) ( ) [( 1) ( \{ }) ( 1) ]NC NC NCS i COALmin q k q S i n k q        .   
The payoff to members of the coalition is increasing in  ( ) / 2, / 2q S k  , while the 
payoff to player i  when leaving the coalition is increasing in ( \{ })q S i . That is, the 
incentive to leave a coalition depends how much free-riding will be punished by the 
remaining members through a reduction of ( \{ })q S i . The multiplicity of equilibria in 
the contribution stage hereby allows stabilizing any coalition size. For example, the 
grand coalition is stabilized when players choose the following subgame-perfect 
strategies: (i) all agents coordinate on the full internalization in the grand coalition, 
while (ii) in all smaller coalitions players suggest the minimum contribution at the Nash 
level ( min / 2q  ).5  
To sum up, in the coalition game in which negotiating parties agree to implement 
provision obligations at the smallest minimum level suggested by a member of the 
coalition, the social optimum in a grand coalition (as well as any other coalition size) 
can be stabilized in a subgame perfect equilibrium. The only equilibrium in weakly 
dominant strategies corresponds to the coalition game in which three members fully 
internalize their mutual benefits. While not allowing precise predictions, the multiplicity 
of equilibria in this minimum proposal game gives one reason to explicitly test the 
behavior of players in an experimental setting. The next sections therefore turn to an 
experimental test of the institutions described above, in particular comparing institutions 
that exogenously fix the internalization inside coalitions (COALfull and COALpartial) 
with the endogenously determined institutional requirements in COALmin. 
 
2.3 Experimental design 
The experiment was designed to test the different institutions on coalition formation 
within a ten-person public good setting. The payoff function for each player was given 
by 2 2
1
n
i i i jj
q Q q q           with 10 , 10n  and ]100,...,0[iq  and was 
common knowledge. We begin with the traditional ‘VCM’ as a control treatment. Three 
coalition formation treatments introduced a first ‘coalition stage’ in which subjects 
                                                 
5 Coalitions that do not include all players may complicate coordination. This could for example be 
caused by inequality concerns (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Lange and Vogt 2003). 
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needed to decide on participating in the institution. Decisions to join a coalition were 
made simultaneously and independently. Following this coalition stage, subjects played 
their contribution game. In treatment COALfull, the members’ contributions to the 
public good were exogenously fixed at the level that fully internalized their respective 
mutual benefits onto each other, while in treatment COALpartial they only internalized 
50% of their mutual benefits, i.e. 0.5  . Non-members in both treatments were free to 
set their contributions at any level. Treatment COALmin introduced an intermediate 
stage: After being told the number of subjects in the coalition, all members of the 
coalition negotiate about the minimum contribution that each member should contribute 
to the public good (minimum stage). Negotiations take the form that all participants 
simultaneously and independently proposed a minimum amount between 0 and 100. 
The smallest proposed amount then became the binding lower limit for the contributions 
of all coalition members. Members were informed about all proposed minimum 
amounts (arranged in descending order). Non-members did not make any decision in 
this stage and were only informed about the coalition size. In the contribution stage, 
members and non-members chose the amount of their contributions to the public good. 
While non-members could freely choose their contributions, members’ contributions 
were bound to provide at least the binding minimum. Finally, we implemented a 
treatment VCMmin in which all subjects took part in the negotiation about a minimum 
contribution. Players first simultaneously and independently proposed a minimum 
amount between 0 and 100. The smallest proposed amount then became the binding 
lower limit for the contributions of all players. Players were informed about all 
proposed minimum amounts (arranged in descending order). In the contribution stage, 
all players simultaneously and independently determined the amount of their 
contribution to the public good which had to be equal or greater than the binding 
minimum. Table 2.1 summarizes the key features of the experimental design and the 
number of participants in each session.  
The experiment was run in May and July 2009 at the MaxLab laboratory at the 
University of Magdeburg, Germany. In total, 500 students participated in the 
experiment, whereby 100 subjects took part in each treatment. No subject participated 
in more than one treatment. Sessions lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. Twenty 
subjects were recruited for each session. Each subject was seated at linked computer 
terminals that were used to transmit all decision and payoff information. The Z-tree 
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software (Fischbacher 2007) was used for programming and ORSEE (Greiner 2004) for 
recruiting. Once the individuals were seated and logged into the terminals, a set of 
instructions and a record sheet were handed out. Experimental instructions included 
several numerical examples and control questions in order to ensure that all subjects 
understood the games. The sessions each consisted of 12 rounds, the first two being 
practice. The subjects were instructed that the practice rounds would not affect earnings. 
At the beginning of the experiment subjects were randomly assigned to groups of ten. 
The subjects were not aware of whom they were grouped with, but they did know that 
they remained within the same group of players throughout the rounds (partner 
matching). At the end of the experiment, one of non-practice rounds was chosen at 
random as the round that would determine earnings with an exchange rate between Euro 
and token of 1:100. On average, a subject earned €10.68 in the games which is slightly 
above the average hourly wage for student jobs. Additionally, all subjects received 
€1.00 as show-up fee.6 
 
2.4 Experimental results 
This section tests the theoretical predictions regarding public good contribution levels 
across the different institutions.  
 
2.4.1 Contribution and payoff levels 
The results summary is crafted by both pooling the data across all periods and reporting 
treatment differences in the first five and last five periods. The effects of time on 
contribution schedules are later explored in more detail. Table 2.2 provides mean 
contribution and payoff levels for each treatment and Figure 2.2 provides a graphical 
depiction of the data. The left panel presents the average contribution levels across 
treatments and the right panel reports the resulting average payoff levels. As can be seen 
from the table and figures, contribution levels in the standard coalition game COALfull 
do not exceed those in the VCM (12.1 vs. 12.3 tokens). Average contributions in the 
COALpartial treatment are smaller (8.5 tokens) such that the hypothesized efficiency 
                                                 
6 Overall, 9 out of 500 subjects earned negative payoffs in the games. In these cases, payoffs were cut off 
at zero and the subjects only received the show-up fee. 
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gains do not materialize. Combining the coalition formation framework or the VCM 
with a minimum stage, however, increases average contributions (14.8 and 22.1 tokens).  
These differences are confirmed by a series of Mann-Whitney tests with the average 
contribution or payoff by one group across all periods being taken as the unit of 
observation: VCM gives larger contributions than COALpartial (1% significance), less 
than the COALmin (10% significance), and less than VCMmin (10% significance). The 
standard coalition model COALfull gives lower contributions than COALmin and 
VCMmin (5% and 10% significance, respectively). Similar comparisons follow for the 
average payoff, i.e. the efficiency level of the respective institutions (see also Table 
2.2): VCM performs better than COALpartial (1% significance) and worse than 
COALmin, and VCMmin (5% and 10% significance respectively). COALpartial 
performs worse than all other institutions (1% significance each) and COALfull 
performs worse than VCMmin (10% significance).  
In summary, average contribution and payoff levels in the coalition formation game do 
not exceed those in the VCM if the coalition fully internalizes mutual benefits. If the 
coalition partially internalizes the mutual benefits, average contributions and payoffs are 
even lower than those in the VCM. If negotiations among coalition members are 
facilitated through a smallest common denominator rule, average contributions to the 
public good increase. The smallest common denominator rule best facilitates public 
good provision when involving all agents. Further evidence for these findings can be 
found through a series of linear regression models as illustrated in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. 
Averaged across all periods, the minimum institutions (VCMmin and COALmin) 
perform significantly better than the VCM (1% significance), while the partial 
internalization in the coalition formation structure leads to lower contributions (1% 
significance). 
Figure 2.3 indicates that the contributions in the VCM are decreasing over time, they are 
smaller in the last 5 periods than in the initial 5 periods (see also Table 2.2). This 
downward trend which has been observed in many other experimental settings primarily 
for linear public goods is less pronounced for the treatments with coalition structure. In 
VCMmin, contributions increase over time. This effect is due an increase in the 
proposed minimum contribution levels. As suggested by the theory, some (but not all) 
groups are able to coordinate on the optimal contribution level (see Figure 2.4). 
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Furthermore, when concentrating on the last five periods, the coalition structure 
COALfull performs better than the VCM. A Mann-Whitney test confirms that COALfull 
leads to larger contributions than VCM in the last five periods (10% significance). This 
suggests that predictions from the theory hold: The coalition formation structure which 
fully internalizes all the coalition members’ benefits provides small benefits compared 
to the voluntary contribution mechanism. However, the partial internalization of 
benefits in COALpartial does not provide any positive effect. The same comparisons 
result for the payoff levels. These findings are confirmed by the regression results 
depicted in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. 
 
2.4.2 Coalition size and internalization of benefits 
In the following, the number of agents who join the coalition is considered. Figures 2.5 
and 2.8 indicate the crucial differences between the coalition treatments. While the 
coalition in the standard coalition formation treatment (COALfull) include on average 
close to the predicted three members (3.50), this number is even slightly less in 
COALpartial (3.22). Formulating less strict provision levels in the coalition therefore 
does not reduce free-riding incentives in a way that more agents join. This result 
directly puts into question the empirical relevance of the theoretical result by Finus and 
Maus (2008). A reduced requirement along the intensive margin therefore does not 
trigger the predicted gains along the extensive margin. The average coalition size 
increases, however, when agents are allowed to make their own proposals for the 
minimum provision in the coalition: In COALmin the average coalition size is 5.07 
which is significantly larger than the one for the other two treatments (Mann Whitney, 
1% significance; further evidence in Table 2.5). In summary, the number of agents in 
the coalition is close to the theoretical prediction in the standard coalition formation 
game. An exogenous reduction in the provision levels required when joining the 
coalition does not enlarge the coalition. An institution in which coalition members can 
suggest their own minimum with the smallest suggested level being binding triggers the 
entry of more agents.  
These observations potentially provide an interesting feature of the acceptance of 
institutional requirements. In the COALmin treatment, agents can impact the coalitions’ 
provision efforts after observing the number of coalition members, i.e. the number of 
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potential cooperators. This implies that they are not bound to a specific provision level 
just by showing their intent to join the coalition.7 As a consequence, the ‘costs’ of 
joining are smaller such that we should expect more agents to join. This observation is 
consistent with recent findings in the literature that endogenously determined 
institutions are better accepted than exogenous rules (Sutter et al. 2010, Tyran and Feld 
2006). The important question is, however, what level such coalition can agree upon.  
A sensible measure to assess the provision level in the coalition is the internalization 
ratio, i.e. the ratio of chosen provision effort of the coalition compared with the level 
that fully internalizes the mutual benefits of coalition members ( )2//( 2kqSi i ). On 
average the ratio is given by 83% for the COALmin treatment and thereby lies in 
between levels in COALfull and COALpartial as illustrated in Figure 2.6. 8  The 
internalization ratio does depend, however, on the size of the coalition. The 
internalization ratio is depicted in Figure 2.7 for the different coalition sizes in 
COALmin. Figure 2.7 shows that the ratio based on the average suggested minimum, the 
binding minimum, as well as the eventually chosen level are decreasing in the coalition 
size k . This is confirmed by a linear regression model as reported in Table 2.6.  
Hence, we observe a trade-off between intensive and extensive margin for the 
endogenously formed coalition. We can furthermore compare the internalization ratio 
given by the binding minimum with the ratio needed to stabilize a given coalition size 
as derived in Section 2.2 (dashed line in Figure 2.7, see also Figure 2.1). Interestingly 
and surprisingly, the binding minimum ratio (int_min) follows closely the levels that are 
necessary to stabilize coalitions of the respective size. In particular, the internalization 
ratios for coalitions that comprise more than 3 players are smaller than 1 (t-test, 1% 
significance). That is, the coalitions do not fully internalize the benefits of their 
members. We can only speculate about the reasons: On the one hand, if agents are 
inequality-averse, they may want to avoid unfavorable payoff differences to free-riders 
and therefore suggest a lower minimum. On the other hand, it may be more complicated 
                                                 
7 For example, this can be relevant if players are inequality-averse and want to avoid large payoff 
inequalities between free-riders and coalition members (see e.g. Fehr and Schmidt 1999). 
8 Note that the internalization ratio is exogenously fixed at 1 in COALfull and 0.5 in COALpartial. 
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for larger coalitions to coordinate onto the optimal provision level as they are more 
susceptible to single players suggesting a small binding minimum.9 
 
2.4.3 Decision to enter the coalition 
We now have a closer look at the determinants of individual decisions to enter a 
coalition. One of the most important theoretical results is that the incentives to leave the 
coalition are the larger, the larger the coalition size is. Table 2.5 shows the average 
marginal effects from a probit estimation model which explains the decision to join the 
coalition by the individual’s decision in the previous period as well as by the lagged 
coalition size. The estimation results show that the individual’s decision is largely 
driven by his or her behavior in the previous period (the probability to join the coalition 
in period t is about 43% higher for a coalition member in t–1 than for a non-member in 
t–1, 1% significance) which suggests that the decision to enter is relatively stable. In 
fact, the likelihood of joining the coalition is not significantly influenced by the 
coalition size in the previous period. For players in COALmin, who show an 8% higher 
probability to join the coalition (1% significance), the internalization ratio based on the 
binding minimum is also decisive: The larger this internalization ratio in the past period, 
the smaller is the likelihood of an agent joining the coalition (5% significance). 
The coalition formation structure allows people to select into the coalition. One may 
wonder how these coalition members would have contributed in a VCM. Even though 
our between-subject design does not allow to generate the right counterfactual, intuition 
suggests that these players may belong to the group of (conditional) cooperators who 
also may have had high contributions in public goods games. To shed some light on this 
idea, subjects in the VCM treatment are classified as cooperators if they contribute more 
than the median value in a given period and non-cooperators otherwise. Comparing the 
average contributions over all periods, there are no significant differences between 
cooperators in VCM (21 tokens) and coalition members in COALmin (21 tokens) or 
between non-cooperators (6 tokens) and non-members (7 tokens). However, the 
                                                 
9 This is similar to the effects in VCMmin where only some groups are able to coordinate (see Figure 2.4) 
while others do not achieve larger provision levels as some players consistently make suboptimal 
minimum suggestions, i.e. do not play the weakly dominant strategy. The difficulties of large groups to 
coordinate to an efficient outcome have been also observed in the minimum-effort coordination game 
(Weber 2006). 
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advantages of the coalition structure develop over time. Averaging over the last five 
periods, the coalition members’ contributions (19 tokens) are higher than the 
cooperators’ contributions (15 tokens) (10% significance). This supports the self-sorting 
hypothesis and indicates that the coalition structure helps to sustain a relatively high 
contribution level among the cooperative players. 
 
2.4.4 Decision on minimum levels 
The results so far have shown the benefits of institutions that allow agents to first 
submit a minimum suggestion, before the smallest one will be binding for all agents. In 
the VCMmin treatment this allows agents to step by step coordinate to larger provision 
levels of the public good. In the COALmin treatment this allows agents to condition the 
coalition efforts on the information on how many agents stay outside the coalition. The 
implied reduction in the ‘risk’ of being exploited by free-riders when joining the 
coalition allows larger coalitions to build which generate larger provision levels of the 
public good.  
A distinct prediction from the theory is that agents in both minimum treatments have a 
weakly dominant strategy to suggest the minimum which fully internalize the mutual 
benefits. We have already seen that this full internalization does not occur in the 
experiment. So how do agents’ minimum suggestions evolve over time? Theory would 
predict that agents’ minimum suggestions should move upward: Those who propose a 
larger level than others have no effect on the binding level. By adjusting downwards, 
they only can bring down the binding minimum which would hurt their and other 
players’ payoffs. Those who suggested the binding level would have incentives to 
increase their suggestion since this can only benefit them and others. To test these 
adjustments over time, a variable ‘change_qimin’ is defined which reflects the 
difference between a player’s minimum suggestion in the current and in the previous 
period. Table 2.7 presents the results from a linear regression model. The explanatory 
variables are the individuals’ minimum suggestion in the previous period, the 
previously binding minimum, and a dummy variably which takes the value one if and 
only if the agent was a pivotal player in the previous period, i.e. if his or her minimum 
suggestion was binding. For both treatments, agents adjust their proposals upwards 
(constant is positive, 1% significance). This adjustment is smaller for subjects who 
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already have submitted larger proposals in the previous periods. In the COALmin 
treatment we see that in particular pivotal players adjust their proposal upwards. This 
effect is particularly important since agents’ provision levels of the public good are (as 
predicted) highly sensitive to the required minimum. In fact, 40% of contribution 
decisions in VCMmin and 65% of decisions in COALmin are exactly at the binding 
minimum level. It is therefore evident that those players whose suggestion forms the 
binding minimum have a large effect on the total provision level of the public good.  
 
2.5 Conclusions 
Forming institutions to secure the provision of global public goods is a complicated 
endeavor. The success of an institution to overcome free-riding incentives depends on 
two interlinked challenges: On the one hand, the institutional arrangements need to 
attract signatories, i.e. coalition members (extensive margin). On the other hand, any 
given coalition should be able to internalize the mutual benefits from the public good 
among its members (intensive margin). 
In this chapter, different institutions were tested with respect to their ability to succeed 
along these two dimensions. The experimental results show, one the one hand, that 
institutions that exogenously force members to fully internalize their mutual benefits 
generate a rather low participation rate, just as theoretically predicted. The resulting 
provision levels of the global public good do hardly go beyond the ones achieved by a 
purely voluntary contribution mechanism. On the other hand, lowering the degree of 
internalization of benefits within the coalition does not attract more members and, 
accordingly, does not generate efficiency gains.  
Benefits arise, however, from institutions that allow members to endogenously 
determine the terms of the agreement as they attract more members. The experiment 
thereby adds to the recent literature on beneficial endogenous choices of rules in social 
dilemma situations (e.g. Sutter et al. 2010, Tyran and Feld 2006). In particular, it shows 
the success of a very simple negotiation rule: Each coalition member can suggest a 
provision level, knowing that the smallest suggested level is binding for all coalition 
members. This rule generates larger coalition sizes and larger average contributions 
while lowering the degree of benefits internalization among members. Efficiency gains 
therefore result along the extensive margin. There is a clear tradeoff between extensive 
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and intensive margin: The larger the (endogenously determined) requirements from 
coalition members were in the previous period, the less willing subjects are to enter the 
coalition, i.e. the negotiations.  
The principle of the smallest common denominator reflects many real-world IEAs 
which often implement uniform obligations. Coordination on large provision levels, 
however, does not always happen and also requires time: The largest benefits from 
coordinating on larger minimum proposals relative to the standard voluntary 
contribution mechanism occur in the last periods of the experiment. This may suggest 
that over time coordination may also result in international climate negotiations. 
However, the coordination on a uniform binding minimum may be more aggravated in 
such applications as countries are heterogeneous with respect to wealth and 
responsibility (see Chapter 3). The experimental investigation of the impact of such 
heterogeneities on coalition formation and on the performance of the different 
institutions and their possible adjustments are fruitful areas of further research. 
 
T h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  a g r e e m e n t s                         P a g e  | 37 
 
2.6 Appendix 
2.6.1 Tables 
Table 2.1: Summary of experimental design 
Treatment Stages Coalition  
structure 
n   No. of  
subjects 
VCM 
 
contribution no 10 10  100 
COALfull membership 
contribution 
 
yes 10 10 1 100 
COALpartial membership 
contribution 
 
yes 10 10 0.5 100 
COALmin membership 
minimum 
contribution 
 
yes 10 10 endogenous 100 
VCMmin minimum 
contribution 
no 10 10  100 
 
 
 
Table 2.2: Summary statistics for all treatments 
Treatment q    k  eff  
 Total 
VCM 12.3 905.2  0.21 
COALfull 12.1 959.3 3.5 0.24 
COALpartial 8.5 727.1 3.2 0.12 
COALmin 14.8 1060.1 5.1 0.29 
VCMmin 22.1 1418.6  0.47 
 First 5 periods 
VCM 15.7 1098.4  0.31 
COALfull 13.3 1030.1 3.7 0.27 
COALpartial 9.0 766.1 3.1 0.14 
COALmin 16.3 1160.1 5.3 0.34 
VCMmin 16.8 1187.9  0.35 
 Last 5 periods 
VCM 8.9 711.9  0.12 
COALfull 10.9 888.5 3.2 0.20 
COALpartial 7.9 688.1 3.3 0.11 
COALmin 13.4 960.1 4.8 0.24 
VCMmin 27.5 1649.2  0.58 
Note: q = average contributions,   = average payoffs, k  = average coalition size,  
eff  = average efficiency defined as )/()( NESONE    with NE  =475 and SO =2500 
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Table 2.3: Linear regression of public good contributions for all treatments 
 All per. All per. Last 5 per. 
VARIABLES qi qi qi 
    
COALfull -0.202 -2.420* 2.016* 
 (0.957) (1.340) (1.029) 
COALpartial -3.826*** -6.702*** -0.950 
 (0.726) (1.070) (0.702) 
COALmin 2.551** 0.582 4.520*** 
 (1.010) (1.498) (1.368) 
VCMmin 9.833*** 1.046 18.62*** 
 (3.259) (2.895) (4.481) 
per6_10  -6.880***  
  (0.999)  
per6_10_COALfull  4.436***  
  (1.427)  
per6_10_COALpartial  5.752***  
  (1.080)  
per6_10_COALmin  3.938*  
  (2.037)  
per6_10_VCMmin  17.57***  
  (3.796)  
Constant 12.30*** 15.74*** 8.858*** 
 (0.614) (0.950) (0.593) 
    
Observations 5000 5000 2500 
R-squared 0.111 0.158 0.252 
Note: Random effects estimation; robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at 
group level); significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Definition of variables: 
qi = subject’s contribution, 
COALfull = 1 if subject played in the COALfull treatment, 0 otherwise, 
COALpartial = 1 if subject played in the COALpartial treatment, 0 otherwise, 
COALmin = 1 if subject played in the COALmin treatment, 0 otherwise, 
VCMmin = 1 if subject played in the VCMmin treatment, 0 otherwise, 
per6_10 = 1 for the last five periods, 0 for the first five periods, 
per6_10_*treatment* = interaction term of time dummy and treatment dummy. 
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Table 2.4: Linear regression of payoff levels for all treatments 
 All per. All per. Last 5 per. 
VARIABLES pay pay pay 
    
COALfull 54.16 -68.28 176.6** 
 (67.48) (83.56) (70.25) 
COALpartial -178.1*** -332.3*** -23.77 
 (51.47) (59.07) (50.91) 
COALmin 154.9*** 61.70 248.2*** 
 (58.80) (73.40) (82.01) 
VCMmin 513.4*** 89.52 937.3*** 
 (165.4) (156.4) (217.2) 
per6_10  -386.5***  
  (30.73)  
per6_10_COALfull  244.9***  
  (74.87)  
per6_10_COALpartial  308.6***  
  (39.44)  
per6_10_COALmin  186.5*  
  (101.9)  
per6_10_VCMmin  847.8***  
  (183.8)  
Constant 905.2*** 1098*** 711.9*** 
 (42.59) (48.17) (42.22) 
    
Observations 5000 5000 2500 
R-squared 0.083 0.117 0.185 
Notes: Random effects estimation; robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at 
group level); significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Definition of variables: 
pay = subject’s payoff level, 
COALfull = 1 if subject played in the COALfull treatment, 0 otherwise, 
COALpartial = 1 if subject played in the COALpartial treatment, 0 otherwise, 
COALmin = 1 if subject played in the COALmin treatment, 0 otherwise, 
VCMmin = 1 if subject played in the VCMmin treatment, 0 otherwise, 
per6_10 = 1 for the last five periods, 0 for the first five periods, 
per6_10_*treatment* = interaction term of time dummy and treatment dummy. 
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Table 2.5: Probit estimation of decision to join the coalition 
 All Coal COALmin 
VARIABLES ci ci 
ci_lag 0.429*** 0.507*** 
 (0.019) (0.031) 
k_lag 0.008 -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.009) 
meanqi_lag -0.002  
 (0.002)  
COALpartial -0.012  
 (0.022)  
COALmin 0.078***  
 (0.023)  
int_ratio_min_lag  -0.074** 
  (0.032) 
Observations 2700 900 
Notes: Average marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses;  
significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Definition of variables: 
ci = 1 if subject joined the coalition, 0 otherwise, 
ci_lag = 1 if subject joined the coalition in the previous period, 0 otherwise, 
k_lag = coalition size in the previous period, 
meanqi_lag = mean group contribution in the previous period, 
COALpartial = 1 if subject played in the COALpartial treatment, 0 otherwise, 
COALmin = 1 if subject played in the COALmin treatment, 0 otherwise, 
int_ratio_min_lag = previous period internalization ratio based on the binding minimum. 
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Table 2.6: Linear regression of internalization ratios 
 COALmin 
VARIABLES int_ratio_min 
  
k -0.0725*** 
 (0.0206) 
period -0.0166 
 (0.0209) 
Constant 1.115*** 
 (0.213) 
  
Observations 1000 
R-squared 0.063 
Notes: Regression of internalization ratios for COALmin; random effects estimation; 
robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at group level);  
significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Definition of variables: 
int_ratio_min = internalization ratio based on the binding minimum, 
k = coalition size, 
period = period. 
 
 
Table 2.7: Linear regression of the adjustment in the individual minimum proposal 
 COALmin VCMmin 
VARIABLES change_qimin change_qimin 
   
qi_min_lag -0.349*** -0.363*** 
 (0.0625) (0.0283) 
q_min_lag -0.236** 0.0118 
 (0.0949) (0.0317) 
pivot_lag 5.174* -0.477 
 (2.785) (1.515) 
Constant 15.86*** 18.28*** 
 (2.915) (1.405) 
   
Observations 344 900 
R-squared 0.237 0.201 
Notes: Regression of the adjustment in the individual minimum proposal miniq  over time 
( miniq  in current period minus 
min
iq  in previous period) for COALmin and VCMmin;  
standard errors in parentheses; significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Definition of variables: 
change_qimin = subject’s minimum proposal minus proposal in the previous period, 
qi_min_lag = subject’s minimum proposal in the previous period, 
q_min_lag = binding minimum in the previous period, 
pivot_lag = 1 if subject suggested binding minimum in the previous period, 0 otherwise. 
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2.6.2 Figures 
Figure 2.1: Internalization factor needed to stabilize a given coalition size 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Average contribution and payoff levels for all treatments 
0
5
10
15
20
25
mean(qi)
VCM
COALfull
COALpartial
COALmin
VCMmin
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
mean(pay)
 
T h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  a g r e e m e n t s                         P a g e  | 43 
 
Figure 2.3: Average contributions for all treatments over time 
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Figure 2.4: Binding minimum 
 
Note: Binding minimum levels in VCMmin for each group over time  
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Figure 2.5: Average contribution levels and average coalition size 
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Note: Average contribution levels among coalition members (mean(qi)coal) and non-
members (mean(qi)free) and average coalition size. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Average internalization ratios conditional on coalition size  
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Figure 2.7: Average internalization ratios conditional on coalition size 
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Note: Average internalization ratios conditional on coalition size in COALmin: 
suggested minimum ratio (int_qimin), binding minimum ratio (int_min), chosen fraction 
of mutual benefits that are internalized in coalition (int_qi); the dashed line (int_needed) 
shows the internalization ratios theoretically required to stabilize the respective 
coalition size. 
 
Figure 2.8: Average coalition size for all coalition treatments over time 
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2.6.3 Experimental instructions 
Instructions for the COALmin treatment (translated from German) 
Welcome to the Magdeburg Experimental Laboratory MaXLab! 
Please read these instructions carefully and should you have any questions please signal 
us by opening the door or a show of hands. In the laboratory experiment you are taking 
part in, you can win money depending on your decisions and the decisions of your 
fellow players. Your payout from the experiment will be calculated in LabDollars (LD). 
The conversion rate between € and LD is 1:100, i.e. 100 LD are €1. All your decisions 
made the experiment will remain anonymous. Only the experimenter will know your 
identity, but your data will be treated confidentially. 
Rules of the game 
Now you will learn more about the rules of the game you will be participating in. 
Altogether 10 players take part in the game, so besides you there are 9 more players. 
Every participant faces the same decision making problem. Your task in the game, and 
also your fellow players’ task, is to decide how many points you would like to 
contribute to a joint project. Your payout will be calculated as follows: 
Your payout = (your contribution to the project)2 + 10(sum of all contributions of all 
players to the project) 
Example: If all other players have contributed an amount of 90 points to the project and 
you contribute an amount of 10 points, then your payout will be: 
 (10)2 + 10(10+90) = 900 LD 
If, however, all other players contribute a total amount of 50 points and you do not 
contribute anything, your payout will be: 
 (0)2 + 10(0+50) = 500 LD 
To simplify the calculation of your payout, you will find an excel-file called 
‘Simulator’ on your screen. You can enter your contribution and the average 
contribution of all other players and so quickly determine your payout. 
There are two stages in this game. In stage 1 you can decide whether you want to 
become a member of a coalition, i.e. if you want to join a coalition or not. Should you 
decide that you want to join a coalition you additionally can decide which amount 
should be the minimum amount each member of the coalition should contribute to the 
project. Also all other members of the coalition can state their desired minimum amount. 
The members will be informed about the proposals for the minimum amount of all 
members. If you are member of a coalition, stage 2 will be to decide for yourself which 
amount you want to contribute. In this decision the smallest minimum amount of all 
members will form your lower limit of contribution. If you have decided not to join a 
coalition, stage 2 for you will be to state your contribution to the project without any 
limitation. 
The game consists of 10 separate rounds in each of which you will play the same two-
stage game. The nine other players you will interact with will be the same in every 
round. If the experiment is complete you will receive the payout of one of the rounds 
in € (according to the conversion rate stated above). The round to be paid out will be 
determined randomly. This means you should behave in each round as if it were the 
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round relevant for payout. In the beginning, two trial rounds will be played which are 
not relevant for payout. Independent of the course of the game you will receive €1 for 
your participation.  
 
Control questions 
If you have read the instructions and do not have any questions, please answer the 
following control questions (hint: use the simulator). 
1. Please assume your contribution to the project is 10 points and the average 
contribution of all the other players is 15 points. How much LD will be your 
payout of this round? 
My payout is: _______ 
2. Please assume the average contribution of all other players is 5 points, which of 
the following amounts will result in the highest payout for you? 
O 5 points O 10 points  O 20 points  O 30 points 
3. Please assume you want to maximise your payout, does it make sense to not 
contribute at all (meaning zero points) to the project? 
O yes O no 
4. Please assume you and three other players have joined a coalition and all 
members have stated the following minimum contribution: 4, 88, 22, 56. In 
which range does your contribution to the project have to be? 
More than or equal ____ and less than or equal _____. 
5. Is it possible that a member of a coalition has to contribute more than he 
proposed as his minimum contribution?  
O yes O no 
6. Please assume all players chose the same amount, which of the following 
contributions results in the highest payout for all players (please check the 
according box)? 
O 10 points O 30 points O 50 points O 70 points O 100 points 
If you have answered all questions, please signal us. We will then check your answers. 
The game begins when all participants in the experiment have successfully completed 
the test. Good luck in the experiment! The MaXLab-Team 
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3 Voting in international environmental agreements 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter directly ties in with the previous chapter and analyses the effects of voting 
on the formation of international environmental agreements (IEA). As already pointed 
out, the IEA literature (e.g. Barrett 1994, Hoel 1992, Carraro and Siniscalco 1993) 
derives rather pessimistic predictions. If the difference in payoffs between the non-
cooperative and full cooperative outcome is large only few countries are predicted to 
form a self-enforcing coalition. Hence, a self-enforcing coalition may only marginally 
improve upon the non-cooperative outcome. Finus and Maus (2008) suggest that public 
good provision and social welfare may increase if coalition members do not maximize 
their joint payoff by fully internalizing their mutual benefits but only partially 
internalize benefits. Lowering the effort level required from the members leads to 
higher participation which compensates for the lower effort level so that social welfare 
increases in equilibrium. 
Assuming either full or partial internalization of mutual benefits, the theoretical 
literature has not paid that much attention to the question how coalition members 
determine their public good provision level. The experimental literature on coalition 
formation also rarely considers the negotiation process: Most experiments involve some 
form of voting to determine whether a coalition is to be implemented, but do not allow 
coalition members to negotiate and to agree on a (possibly suboptimal) effort level 
(Burger and Kolstad 2009, Kosfeld et al. 2009, McEvoy et al. 2010, see also Section 
2.1). Different from these experiments, the study presented in Chapter 2 allows the 
coalition to endogenously determine their effort level by introducing a smallest common 
denominator rule: After the decision to participate in a coalition in the first stage, each 
member suggests a minimum contribution level in the second stage. The smallest 
proposal is then the binding minimum for all members.  
This chapter extends the latter experiment by analyzing the welfare effects if coalition 
members apply majority voting to determine the minimum contribution level. To this 
end, qualified majority voting and simple majority voting are considered and the 
resulting public good provision levels are compared with those achieved by the smallest 
common denominator coalition (described in Chapter 2) where members apply a 
unanimity rule to determine their effort level. At first sight in line with theoretical 
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predictions, the experiment shows that the change of the voting scheme implemented in 
a coalition does not significantly change social welfare. However, changing the majority 
required to determine the terms of the agreement alters the depth and breadth of 
cooperation: Under the unanimity rule, coalitions are relatively large and implement 
moderate effort levels while coalitions with majority votes implement high effort levels 
but attract only few participants. 
While the experimental game is designed to incorporate key real-world issues, it is 
necessarily simplistic for the sake of control and tractability. In particular, the 
experimental subjects face exogenously specified voting schemes, whereas these 
institutions in real-world negotiations evolve endogenously. Furthermore, just like in 
most of the theoretical and experimental literature, coalition members are assumed and 
forced to comply with the terms of the agreement.10 While the former assumption can 
be expected to hamper cooperation, as endogenous institutional choice has been shown 
to enhance cooperation (e.g. Tyran and Feld 2006, Sutter et al. 2010), the latter is 
certainly an important precondition for cooperation. There are, however, arguments to 
justify this assumption. For example, customary law may require full compliance by 
coalition members and the enforcement of custom could be assumed to be solved 
outside the model in some kind of meta game (Barrett 2003). 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 provides the theoretical background. 
The experimental design is laid out in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents the results and 
Section 3.5 concludes.  
 
3.2 Theoretical background 
The game underlying the experiment is identical to the game in Chapter 2 and will be 
repeated here. It is standard in the IEA literature (e.g. Barrett 1994). An economy is 
considered with 1,...,i n  identical individuals who may contribute to the production of 
a public good. Each individual’s contribution costs are assumed to depend only on its 
                                                 
10 As mentioned before, some experimental studies (MyEvoy et al. 2010, Kosfeld et al. 2009) allow for 
non-compliance in the contribution stage. However, they enforce the implementation of sanctions; thus, 
in a broader sense, they do assume compliance. 
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own contribution level while benefits are assumed to depend on the total provision of 
the public good. The payoff function for individual i  is set by 
2/2
1 i
n
j ji
qcqb         (3.1) 
where iq  is 'i s contribution to the public good with ],0[
max
ii qq  , 0b  denotes the 
constant marginal per capita return from contributing to the public good, and 0c  
represents the slope of the marginal contribution cost curve. The full cooperative public 
good contribution level which maximizes social welfare is given by 
cbnqi /*   
while the unique non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is given by 
cbqNCi / . 
The Nash equilibrium involves dominant strategies such that each player’s action does 
not depend on the contribution levels chosen by the remaining players. Throughout, 
interior solutions are assumed which require maxiq  to be sufficiently large. Since joint 
payoffs are maximized when all players chose cbnqi /*   the players generally have an 
incentive to form a cooperative agreement to provide the public good. 
 
3.2.1 Coalition formation and voting rules 
The formation of coalitions is a very complex process. The negotiation process involves 
multiple stages, it may be little structured ex-ante and voting rules evolve endogenously 
with continuous updating of targets and expectations (Barrett 2003). The modeling of 
coalition formation in this setting is necessarily much simpler. It involves three stages: 
In the first stage (‘participation stage’), each player chooses to join the coalition or not. 
Let k be the number of members with nk 1 . In the second stage (‘voting stage’), 
coalition members negotiate a minimum public good contribution for all members. 
Negotiations proceed in a way that all members anonymously vote on minimum 
contribution levels, starting from the level that maximizes joint payoffs, cbkqi /
min  , 
and decreasing until the required majority of members agrees with a certain contribution 
level. This level minq  is then the binding minimum contribution level for all members. 
In the third stage (‘contribution stage’), all players determine their contributions to the 
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public good. Non-members are free to choose any contribution level. The choice of the 
public good contributions by the coalition members depends on the negotiations. Three 
different voting rules are considered: unanimity, qualified majority, and simple majority.  
In the experiment, negotiations are initiated by requesting all members to suggest a 
minimum contribution level. After these minimum proposals miniq  are received from all 
participating subjects, the agreement will require all members to provide at least (i) the 
smallest suggested level miniq  (unanimity); (ii) the suggested level 
min
iq  upon which 
three quarter of members agree by proposing this or a higher minimum level (qualified 
majority); or (iii) the suggested level miniq  upon which more than half of members agree 
by proposing this or a higher minimum level (simple majority). In all three treatments 
members are bound to provide minqqi  . 
In a subgame perfect equilibrium, players choose their actions in each stage by 
rationally anticipating the outcome of future stages and applying backward induction. 
Therefore, consider the final stage, the contribution stage, first. Non-members’ payoff-
maximizing decision does not depend on the coalition’s effort and is given by 
cbqNCi / . In contrast, members’ payoff-maximizing contribution level at this last 
stage is given by ]/,max[ min cbqqi  . That is, members provide exactly the binding 
minimum as long as cbq /min   is valid. This implies that it is weakly dominant for 
members to suggest the collectively optimal amount of cbkqi /
min   in the intermediate 
voting stage. There are many other equilibria in weakly dominated strategies. In the 
case of unanimity, any binding minimum cbkq /min   is established as equilibrium if at 
least two players suggest this level while all other players suggest a larger minimum. In 
the case of majority voting, any binding minimum level minq can be established as 
weakly dominated equilibrium as long as enough players suggest that level. For 
convenience, all weakly dominated strategies shall be eliminated in the voting stage. 
This gives a unique subgame perfect equilibrium for all voting schemes: The coalition 
will consist of 3k  players (provided 3n ) who maximize their joint payoff while 
3n  players stay outside the coalition and maximize their individual payoff. The proof 
follows straightforward from the comparison of payoffs to members and non-members 
according to (3.1) and the use of the concept of internal and external stability from the 
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IEA literature: Denoting the payoffs to members by )(kM  and the payoffs to non-
members by )(kNM  given the coalition size k , the coalition is externally stable if no 
non-member has an incentive to join unilaterally, i.e. if )1()(  kk MNM  and the 
coalition is internally stable if no member has an incentive to leave unilaterally, i.e. if 
)1()(  kk NMM  (cf. Barrett 1994). The intuition behind this is not too difficult. 
The members of a coalition commit to joint-payoff maximization as long as each of 
them is at least as well off with all members cooperating as they would be if no player 
cooperated. That is, a coalition must be profitable for its members which is valid for all 
coalitions with 2k . If a coalition is larger than the smallest profitable size, i.e. if 
2k , any member could leave the coalition and the remaining members would still 
find it profitable to cooperate. Members earn strictly more by leaving the coalition than 
by staying if 3k  so these coalitions are not internally stable. In contrast, a coalition 
with 3k  members is internally stable because members cannot do better by leaving. It 
is assumed that players stay in the coalition if they are indifferent to being a member or 
non-member. The coalition with 3k  members is also externally stable because non-
members are better off by staying outside than by joining it. Thus, although each player 
has an individual incentive to free-ride and is better off if other players participate in the 
coalition, the coalition is still formed in equilibrium because members get a higher 
payoff than without coalition. 
 
3.3 Experimental design 
The experiment was designed to investigate the effects of different voting schemes on 
the voluntary formation of coalitions. All treatments involved a ten-person public goods 
game and the payoff function for each player was given by 2/2
1 i
n
j ji
qcqb    with 
10b , 2c , 10n , and ]100,...,0[iq . 
The traditional voluntary contribution mechanism (‘VCM’) served again as a control 
treatment which only contained a contribution stage in which players simultaneously 
and independently chose their contribution to the public good. The three coalition 
treatments involved three stages each: In the first stage, the participation stage, subjects 
decided on participating in a coalition. Decisions to become a member or non-member 
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were made simultaneously and independently. In the second stage, after being told the 
coalition size, all members negotiated the minimum amount that each member should 
contribute (voting stage). Negotiations took the form that all participants simultaneously 
and independently proposed a minimum contribution between 0 and 100. In the 
treatment called ‘COALmin’ the smallest proposed amount became the binding lower 
limit for the members’ contributions.11 In the treatment ‘COALqual_maj’ the proposed 
amount on which three quarter of members could agree by suggesting this or a higher 
contribution level became the binding minimum. In the treatment called 
‘COALsimple_maj’, the proposed amount on which the simple majority of members 
could agree by suggesting this or a higher amount became the binding minimum. In all 
three coalition treatments, members were informed about all proposed minimum 
amounts (arranged in descending order) and the binding minimum. Non-members did 
not make any decision at this stage and were only informed about the coalition size. In 
the third stage, the contribution stage, members and non-members chose their 
contributions to the public good. While non-members could freely choose their 
contribution level, members were bound to provide at least the binding minimum. At 
the end of the game, participants were informed about the average contributions 
provided by members and non-members and their own payoff.  
Table 3.1 summarizes the key features of the experimental design and the number of 
subjects in each treatment. The experimental sessions were held in a computer lab at the 
University of Magdeburg, Germany, using undergraduate and graduate students 
recruited from the general student population (recruiting software Orsee, Greiner 2004). 
In total, 400 students participated in the experiment, of which 100 took part in each 
treatment. In each session, 20 subjects were seated randomly at linked computers (game 
software Ztree, Fischbacher 2007) and paid €1.00 as show-up fee. A set of written 
instructions and a record sheet were handed out. Experimental instructions included 
several numerical examples and control questions. The instructions involved a neutral 
frame for the context and language of the experiment in order to avoid potential biases 
subjects may have regarding certain frames (see Section 2.6.3 for instructions). The 
questions tested the subjects’ understanding of the payoff function given in (3.1) to 
                                                 
11 The treatments VCM and COALmin are also used in Chapter 2. They are repeated in this chapter for 
comparison reasons. 
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ensure that they were aware of the payoff-maximizing strategy and the dilemma 
situation. After reading the instructions and answering the control questions correctly, 
the subjects began the game. At the beginning, the 20 subjects were randomly assigned 
to one of two 10-person groups. The subjects did not know their fellows’ identities but 
they knew that they remained within the same group of players throughout the game 
(partner matching). All decisions were made under completely anonymous conditions. 
Five 12-round sessions with two groups per session were conducted for each treatment 
with the first two rounds being practice. This resulted in 100 group level observations 
(10 groups and 10 non-practice rounds) and 1.000 individual level observations per 
treatment. During the game, earnings were presented in experimental dollars and 100 
experimental dollars converted to one Euro. At the end of the experiment, one of the 
non-practice rounds was randomly selected for the determination of payments. Sessions 
lasted about 60-90 minutes and subjects earned on average €11.60 in the games. 
Earnings were paid in cash.12 
 
3.4 Experimental results 
The results section proceeds according to the stages of the game. It is first analyzed 
whether coalitions are actually formed and how many subjects participate under the 
different voting rules. I then study the individual minimum proposals, the binding 
minimum levels implemented in the coalitions, and the contributions chosen by 
members and non-members. Finally, the overall impact of coalition formation and 
voting on public good provision and welfare is presented by comparing average 
contribution and payoff levels in the coalition games and the voluntary contribution 
mechanism. 
 
3.4.1 Participation in the coalitions 
In line with previous coalition formation experiments, the first result shows that players 
almost always implement a coalition. Under the unanimity rule there are always at least 
two players who form a coalition. Under the qualified majority rule and the simple 
                                                 
12 Overall, 18 out of 400 subjects earned negative payoffs in the games. In these cases, payoffs were cut 
off at zero and the subjects only received the show-up fee. 
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majority rule, at least two players form a coalition in 90% and 89% of the cases 
respectively. Previous experiments have shown that the grand coalition is particularly 
compelling as it eliminates the possibility to free-ride on the coalition’s effort. In 
McEvoy et al.’s (2010) experiment, coalitions are more likely to form when they require 
full participation instead of the minimum profitable size. The experiment conducted by 
Kosfeld et al. (2009) shows that subjects are reluctant to implement coalitions where a 
subset of players has the opportunity to free-ride. The authors demonstrate that inequity 
aversion of at least some players may explain this behavior. It seems, however, that 
these subjects need a mechanism, which disallows the formation of smaller coalitions 
directly or gives subjects the power to reject them, in order to effectively discipline 
potential free-riders. As the present study does not offer such a mechanism large 
coalitions are rarely implemented: 81% of the coalitions in COALmin, 93% of coalitions 
in COALqual_maj, and 98% of coalitions in COALsimple_maj consist of six or fewer 
players. No group manages to implement the grand coalition consisting of all ten 
players. 
The left panel in Figure 3.1 shows the average coalition size across all rounds for each 
coalition treatment. While in COALmin on average half of all players form a coalition 
(5.07), coalitions are significantly smaller in COALqual_maj (3.68) and 
COALsimple_maj (3.56) (Mann-Whitney test, p<0.05 and p<0.01 respectively).13 The 
right panel in Figure 3.1 shows the average coalition size over time. While the coalition 
size in COALmin and COALqual_maj is relatively stable at around 5 and 3-4 
respectively, in COALsimple_maj it is decreasing over time from over 5 to less than 3. 
The Spearman rank correlation between coalition size and number of rounds is negative 
and highly significant in the latter treatment (ρ=-0.40, p<0.01). It seems that some 
players are willing to join the coalition in the beginning but learn from experience 
during the course of the experiment. Table 3.2 presents the results of a probit estimation 
model of the individual decision to join the coalition. Players in COALmin are more 
likely to join than players in COALqual_maj and COALsimple_maj. The results 
furthermore show that players are more likely to join when they have already been a 
                                                 
13 Statistical tests are based on group averages as units of observation. All reported tests are two-sided 
throughout the chapter.  
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member in the previous round and they are less likely to join if the coalition has agreed 
on a high minimum contribution in the previous round.  
 
3.4.2 Minimum contribution levels inside the coalitions 
The next point of interest is the minimum effort level a coalition can agree upon. The 
decision on the binding minimum level is particularly important since subjects’ 
contributions are highly sensitive to the binding minimum: 63% of members’ decisions 
on contributions are exactly at the minimum level and 81% are nearby, with the 
difference being 5 tokens or less. It is therefore evident that the binding minimum level 
has a large impact on the coalition’s actual effort level.  
Before turning to this, I will first report on the individual minimum proposals as they 
are the determinant for the binding minimum. A sensible measure to assess the 
minimum proposals is the benefit internalization ratio, i.e. the ratio of the minimum 
proposal compared with the joint-payoff maximizing level, )//(min cbkqi . The 
internalization ratios of the individual minimum proposals cover a wide range from 0% 
to over 200%. The individual minimum proposals do not significantly differ between 
voting schemes (Mann-Whitney test, p>0.10). In all coalition games, about a quarter of 
subjects suggest a minimum below 100%, about 60% suggest a minimum between 
100% and 200% and the remaining subjects suggest more than 200%. Table 3.3 
presents the results of a linear regression of the internalization ratio of individual 
minimum proposals. The regression results confirm that majority voting does not 
significantly affect the internalization ratio of the proposals. Thus, changing the 
required majority to determine the coalition’s effort level does not change individual 
minimum suggestions but merely the outcome of the negotiations. The regression 
results furthermore show that the internalization ratio of the proposal is not significantly 
affected by coalition size and it is higher when the player has already made a high 
proposal in the previous round. These findings indicate that players have quite different 
views on what the coalition should do. Drawing from the theory part in Section 3.2, the 
prediction for payoff maximizing players is that they propose an internalization ratio of 
100% when they have entered the coalition. A lower internalization ratio may be 
suggested by inequity-avers agents if they want to reduce unfavorable payoff 
differences to free-riders outside the coalition. Suggesting a higher minimum, on the 
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other hand, can be explained neither by self-interest nor by inequity aversion because, 
relative to joint-payoff maximization, such a minimum level would reduce the players’ 
own payoff and increase inequality. The most plausible explanation is that these players 
try to lead by example. By joining the coalition and suggesting a high effort level, they 
might have hoped that other players would follow and the group would coordinate on a 
high provision level over time. 14  The following sections will show, however, that 
leadership does not pay out. The average internalization ratio of proposals decreases 
with larger coalitions: The Spearman rank correlation between average internalization 
ratio and number of rounds is negative and significant for all coalition games (at least 
p<0.10 each).  
The internalization ratio of the binding minimum in the coalition is defined as the ratio 
of the binding minimum contribution compared with the joint-payoff maximizing level, 
)//(min cbkq . On average, this ratio is 62% in COALmin, 109% in COALqual_maj, and 
147% in COALsimple_maj as illustrated in Figure 3.2 (left panel). Thus, while the 
qualified majority rule leads to an average minimum level near the collectively optimal 
level, the unanimity rule produces a minimum below that level and the simple majority 
rule produces a minimum above that level. Figure 3.3 shows the average internalization 
ratio of the agreed minimum conditional on the coalition size (solid line). The 
internalization ratios are relatively stable for coalitions including 2-6 members and they 
tend to be lower for larger coalitions. Interestingly, while the theoretical model 
described in Section 3.2 clearly fails to predict the individual minimum proposals in the 
voting stage, it serves as a good prediction in the participation stage: Given joint-payoff 
maximization in the voting stage in COALqual_maj, the coalition size is not 
significantly different from the predicted 3k  members (t-test, p>0.10). Furthermore, 
the behavior observed in COALmin supports the suggestion of Finus and Maus (2008) 
that a lower effort level in the coalition can attract more members. According to their 
model, an internalization ratio of 62% would lead to a coalition consisting of 5k  
members which is exactly what we observe (t-test, p>0.10). 
                                                 
14 Contrary to theoretical predictions, leadership has been observed in several sequential public goods 
games (Gächter et al. 2010, Güth et al. 2007). Followers are found to positively respond to leadership but 
this reaction often does not suffice to compensate the leaders or to substantially increase overall 
efficiency (Sturm and Weimann 2008, Moxnes and van der Heijden 2003). 
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3.4.3 Contributions of members and non-members 
The right panel in Figure 3.2 shows the internalization ratio based on the members’ 
chosen contributions, )//( 2 cbkq
Si i . With 83% in COALmin, 132% in 
COALqual_maj, and 167% in COALsimple_maj these ratios are higher than the ratios 
based on the agreed minimum because some members contribute more to the public 
good than the binding minimum. This is true even for the coalitions under the simple 
majority rule where members have already negotiated a very high minimum level. 
Figure 3.4 shows the average public good contributions of coalition members and non-
members. As expected, non-members contribute clearly lower amounts than members. 
Although non-members in COALqual_maj and COALsimple_maj contribute slightly 
more to the public good than non-members in COALmin, majority voting produces a 
higher inequality between members and non-members: Under unanimity, the members’ 
average payoff is 28% lower than that of non-members (889 versus 1.236); the 
inequality is thereby close to the predicted 26%. In contrast, under the simple majority 
rule members earn a payoff which is remarkable 46% lower than the non-members’ 
payoff (797 versus 1.478). Moreover, in the COALsimple_maj treatment, the members’ 
payoff is significantly lower than the average payoff in the VCM treatment (Mann-
Whitney test, p<0.05). That is, on average, those who join the coalition under the simple 
majority rule are even worse off compared to unilateral decisions. This does not hold for 
members in COALmin and COALqual_maj. It is conceivable that the high inequality 
and the low payoff of coalition members in COALsimple_maj might have a negative 
effect on the overall efficiency. The final result will therefore reveal the overall impact 
of the different voting schemes on the provision of the public good and welfare by 
comparing average contribution and payoff levels in the coalition games and the 
voluntary contribution mechanism. 
 
3.4.4 Overall public good provision and welfare 
All games perform better than predicted by theory leading to higher average 
contribution and payoff levels (t-test, p<0.01 each). The bird’s eye view of cooperation 
is provided in Table 3.4 and Figure 3.5 which present average contribution and payoff 
levels across all rounds for each treatment. Average contribution and payoff levels in 
the three coalition games exceed those in the standard voluntary contribution 
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mechanism. A Mann-Whitney test shows that VCM gives lower contributions than 
COALmin, COALqual_maj, and COALsimple_maj  (p<0.10, p<0.10, and p<0.01 
respectively). Reducing the majority required to implement the minimum contribution 
level leads to small increases in contribution and payoff levels. Testing among the 
coalition treatments shows that COALsimple_maj gives higher contributions than 
COALmin (p<0.10). Identical comparisons follow for the average payoff levels.  
Figure 3.6 shows the development of average contributions for each treatment over time. 
The contributions in VCM are decreasing over time which has also been observed in 
many other public good experiments (Ledyard 1995, Fischbacher and Gächter 2010). 
Though to a lesser extent, this downward trend is also observable for the three coalition 
games. Irrespective of the voting scheme, the possibility to form a coalition provides 
small benefits compared to the voluntary contribution mechanism. Comparing average 
contributions and payoffs over the last five rounds shows that the differences between 
the voluntary contribution mechanism and the coalition games remain significant 
(Mann-Whitney test, p<0.01 each) while there are no significant differences any more 
among coalition games. A series of linear regression models confirms that all three 
coalition games perform better than the voluntary contribution mechanism leading to 
higher contributions and payoffs. The differences become more pronounced towards the 
end of the experiment (see Tables 3.5 and 3.6).  
 
3.5 Conclusions 
The study presented in this chapter adds to the experimental literature on the voluntary 
formation of coalitions to provide public goods. Participants in the experiment have the 
possibility to form a cooperative coalition to provide the public good while non-
members may free-ride on the coalition’s effort. The effectiveness of any such coalition 
crucially depends on its ability to attract members and to implement a sufficiently high 
effort level to provide the public good. The aim of this experiment is to shed light on the 
negotiation process inside the coalition which determines the effort level and, thereby, 
affects the incentives to join the coalition. Different voting schemes are implemented in 
the coalitions to determine their effort levels, namely unanimity, qualified majority 
voting and simple majority voting. The resulting public good provision and payoff 
V o t i n g  i n  a g r e e m e n t s                                   P a g e  | 61 
 
levels are compared with those achieved by the traditional voluntary contribution 
mechanism.  
The experimental results provide further evidence of the beneficial effects of coalition 
formation: All coalition formation games outperform the traditional voluntary 
contribution mechanism leading to higher public good provision and welfare. Theory 
suggests that the voting scheme does not matter for the outcome. As long as coalition 
members choose the dominant strategy by maximizing the joint payoff only few players 
are expected to join the coalition. At first sight in line with theoretical predictions, the 
experiment shows that a change of the voting scheme implemented in a coalition does 
not significantly change the public good provision level and welfare. However, 
changing the majority required to determine the terms of an agreement alters the depth 
and breadth of cooperation. Coalitions under the unanimity rule are relatively large and 
implement moderate effort levels, while coalitions with majority votes implement high 
effort levels but attract only few participants.  
Though coalition members make similar minimum proposals under all voting rules, the 
pivotal players, whose minimum proposals form the binding minimum, differ between 
voting schemes. While coalitions under the qualified majority rule implement a 
minimum contribution near the predicted joint-payoff maximizing level, coalitions 
under simple majority implement a minimum above that level and coalitions under 
unanimity choose a minimum below that level. This lower effort required from the 
members under unanimity keeps the coalition size relatively high with averagely half of 
all players being in the coalition throughout the game. The experimental results hereby 
confirm that the terms of institutionalizing the requirements from a coalition are crucial 
for the capacity to attract participants (Finus and Maus 2008). Lowering the effort level 
inside the coalition leads to a higher and more stable participation rate. It furthermore 
leads to less inequality, as the burden of the provision of the public good is shouldered 
by more users, which may enhance the long-term acceptance of the institution. 
The theoretical coalition formation literature mostly assumes that agents are purely self-
interested.15 The experimental studies provide some insight to the consequences arising 
from real (and possibly other-regarding) preferences. As already pointed out in the 
introduction, the experimental literature in this field is in need of further development 
                                                 
15 Exceptions are for instance Lange and Vogt (2003) and Lange (2006). 
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and therefore the picture is still incomplete. Promising areas for further research include, 
for instance, asymmetric actors, endogenous institution design, and non-compliance. 
The coalition formation experiments so far show that people in the lab do not always act 
in line with the theory. Similar to the standard public goods games, the institutions 
typically perform better in the lab than in theory. The present experiment on coalition 
formation indicates that subjects have quite different views on what the coalition should 
do. Pure self-interest cannot explain all observed behavior; it rather seems that a 
significant share of people is willing to forego money in order to reduce inequality or to 
lead by example. But for all that, the experimental subjects are far away from the social 
optimum. The grand coalition is never implemented perhaps because subjects lack the 
possibility to prevent the formation of smaller coalitions. Relative to the difference 
between the full cooperative and the non-cooperative outcome, the average efficiency 
gain in all coalition games is 29-38% which decreases to 17-24% in the final round. The 
chief cause is the inevitable link between coalition performance and participation, as 
described above, which illustrates the importance of jointly considering these two 
requirements. In this respect, the experimental results support the view that under 
certain circumstances first-best solutions are not available, thereby bringing second-best 
solutions to the table which do not aim at coalition performance but rather try to 
transform the underlying game (Barrett 2003).  
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3.6 Appendix 
3.6.1 Tables 
Table 3.1: Summary of experimental design 
Treatment Stages n  b  c  No. of subjects 
VCM 
 
contribution 10 10 2 100 
COALmin participation 
voting 
contribution 
 
10 10 2 100 
COALqual_maj participation 
voting 
contribution 
 
10 10 2 100 
COALsimple_maj participation 
voting 
contribution 
10 10 2 100 
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Table 3.2: Probit estimation of individual participation decision 
Variables Rd. 1-10 
ci 
  
ci_lag 1.270*** 
 (0.0803) 
k_lag 3.11e-05 
 (0.0241) 
COALqual_maj -0.145* 
 (0.0869) 
COALsimple_maj -0.197*** 
 (0.0602) 
int_min_lag -0.103*** 
 (0.0374) 
outvoted_lag -0.110 
 (0.128) 
round6_10 -0.0841 
 (0.0521) 
Constant -0.545*** 
 (0.110) 
  
Observations 
Clusters 
Wald chi2 
2650 
30 
384.17*** 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at group level), 
significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
Definition of variables: 
ci = 1 if subject is coalition member, 0 otherwise, 
ci_lag = 1 if subject was coalition member in the previous round, 0 otherwise, 
k_lag = coalition size in the previous round, 
COALqual_maj = 1 if subject plays in the COALqual_maj treatment, 0 otherwise, 
COALsimple_maj = 1 if subject plays in the COALsimple_maj treatment, 0 otherwise, 
int_min_lag = previous round internalization ratio based on the binding minimum, 
outvoted_lag = 1 if subject’s minimum proposal in previous round was below the 
binding minimum, 0 otherwise, 
round6_10 = 1 if last five rounds, 0 if first five rounds. 
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Table 3.3: Linear regression of internalization ratios of minimum proposals 
Variables Rd. 1-10 
int_qimin 
int_qimin_lag 0.402*** 
 (0.0651) 
round6_10 0.0155 
 (0.0603) 
k 0.00554 
 (0.0336) 
COALqual_maj 0.0246 
 (0.0953) 
COALsimple_maj 0.0101 
 (0.0914) 
Constant 0.776** 
 (0.282) 
  
Observations 
Clusters 
R-squared 
763 
30 
0.238*** 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at group level), 
significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
Definition of variables: 
int_qimin = internalization ratio of subject’s minimum proposal, 
int_qimin_lag = internalization ratio of subject’s previous round minimum proposal, 
round6_10 = 1 for the last five rounds, 0 for the first five rounds, 
k = coalition size, 
COALqual_maj = 1 if subject plays in the COALqual_maj treatment, 0 otherwise, 
COALsimple_maj = 1 if subject plays in the COALsimple_maj treatment, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
Table 3.4: Summary statistics of results 
Treatment Total First 5 rounds Last 5 rounds 
 q    k  q   k  q   k  
VCM 12.3 905.2  15.7 1098.4  8.9 711.9  
COALmin 14.8 1060.1 5.1 16.32 1160.1 5.3 13.4 960.1 4.8 
COALqual_maj 15.7 1107.0 3.7 17.8 1200.6 3.9 13.6 1013.5 3.5 
COALsimple_maj 18.9 1235.8 3.6 22.8 1430.4 4.0 15.1 1041.1 3.1 
Note: q  = average contributions,   = average payoffs, k  = average coalition size 
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Table 3.5: Linear regression of individual contributions 
Variables Rd. 1-10 
qi 
Rd. 1-10 
qi 
Rd. 6-10 
qi 
    
COALmin 2.551** 2.551** 4.520*** 
 (1.012) (1.012) (1.372) 
COALqual_maj 3.360** 3.360** 4.698*** 
 (1.687) (1.687) (1.467) 
COALsimple_maj 6.644*** 6.644*** 6.194*** 
 (1.664) (1.664) (1.268) 
round6_10  -5.451***  
  (0.807)  
Constant 12.30*** 15.02*** 8.858*** 
 (0.616) (0.782) (0.595) 
    
Observations 
Clusters 
Wald chi2 
4000 
40 
20.05*** 
4000 
40 
58.56*** 
2000 
40 
58.56*** 
Note: Random effects estimation, robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at 
group level), significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
Definition of variables: 
qi = subject’s contribution, 
COALmin = 1 if subject plays in the COALmin treatment, 0 otherwise, 
COALqual_maj = 1 if subject plays in the COALqual_maj treatment, 0 otherwise, 
COALsimple_maj = 1 if subject plays in the COALsimple_maj treatment, 0 otherwise,
round6_10 = 1 for the last five rounds, 0 for the first five rounds.  
 
Table 3.6: Linear regression of individual payoff levels 
Variables Rd. 1-10 
pay 
Rd. 1-10 
pay 
Rd. 6-10 
pay 
    
COALmin 154.9*** 154.9*** 248.2*** 
 (58.95) (58.96) (82.22) 
COALqual_maj 201.9** 201.9** 301.6*** 
 (94.02) (94.03) (90.03) 
COALsimple_maj 330.6*** 330.6*** 329.2*** 
 (76.16) (76.17) (66.19) 
round6_10  -290.7***  
  (41.57)  
Constant 905.2*** 1,051*** 711.9*** 
 (42.69) (48.20) (42.32) 
    
Observations 
Clusters 
Wald chi2 
4000 
40 
20.49*** 
4000 
40 
63.05*** 
2000 
40 
29.89*** 
Note: Random effects estimation, robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at 
group level), significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
Definition of variables: 
pay = subject’s payoff, 
COALmin = 1 if subject plays in the COALmin treatment, 0 otherwise, 
COALqual_maj = 1 if subject plays in the COALqual_maj treatment, 0 otherwise, 
COALsimple_maj = 1 if subject plays in the COALsimple_maj treatment, 0 otherwise,
round6_10 = 1 for the last five rounds, 0 for the first five rounds.  
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3.6.2 Figures 
Figure 3.1: Average coalition size across rounds (left) and over time (right) 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Average internalization ratio 
 
Note: Average internalization ratio based on the agreed minimum contribution (left) and 
actual contributions (right). 
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Figure 3.3: Average internalization ratio conditional on coalition size 
 
Note: Average internalization ratio based on the agreed minimum (solid line) and actual 
contributions (dotted line) conditional on coalition size 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Average contribution levels:coalition members vs. non-members 
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Figure 3.5: Average contribution and payoff levels 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Average contribution levels over time 
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4 The role of inequality and pledges in a climate change 
coordination game 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the drivers of coordination among groups of unrelated 
individuals faced with a public good game requiring multilateral effort in order to reach 
a target and avoid losses to all members. Similar to conventional coordination games, 
this game involves many equilibria including the one that leads to the efficient outcome. 
Therefore, the experimental subjects need to coordinate rather than to cooperate to reach 
the social optimum.  
 The experiment thereby builds upon the climate change game proposed by Milinski et 
al. (2008). These authors introduced two salient and distinguishing characteristics of 
individuals’ attitude towards risk and time. On the risk-aversion side, it sets itself apart 
from commonly studied public goods games, as it involves investing in a public good 
(climate protection) in order to avoid a loss (hazardous climate change), rather than 
realizing a gain. Concerning the time dimension, a relevant trait of the climate problem 
is the tension between avoiding incurring immediate mitigation costs by not 
contributing to the public good today, and the long-term preference for a sound 
environment.  
The focus here is on two further aspects that are absent in the original experiment but 
may prove determinant for its results: First, the experiment explicitly considers how the 
game is perceived in the presence of an asymmetric geometry for sharing the burdens of 
mitigation. That is, differences in the endowments originating from contributions (or 
lack thereof) in the initial rounds of play are introduced to convey the idea of 
differential wealth and responsibilities to players. Such asymmetries in wealth and 
carbon responsibilities among the actors might further impede coordination. Second, the 
players are empowered with the ability to make non-binding pledges before the actions 
are chosen. While these announcements do not carry any enforceable commitments with 
them, we postulate that they may facilitate the coordination among players towards the 
efficient outcome.16 In coordination games communication is not simply ‘cheap talk’ 
                                                 
16 See Bernasconi et al. (2010) for an experimental investigation of the role of expressive obligations in 
public good provision. 
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but may have an important effect on the ability to coordinate (Riechmann and Weimann 
2008). 
These additional aspects are deemed to be very important both at the theoretical and 
policy level. They are reminiscent of the real climate negotiations where countries have 
“common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (UNFCCC 
1992) and individual nations can make pledges in an uncoordinated manner. The two 
issues also appear to have played a determinant role in the negotiation discourse in the 
two latest Conferences of the Parties of the United Nations, which took place in 
Copenhagen and Cancún (COP 15 and COP 16). First, countries seem to have different 
views on fairness considerations in sharing the burden of the greenhouse gas mitigation 
costs: Developed countries are historically the main contributors to climate change, 
while in some newly industrializing economies, notably China, greenhouse gas 
emissions grow at an unprecedented rate. Therefore, the fair way to share the 
responsibilities among developing and developed countries in the containment of global 
greenhouse gas emissions is not obvious. In international climate policy, different 
notions of equity have been proposed: For example, the egalitarian rule incorporates 
the principle of equal per capita emissions, the sovereignty rule postulates the principle 
of equal percentage reduction of current emissions, the polluter-pays rule incorporates 
the principle of equal ratio between abatement costs and emissions, and the ability-to-
pay rule stipulates the principle of equal ratio between abatement costs and GDP (Lange 
et al. 2010). The lack of consensus on equity principles has informed much of the 
United States – China exchanges on who is to be the first mover in the emission 
reduction game. Advocating that the other country was to take the lead in terms of 
timing and magnitude of greenhouse gas reductions on the grounds of reciprocity 
considerations, the two largest emitters worldwide (each accounts for roughly one fifth 
of energy related global CO2 emissions) have managed to stay clear of binding 
commitments to date. Second, the Copenhagen Accord has introduced a non-binding 
‘pledge and review’ mechanism where individual countries define voluntary emission 
reduction targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (or a correlated measure such as 
the carbon intensity of output) before 2020. Some 100 countries have already associated 
themselves with the Accord, of which 75 have also issued domestic goals for mitigation 
actions by 2020. The pledges of the participating countries were officially adopted at 
the subsequent climate conference in Cancún in December 2010. 
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The experimental results show that the real-world features introduced in the game have 
deep consequences on the coordination level. Both claims that the inequality disrupts 
and the pledges help coordination are supported by the data. The remainder of the 
chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 provides a brief discussion of the related 
literature along with the design of the present experiment. Section 4.3 is concerned with 
its theoretical underpinnings, followed by the Section 4.4 displaying the main results. 
Section 4.5 draws some concluding remarks.  
 
4.2 Experimental design 
Most experiments on public goods utilize linear public goods games, where participants 
have the option to invest a fraction of their endowments in a public good by means of a 
voluntary contributions mechanism (e.g. Ledyard 1995). Typically, the returns to the 
investment are equally shared among the participants according to the marginal per 
capita return. The experiment in this chapter departs from this standard formulation in 
many ways in order to create a setting which incorporates realistic issues faced by 
climate change negotiators. First, the provision of the public good is sequential, as 
multiple stages of contributions (10 rounds) are performed before the assessment of the 
group effectiveness in preventing simulated catastrophic climate change. Second, the 
objective of the game is to avoid a loss rather than creating a surplus by contributing to 
a public good (with higher group contributions leading to higher returns to the players). 
Here players’ contributions to the public good make them collectively better off only 
insofar they are sufficient to reach a threshold (€120). All contributions below (or 
above) the threshold are wasted, as they fail to secure the keeping of the private 
accounts by the participants (or have no additional benefit if above the threshold). This 
feature leads to the next salient one, concerning the probabilistic nature of the losses. To 
account for the uncertainty involved in climatic change, the actions of the six players 
forming a group taking part in the game have consequences that are not deterministic. If 
they collectively fail to reach the target required to provide the public good, they will 
lose their savings on the private account with a probability of 50%. As both the climate 
threshold and the probability of the climate catastrophe are known, the players’ primary 
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challenge here is to coordinate their contributions.17 Finally the experiment is framed as 
a climate change game (see Section 4.6.3), i.e. the players contribute to a climate 
account and not to an abstract ‘joint project’ that often codifies the public good in 
experiments. 
The probability of the climate catastrophe (50%) was chosen in the light of the results of 
the original experiment by Milinski et al. (2008), who developed and experimentally 
tested the above set-up. It is therefore worth taking a closer look at their experiment: Six 
individuals in a group are each endowed with €40. They decide on each of ten rounds of 
the game whether to contribute either €0, €2, or €4 to the climate account, with each 
group being presented with one of three different treatments corresponding to three 
probability of savings’ loss: 90%, 50% and 10%. These yielded the following levels of 
success in avoiding simulated climate change: 50%, 10% and 0%. That is with the 
highest stakes, due to the larger gains in expected value from reaching the target, 
cooperation was highest and half of the participating groups were successful in 
collecting at least €120, while only one group out of ten succeeded in the 50% treatment 
and no groups succeeded in the 10% treatment. Note that the last result is not surprising 
from a rationality standpoint, as a player contributing €0 in all rounds would have 
expected earnings of €36 compared to earnings of €20 and €0 by following the 
remaining two pure strategies of €2/round and €4/round contributions. Only in the 90% 
treatment the social optimum coincides with the strategy of €2/round, as it would lead to 
certain earnings of €20 if adopted by all subjects, compared to expected earnings of €4 
if all adopt the €0/round strategy and a certain outcome of €0 if they follow the 
€4/round strategy.  
The basic experimental design in this chapter closely follows the design of Milinski et 
al. (2008) with six individuals playing together in a group, each endowed with €40. The 
players decided in each of the active rounds of the game whether to contribute either €0 
(‘no contribution’), €2 (‘intermediate contribution’), or €4 (‘high contribution’) to the 
climate account. All groups were being presented with the probability of savings’ loss 
of 50%. After each round the players were informed about all individual contributions 
                                                 
17 Scott Barrett theoretically examines what happens if these (and other) conditions do not apply. For 
preliminary results see 
http://cbey.research.yale.edu/uploads/Environmental%20Economics%20Seminar/Yale%20seminar%20pa
per.pdf (accessed in July 2010). 
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and the aggregate group contribution in that round as well as the cumulative past 
contribution of each player and the group. As in Milinski et al. (2008), players were 
assigned nicknames in order to keep their identity private. Since the focus of this paper 
is to test in the lab for the role of inequalities in informing the debate on climate change, 
we introduced a series of treatments aimed at capturing features of asymmetry among 
participants in terms of wealth, past contributions and future commitment 
announcements.  
In order to induce subjects to perceive the inequalities among them as the result of past 
actions, we modified the game described above by replacing the first three rounds with 
three inactive ones where half of the group had only the option of choosing a €4/round 
contribution, while the remaining three players could only select a €0/round 
contribution. That is, rather than externally imposing different endowments from the 
beginning of the experiment, players were all told they had the full €40 endowment 
before the start, but witnessed through the first three rounds a growing divergence 
between high and low contributors. As a result of these three inactive rounds, the 
players begin the active play consisting of seven rounds with substantial ‘inherited’ 
differences: Those who forcefully contributed €12 prior to round 4 had €28 left in their 
private accounts, while those who previously did not contribute anything to the public 
good found themselves with the entire endowment available for the ensuing seven 
rounds. This treatment is called ‘Base-Fair’ and it is expected to convey a sense of 
responsibility to the relatively wealthy players, as their position is due to past free-
riding. This situation is reminiscent of that of global CO2 emissions, with developed 
countries owing much of their prosperity to past carbon-intensive industrialization, 
relative to developing countries with historically smaller carbon footprints and wealth. 
In order to single out the effect on coordination of the introduced asymmetry, a ‘Base’ 
treatment has been performed without such unequalizing redistribution. In it, subjects 
go through three inactive rounds where they all have no other option than to choose the 
intermediate contribution of €2 per round. 
 Finally, two treatments in which the subjects had the opportunity to make future 
commitment announcements are implemented. The ‘Pledge’ treatment introduced two 
pledge stages to the symmetric case while the ‘Pledge-Fair’ treatment introduced two 
pledge stages to the asymmetric case. In both pledge treatments it was common 
knowledge that the pledges were non-binding. The first pledge stage was after the 
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(inactive) first three rounds. The subjects simultaneously and independently announced 
their intended contributions for the subsequent seven rounds. Afterwards the players 
saw the ‘intended climate account’ which contained the individual contributions from 
the first three (inactive) rounds plus the individual pledges. Thereby they immediately 
detected whether the intended contributions would be sufficient to avoid catastrophic 
climate change. The second pledge stage took place after round seven. Similar to the 
first pledge, the players simultaneously and independently announced their intended 
contributions for the last three rounds and were subsequently informed about the ‘new 
intended climate account’ that included past contributions and the pledges. Table 4.1 
summarizes the key features of the experimental design and the number of participants 
in each session.  
The experiment was run in May 2010 at a computer laboratory at the University of 
Magdeburg, Germany. In total, 240 students participated in the experiment, whereby the 
pool consisted of a mixture of students with an economic or business major (60%) and 
students with a non-economic major (40%). Most of the students were experienced as 
they had participated in three or more experiments before (88%) while only few 
students were inexperienced (12%). Sixty subjects took part in each treatment. No 
subject participated in more than one treatment. Sessions lasted about 60 minutes. For 
each session, we recruited either 12 or 18 subjects using the ORSEE software (Greiner 
2004). Each subject was seated at linked computer terminals that were used to transmit 
all decision and payoff information (Ztree software, Fischbacher 2007). Once the 
individuals were seated and logged into the terminals, a set of written instructions was 
handed out. Experimental instructions (see Section 4.6.3) included a numerical example 
and control questions in order to ensure that all subjects understood the game. At the 
beginning of the experiment subjects were randomly assigned to groups of six. The 
subjects were not aware of whom they were grouped with, but they did know that they 
remained within the same group of players throughout the ten rounds. After the final 
round, the players were informed whether the group had successfully reached the 
threshold of €120. Afterwards they were asked to fill in a short questionnaire. The 
questionnaire was designed to elicit the players’ impressions and motivation during the 
game, as well as the general opinion about climate change policy (see Section 4.4.3). At 
the end of the experiment, one of two table tennis balls was publicly drawn from a bag 
by a volunteer student. If there was the number 1 on the ball, all players in the groups 
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that had not reached the threshold kept the money (that was left on their private 
account). If there was the number 2 on the ball, these players lost their money. Out of 
the 20 groups which did not reach the threshold 11 groups were in good luck and kept 
their money while 9 groups were in bad luck and lost their money. No show-up fee was 
administered. On average, a subject earned €17.23 in the games; the maximum payoff 
was €40 and the minimum €0. 
The money allocated to the climate account was used to buy and withdraw CO2 
emission certificates traded in the European Union emission trading scheme (EU 
ETS).18 If a group had successfully reached the threshold, all of the climate account 
money was used in this way. In case of a failing group only half of the climate account 
money was used for emission certificates. Thereby, we introduced a specific field 
context to the experiment which made the task more realistic and might increase the 
participants’ motivation. The experimental instructions contained a short explanation of 
the EU ETS and the above mentioned rules. It was announced furthermore that the 
overall amount of certificates as well as the purchase and suspension documents could 
be found on a specific website shortly after the experiment. Overall, €3,248 were spent 
for emission certificates which corresponds to 212 tons of CO2 given a price of 15.3 
€/ton.19 
 
4.3 Theoretical background 
The multiplicity of equilibria in the game makes classification virtually impossible. The 
game utilized here is a modified n-person stochastic threshold public goods game, with 
a total of ten rounds of which only seven allow freedom of choice over the three 
possible actions. Both contributing nothing and 2€ in each round are (symmetric) Nash 
equilibria, since unilateral deviations are nonprofitable. Of course, depending on the 
round and the path that has led to it, a round contribution of €4 bringing the individual 
sum above €20 may still be optimal if successful in guaranteeing that past investments 
were not wasted. Conversely, if at a certain stage the target becomes out of reach 
                                                 
18  For information about the EU ETS visit the European Commission official website 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/index_en.htm (accessed in September 2010). 
19  See http://www.zew.de/en/topthemen/meldung_show.php?LFDNR=1517&KATEGORIE=2; for 
emission certificate prices visit http://www.eex.com/en (accessed in September 2010). 
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because of insufficient members’ contributions, one’s best response is to stop 
contributing and play the odds.   
Given the 50% probability of loss, conditional on the group failure to collect €120, the 
take home expectations when choosing not to contribute are given in the second column 
of Table 4.2. In the symmetric treatments, borrowing the wording from Milinski et al. 
(2008), “each course of the game that leads to exactly reaching the target sum of €120, 
irrespective of who[m] contributes how much as long as each player invests” at most 
€22 overall, is a Nash equilibrium. This is since the latter investment translates into a 
payoff of €18, which is above the €17 that are expected when all players choose not to 
contribute to the public good (second column in Table 4.2). Therefore, individuals can 
maximize the pay at the end of the game by choosing the intermediate level of 
contribution, invest a further €14 over rounds 4 to 10 and secure the €20. 
In the asymmetric treatments, due to the different disposable endowments of rich and 
poor players, the former gain the most when the climate is protected with equal burden 
sharing in the active rounds (€26, resulting from an investment of €14 in the active 
rounds). Relative to the no contribution equilibrium, it is more appealing as the rich will 
be at least as well off when investing at most €20. The poor, on the other hand, do not 
stand to gain from the equal burden sharing in the active rounds, assuming risk 
neutrality. Given the early rounds contributions of €12, only by investing less than €14 
in the active rounds (and the group still reaching the threshold) can these players have a 
higher expectation than by not investing in the public good.  
The game design allows for such a redistribution. Since the wealthy players have a 
surplus of €12 in the 2€/active round equilibrium relative to the other, they can in 
principle forgo part or all of it by investing more and allowing the poor to 
correspondingly decrease their investment. In the case of full redistribution, both types 
of players have a final payoff of €20, which for the rich is still rational in the sense of 
not being welfare diminishing relative to not contributing anything.    
 
4.3.1 Game trade-offs between risk aversion and inequity aversion 
For illustrative purposes, a hypothetical scenario is shown in Table 4.3. Assume the 
group has just completed round nine, with an aggregate contribution of €108 (i.e. they 
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are on track). Assume further that four players stick to €2 in round ten, unilaterally 
bringing the account to €116. If the two remaining players were convinced, say due to 
previous contribution patterns, that only the two of them would consider deviating from 
the intermediate €2 contribution in the last round, they would be facing the figures 
displayed in Table 4.3. 
Ultimately, the decision depends largely, in this situation, on the degree of risk aversion 
and on mutual expectations. A third driver of behavior should not be overlooked, 
namely moral heuristics. Especially if previous departures from symmetric burden 
sharing introduced the need and led to altruistic acts by some of the players, inequity 
aversion might motivate the latter to refuse participation in an unfair outcome, even at a 
deer cost to them and the others. In this experimental setting, these situations are 
expected to arise more frequently in the treatments with initial unequalizing rounds, as 
they are likely to result in greater disparities among players (due to the constrained 
behavior in the early rounds). Inequity aversion may be determinant in guiding the 
decision based on Table 4.3-type of scenarios. If for example a player is risk-averse but 
strongly resists disadvantageous inequity (has a high alpha parameter in Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999 terminology), he or she will be unwilling to compensate for the actions of 
the risk-seeker(s).  
Let us return to the example shown in Table 4.3 in order to evaluate how inequity 
aversion may steer the end result towards successful or unsuccessful coordination. In its 
absence, a risk-seeking player believing the opponent to be risk-averse (i.e. placing a 
high probability on his/her choosing the high round contribution of €4), might be 
inclined to take a chance and choose €0 in the last round. Symmetrically, a risk-averse 
individual, say the column player, fearing to see the certainty of a gain jeopardized as a 
result of free-riding, may well opt for contributing €4. In that case, the two contributions 
would offset each other and €120 would be reached (top right entry in Table 4.3). This 
situation is reminiscent of the snow drift game, which differs from the prisoner dilemma 
game in that unilateral action, while not as desirable as shared cooperation, still 
provides a benefit to its pursuer.20 However, if risk aversion is dominated by inequity 
                                                 
20 Kümmerli et al. (2007) argue for the omnipresence of these situations in human working life, with the 
following example: “two scientists accomplishing a research project would each benefit if the other 
invests more time than oneself in the writing of the paper reporting the collaborative work. But if one of 
the collaborators does not contribute at all, the best option probably remains to do all the work on one’s 
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aversion, the column player may choose either the €2 or the €0 contribution, if believing 
the row player to free-ride, thus leading to the highly inefficient outcome represented by 
the top left and top middle cells. Highly inefficient since they do not guarantee certainty 
of success, notwithstanding the substantial contributions, which on average are close to 
€2/round per player.  
 
4.3.2 Impact of the computerized rounds 
As discussed in Section 4.2, in the two symmetric treatments the players witness three 
rounds of unavoidable €2 contributions, while in the remaining two asymmetric 
treatments the players undergo three unequalizing rounds resulting in half of the group 
being wealthier than the remaining half. At the group level, independent of the 
treatment, they contribute €36 to the public good before round four begins, keeping 
them on track with respect to the threshold. What is the impact of this mechanism on the 
attainable game equilibria? First of all, it makes the achievement of the threshold 
collectively optimal as otherwise the already invested €36 would have been wasted.  
Let us consider the case of symmetric contributions constrained to the intermediate 
round contribution of €2. Of the two symmetric Nash equilibria from the setup in 
Milinski et al. (2008), corresponding to all players contributing either €2 or €0 per 
round, the latter is no longer available. This difference may promote coordination, as 
the unrecoverable individual contribution of €6 early in the game could in principle 
steer away individuals from no contribution towards the intermediate contribution.21  
For what concerns the remaining two asymmetric treatments, both symmetric Nash 
equilibria disappear, as not only the all selfish equilibrium is ruled out by the first three 
rounds (although now three players do have the option to avoid any contribution), but 
also the one where all players contribute €2/round. This happens since half of the group 
begins round four with a sunk investment of €12, while the remaining players are 
unbound. The difference with respect to the symmetric case is stark, as it arguably 
                                                                                                                                               
own.” These tradeoffs, which also apply to the sharing of the global climate bill, are captured by the game 
analyzed here. 
21 In the experiment by Milinski et al. (2008), participants of the 50% treatment, which were not bound to 
the fair amount in rounds one to three, contributed on average > €1.5/round. This suggests that the selfish 
Nash equilibrium was not popular even in the absence of the discussed mechanism. 
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introduces profound differences in the motivations of the two subgroups to provide the 
public good. 
Before turning to it, at the risk of oversimplifying the complexity of the 6-person, 10-
round game, Table 4.4 presents payoff matrices with the aim to highlight some key 
characteristics of the game in Milinski et al. (2008) and in the present work. The left 
matrix concerns the former, while the centre and right matrices respectively summarize 
the outcome of interactions in the symmetric and asymmetric games introduced here. 
For the sake of presentational clarity, the analysis is simplified by assuming that two 
subgroups of three players choosing the same strategy form, effectively reducing the 
type of interactions to those present in the familiar 2x2 formulation. That is, the three 
players in each subgroup act identically, as if they tacitly coordinated on the same 
choices. Moreover, in Table 4.4 players can only choose between either free-riding in 
all active rounds (no contributions), or always contributing the intermediate amount of 
€2/round.22 This simplification allows analyzing the game as if it was a one shot game, 
where people simultaneously reason on the outcome from picking one of two strategies 
leading to the corresponding group level Nash equilibria (keeping in mind the above 
discussion on the no longer attainable Nash equilibria).  
Comparing the three cases, we notice that, when choosing between no contribution and 
the intermediate contribution in the respective games, best response behavior leads to 
two pure strategy Nash equilibria where all players coordinate on either the free-riding 
or the intermediate €2 strategy, irrespective of which matrix we consider. However, 
while in the one simplifying the game in Milinski et al. (2008), both are payoff 
equivalent, with the €2/round equilibrium being a weak Nash equilibrium and the 
€0/round equilibrium being strict, in the symmetric game in the centre of Table 4.4 the 
intermediate contribution equilibrium is payoff dominant (and both are strict). Lastly, in 
the asymmetric one, the intermediate contribution equilibrium is again payoff dominant, 
although it is weak, unlike the no contribution equilibrium which is strict. This analysis 
confirms that the games experimentally tested here can be seen as coordination games 
of the Stag Hunt kind, with the trade-off between social cooperation and safety being 
                                                 
22 It is important to stress again that, while the all fair-sharer equilibrium is present in all three matrices in 
Table 4.4 (top-left cells), the one where all players choose the selfish act in each of the ten rounds 
(bottom-right cell in the first matrix) is not preserved in either of the games introduced here. In other 
words, due to the introduction of the computerized rounds, the €0 contribution is no longer attainable in 
the remaining two matrices. 
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represented by the more rewarding €2/round strategy versus the safer €0/round strategy, 
which does not require cooperation to succeed.23  
Against this background we can summarize the following hypotheses for the game: 
(i) pledges increases successful coordination by helping players to coordinate on 
whether to provide the public good or not and 
(ii) inequality disrupts coordination due to the different incentives of the two types 
of players (see Table 4.2). 
In other words, we expect more groups to reach the threshold of €120 if players have 
the opportunity to pledge their planned contribution than if they do not have this 
opportunity; and we expect fewer groups to reach the threshold if the players are 
asymmetric than if they are symmetric with respect to their endowment and 
responsibility. 
 
4.4 Experimental results 
The results in Figure 4.1 show a clear ranking in terms of success of coordination as 
measured by the percentage of groups who contributed at least €120 to the climate 
account. Both hypotheses are supported by the experimental data: The two pledge 
treatments are well above the corresponding ones without pledges. In the absence of the 
mitigating effect of the pledges, which proved to be an important vehicle of intentions 
among the participants, income inequality reduced the prospects of success (5/10 
successful groups in the Base treatment vs. 2/10 in Base-Fair). In the latter, investment 
by the failing groups was €15 higher (n=13, p=0.0393, two-sided Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon (MWW) test), indicating that inequality also led to poorer coordination on the 
non-provision outcome. Allowing subjects of the asymmetric treatment to announce 
                                                 
23 Skyrms (2001) has the following interpretation of the game: “In the Stag Hunt, what is rational for one 
player to choose depends on his beliefs about what the other will choose. Both stag hunting and hare 
hunting are equilibria. [....] A player who chooses to hunt stag takes a risk that the other will choose not to 
cooperate in the Stag Hunt. A player who chooses to hunt hare runs no such risk, since his payoff does 
not depend on the choice of action of the other player, but he foregoes the potential payoff of a successful 
stag hunt. Here rational players are pulled in one direction by considerations of mutual benefit and in the 
other by considerations of personal risk”. The game analyzed here adds a further layer of complexity, as 
the option that doesn’t require cooperation to succeed, namely the always defect strategy labelled Selfish 
in Table 4.3, is not entirely safe due to the associated probabilistic payoff; Fair, on the other hand, is risky 
in terms of reliance on coordination, but safe with respect to the ensuing payoff.  
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future contributions significantly raised the success rate in collecting the target sum 
(from 20% in Base-Fair to 60% in Pledge-Fair, n=20, p=0.085, one-sided Fisher's exact 
test). The latter success rate (60%) is not significantly different from the 70% achieved 
by participants of the symmetric Pledge treatment (p=0.500), indicating that inequality 
is a less serious threat once a coordination mechanism is introduced.  
While non-binding, the amounts pledged were close to actual contributions: Following 
the second pledge, average cumulative contributions in rounds 8-10 were €31.8 and €30 
in Pledge-Fair and Pledge respectively, and the stated amounts were €32.6 and €29.6. 
In support of their role as lubricant of collaboration, we find that the closer the pledges 
to actual contributions, the higher the probability of success: As the difference between 
the player’s pledged amounts and cumulative contributions increases, the probability of 
the player being in a successful group decreases significantly (see Figure 4.3). The top 
panels in Figure 4.3 visually confirm the link between success and adherence to the 
initial pledge: For the successful groups that provided the public good the gap is tighter 
than for the unsuccessful ones, as indicated by the dispersion around the bisector. 
Similarly for the second pledge, greater clustering around the bisector takes place in 
successful groups than in unsuccessful ones (see also probit estimation results in Table 
4.7). The following sections take a closer look at between and within treatment 
differences, and find supporting evidence for the above claims, as well offering 
explanations based on the underlying patterns. 
 
4.4.1 Trajectories of public good contributions 
Much of this section’s analysis is based on Figure 4.2. In it, the contribution trajectories 
resulting from averaging those of the participants of the four treatments are contrasted 
with the symmetric trajectory that would arise if all subjects chose the intermediate €2 
strategy, therefore collecting €12 per round. Note that each curve concerns eight rounds, 
the first of which represents the group contribution in round three, set by default at €36 
for all treatments, after which each subject has the freedom to choose the round 
contribution between €0, €2, and €4. 
The experimental subjects displayed a significant amount of variation, with some 
groups contributing little to the public good (the group that came closest to the no 
contribution equilibrium collectively contributed only €12 in the seven active rounds), 
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and others surpassing the threshold (the maximum was €126). Nevertheless, each 
treatment was characterized by substantial differences in terms of success rate in 
simulated climate catastrophe avoidance. Five of the ten groups participating in Base 
were successful, contributing on average €122.4, while the remaining five fell short by 
contributing €70. The ten groups as a whole contributed €96.2 ± 32.5 (mean ± error), as 
shown in Figure 4.2. As expected, the Pledge treatment proved effective in facilitating 
coordination, even if based on non-binding commitments. Successful coordination on 
the target increases to 70%, with all groups contributing €103.6 ± 29.6, stemming from 
the €121.1 set aside by the seven groups who reached the target and €62.7 by the 
remaining three. Participants of Base-Fair provided €100.6 ± 21.8, which is below the 
provision level in both pledge treatments (the highest across treatments was achieved in 
Pledge-Fair, with 108 ± 21.8), reflecting the positive impact of the pledges discussed 
above. Notably, this impact is higher when considering the asymmetric treatments 
(+40% success rate from Base-Fair to Pledge-Fair), with respect to the symmetric ones 
(+20% success rate from Base to Pledge). Table 4.5 provides linear regression results 
on individual contributions across all treatments. The results indicate that, while the 
treatments matter for the probability of success, they are of less importance for 
individual contributions. 
While in Base and Pledge failing groups provided only €70 and €62.7 respectively, 
failing groups participating in Base-Fair and Pledge-Fair contributed a remarkable 
€95.5 and €88, despite the lower success rate in the latter two. This suggests that the 
role of the asymmetric endowments is twofold: It disrupts coordination by rendering the 
process more complex, but the increased failure rate is not simply the result of a 
decision by a larger proportion of group members to opt for a no contribution strategy in 
the hope of high earnings. Many groups in these two treatments clearly tried to reach 
the €120 threshold until the last rounds, therefore increasing average contribution 
relative to the failing groups in Base and Pledge, who often behaved as if they tacitly 
agreed on gambling with the probability, due to low contributions in the early rounds. In 
fact 6/8 failing groups (75%) in Base and Pledge combined provided ≤ €70, while in the 
corresponding asymmetric treatments only 2/12 failing groups (17%) provided ≤ €70. In 
other words, the inequality undermined the groups’ ability to combat simulated climate 
change damage, but not their motivation, which is actually higher than in the symmetric 
treatments. 
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4.4.2 Inequality 
We have seen that inequality impedes coordination among the players. This section 
analyzes in more detail how the groups in the asymmetric treatments Base-Fair and 
Pledge-Fair handle the inequality and compare the handling between groups which 
successfully reached the threshold and those which did not.  
Successful groups were strikingly effective in eliminating the inherited inequality (see 
Figure 4.4): Both the rich players and the poor players contributed on average precisely 
€20 to the climate account (two-sided MWW test, n=16, p=0.8195). Thereby, 92% of 
the rich players and also 92% of the poor players gave €20 or more. Conversely, the 
difference in contributions between rich and poor is significant in failing groups (€12.83 
by the rich and €18.17 by the poor, n=24, p=0.0138), indicating that such redistribution 
did not take place. 47% of the poor players and only 17% of the rich players paid €20 or 
more. However, the rich players did not completely refuse to invest. The majority 
(53%) invested €14 or more. That means they were not willing to eliminate inequality 
completely. The poor players, on the other hand, were not willing to compensate for the 
missing investment. Obviously the rich and the poor had different views on what is the 
appropriate contribution for each type of player. In the end, the persistence in their 
different viewpoints was crucial and caused the shipwreck of the group. We will come 
back to this point in the next section.  
Interestingly, even in the absence of communication, participants of successful groups 
tacitly coordinated on an equalizing redistribution which offset the original endowment 
asymmetry. However, the pledges appeared to be of great help since in the Pledge-Fair 
treatment 75% of the groups managed to eliminate inequality and reach the target that 
while in the Base-Fair treatment only 33% of the groups managed to do that. 
The above findings shed light on the importance of countering inequalities and on the 
need for channels to vehicle intentions, if successful coordination on a costly group 
effort is the objective. It is particularly salient to see whether timely redistributive 
signals by the rich are associated with effective coordination. On average, rich players 
in successful groups contributed €3.17 in round 4, while they contributed €2.06 in 
failing groups. This difference is significant (two-sided MWW test, n=20, p=0.0054). 
Likewise, cumulative contributions by the rich over rounds 4 to 6 were €9.83 in 
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successful groups, while the rich in failing groups appeared to be unwilling to commit 
to early redistribution and invested only €6.67 (n=20, p=0.0040). These differences 
indicate that early leadership by those with greater means (and responsibilities) is a key 
to reach the target. 
 
4.4.3 Questionnaire analysis 
After the experiment subjects were asked to fill in a questionnaire about the motivation 
for their contribution decisions during the game and their general opinion about climate 
change (see Tables 4.8 and 4.9 for summary of responses and Table 4.5 for regression 
results). The summary of the players’ motivation for their contribution decisions during 
the game is a bit complicated because, on the one hand, open questions were used to 
elicit the motives and, on the other hand, the motives obviously depend on the 
respective group performance. The qualitative categorization of responses reveals that 
the majority of players is primarily motivated by the achievement of the threshold 
(43%), fairness considerations (18%), material self-interest (15%), and the past group 
performance (14%). Understandably, the poor players in the asymmetric treatments 
Base-Fair and Pledge-Fair care more about fairness than the rich players (22% versus 
15%) and more about the past group performance (27% versus 14%). In the final round 
the players are primarily motivated by the achievement of the threshold (42%), material 
self-interest (18%), the hopelessness to reach the threshold (14%), and fairness 
considerations (11%). The self-reported motives are in line with the actual behavior in 
the game, e.g. people stating that fairness was the most important reason often 
contributed €20 to the climate account while people stating the self-interest was their 
primary motive mostly gave less than €20. The self-reported motives furthermore help 
to understand why some groups did not reach the threshold. Comparing the successful 
groups that reached the threshold and the groups that did not, fairness considerations 
were more important for the successful groups (23% versus 13%) as well as the 
achievement of the target (52% versus 35%) while self-interest (9% versus 20%) and 
the past group performance (8% versus 21%) were less important. 
In order to elicit players’ fairness perceptions, the subjects in the asymmetric treatments 
were asked whether they agree with the following statement: “Those who began in 
round 4 with a starting capital of €40 should pay more into the climate account in the 
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following seven rounds than the other players”. Overall, 76% of subjects agree with that 
statement, 10% disagree, and 14% neither agree nor disagree. Considering, again, the 
difference between successful groups and failing groups, we observe that the rich’s 
fairness perceptions and willingness to redistribute were decisive for success: Being 
confronted with the above statement 75% of the rich in successful groups but only 53% 
of the rich in failing groups agreed with that claim (one-sided Fisher’s exact test, n=60, 
p=0.071). Therefore the rich’s opinion in that question and the group’s success are 
significantly correlated (Spearman’s correlation test, n=60, p=0.0855).  
Furthermore, the acceptance of the above claim is highly dependent on the player’s 
wealth (Spearman’s correlation test, n=120, p=0.0002). In numbers: 90% of the poor 
but only 62% of the rich support the claim for redistribution (one-sided Fisher’s exact 
test, n=120, p=0.000). In another question, subjects in the asymmetric were asked 
“What would you consider a fair average investment for the last seven (active) rounds 
for those beginning with €40 and for those beginning with €28?” Possible answers 
include €0, €1, €2, €3, and €4. Almost all of the poor players (95%) perceive €3 as the 
fair amount for the rich players while only 72% of the rich players share this perception. 
Similarly, only 23% of the poor players perceive €2 as the fair average contribution for 
the poor players while 42% of the rich players state that this would be the fair amount. 
These specific amounts (€3 for the rich and €2 for the poor) are particularly important 
because they reflect the application of the different equity principles. In our game, the 
egalitarian rule, the polluter-pays rule and the ability-to-pay rule are equivalent: 
According to these principles the rich (and responsible) players should compensate for 
the inactive rounds where they gained their wealth without contributing to climate 
protection. In order to equalize the players’ contributions and payments the rich should 
contribute €20 in the active rounds, i.e. on average €3 per round. As opposed, the 
sovereignty rule does not consider the players’ wealth or responsibility but rather 
requires the same contribution during the active rounds, i.e. €2 per round for the rich as 
well as for the poor players. In fact, a couple of rich subjects argued that the assignment 
of roles was just bad luck or good luck and that the €2 contribution per (active) round 
and player was a fair burden sharing. Hence, our game as much as the real climate 
negotiations allow for different notions of fairness. The players tend to pick the notion 
that is in their best interest (‘self-serving bias’) meaning that the implementation of that 
notion would generate least costs for them. This self-serving bias in the perception of 
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fairness has been also observed in the real climate negotiations (Lange et al. 2010) and 
it obviously deteriorates the chances for effective coordination. 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
The experiment presented in this chapter explores the relevance of equity and 
commitment issues in affecting the subjects’ willingness to contribute to a public good 
framed in terms of avoidance of catastrophic climate change. It builds upon the game 
proposed by Milinski et al. (2008) to explore some further aspects that were not 
captured by the original design, and that are deemed important both at the theoretical 
and policy level. In particular the focus is on: (i) introducing asymmetries among 
players by means of a novel unequalizing mechanism in the first three rounds and (ii) 
allowing players to make non-binding pledges concerning future contributions. The 
extended climate change game empirically tested here captures trade-offs that are 
particularly salient for the issue of climate change mitigation. It is a promising tool for 
analyzing such tensions notwithstanding its simplicity, as it provides insights into many 
aspects that are crucial to climate change and coordination at large. Given the lack of 
scientific consensus on who should bear the burden of mitigation costs, providing 
empirical evidence on the driving forces behind coordination in a setting designed to 
mimic inequalities and bargaining possibilities faced by actors involved with climate 
change, should be fruitful also from a policy perspective. 
The main purpose of the paper was to address the question: Will the most responsible 
actors contribute more to combat climate change damage in a public goods game 
experiment where players differ in wealth and responsibilities? The empirical answer to 
this question is generally ‘no’: Initially wealthier subjects were often unwilling to 
compensate for past, ‘inherited’, actions which had benefited them at the expense of the 
common good. Such resistance, much to the frustration of the remaining subjects who 
expected initiative on the part of the wealthy, accounted for the frequent coordination 
failures in the asymmetric treatments. In all twelve instances (out of twenty 
participating groups) where the target sum was not provided, there was an unfavourable 
contribution imbalance for those who had been bound to the altruistic act in the first 
three rounds, who ended up on average paying 60% of the bill. Not surprisingly, the 
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burden was shared evenly in the remaining eight successful groups, with both subgroups 
contributing 50% of the sum. 
While neither one of the new features introduced in the climate change game alters the 
game structure in terms of the group trajectory required to reach the threshold for 
climate protection, they both have a significant impact on the groups' success rate. 
Asymmetries undermined coordination, especially in the treatment where subjects had 
no signaling mechanism beyond contributions, in which 80% of the groups failed to 
reach the target sum. Pledges, on the other hand, proved to be an effective lubricant of 
coordination, halving the percentage of failures in the treatment with endowment 
inequalities. Both in the baseline and across all treatments, the rate of success was 50%, 
a remarkably high level considering the instability of the fair share Nash equilibrium 
and the previous findings of 10% cooperation by Milinski et al. (2008). With respect to 
the latter, the higher coordination may stem from design and subject pool differences. 
As for the former, we argue, in accordance to much of the experimental literature, that 
human behavior is guided by a rich set of heuristics that may interfere with expected 
payoff computations, steering decisions away from the pure rationality prescriptions. 
Two such heuristics were discussed in Section 4.3, risk aversion and inequity aversion. 
The data and questionnaire analysis suggest that both play an important role in 
explaining the observed departures from best-response behavior. 
The asymmetric geometry of global emissions introduces the possibility to argue in 
essentially opposite directions on the grounds of fairness motives. Developing countries 
may insist on the importance of past emissions to justify their unwillingness to take 
action, while developed countries can appeal to the relevance of current emissions, 
generally higher in transitioning economies, to refute to take lead in mitigation actions. 
These positions can be backed with different notions of equity: The egalitarian rule, for 
example, incorporates the principle of equal per capita emissions, which would demand 
drastic emission cuts in industrialized countries. On the other hand, the sovereignty rule, 
which postulates the principle of equal percentage reduction of current emissions, shifts 
more of the abatement burden to developing countries. Such asymmetries may lead to 
‘political lock-ins’ that are detrimental to the establishment of a global agreement to 
curb emissions (Halsnæs and Olhoff 2005). Equity criteria might be also used by 
countries to influence the negotiations process in their own material self-interest. Lange 
et al. (2010) provide evidence that the perceived support of different equity rules by 
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countries is self-serving, i.e. purely tactical, and can be explained by the ranking of their 
economic costs. The game introduced here allows capturing relevant aspects concerning 
both the tension between collective good and free-riding on the efforts of others (e.g. 
benefiting from polluting activities without internalizing the externality), as well as the 
potentially disruptive role of uneven wealth and responsibilities arising from past 
activities. 
The implications of the experimental results for the ongoing policy discussions may be 
important. We have seen that inequality impedes coordination. An alignment of wealth 
and carbon responsibilities might, on the one hand, facilitate coordination in addressing 
climate change. This strategy, however, is seen as dangerous as it risks unconstraint 
growth in emissions which might prove difficult to curb substantially in the future. The 
present analysis concerning the faculty to make non-binding pledges on future 
contributions to the public good, however, showed that this institution promotes 
coordination and mitigates the problems arising from the above mentioned inequalities. 
Future research might investigate the potential role of the ‘pledge and review’ 
mechanism in the economic catch up process in developing countries. That is, one could 
experimentally investigate the successfulness of a bottom-up approach based on delayed 
action by parties that commit to a mechanism that ensures future emission reductions. 
Although necessarily simple for the sake of control and tractability, the game presented 
here is designed to incorporate key real-world issues, such as equity and the impact of 
emergent institutions based on non-binding ‘pledge and review’ mechanisms. One 
further salient aspect which is not captured by this game is that of uncertainty over the 
magnitude of the threshold. Future research is needed along these lines. Moreover, 
different games emphasizing mitigation cooperation over catastrophe avoidance 
coordination would complement the present analysis.  
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4.6 Appendix 
4.6.1 Tables 
Table 4.1: Experimental design 
Treatment Asymmetric 
players 
Pledge 
stages 
Probability of 
climate change 
No. of 
subjects 
Base 
 
no no 50% 60 
Pledge no 
 
yes 50% 60 
Base-Fair yes 
 
no 50% 60 
Pledge-Fair yes yes 50% 60 
 
 
 
Table 4.2: End payoffs given symmetric and pure strategies 
Treatment type 0€/active round 2€/active round 4€/active round 
Symmetric 
wall=€34 
                                 
17*                            
(36) 
                                 
20                     
(120) 
                                  
6                                
(204) 
Asymmetric              
wrich=€40                   
wpoor=€28 
                               
20*                            
14*                     
(36) 
                                 
26                              
14                           
(120) 
                                
12                              
0                        
(204) 
Note: End payoffs in € (and corresponding climate account values for the group) arising 
if the 3 pure strategies were adopted by all players for the 7 active rounds. The starred 
entries are expected values based on the 50% probability of account loss when the target 
sum of €120 is not reached. In the symmetric treatments (Base and Pledge), all group 
members begin the active play having contributed €6 in the previous 3 rounds, leaving 
them with a disposable endowment of €34; in the asymmetric treatments (Base-Fair and 
Pledge-Fair), three rich players have no prior contributions and the three poor players 
have prior contributions of €12, leaving them with €40 and €28 respectively. 	
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Table 4.3: End payoffs given round-nine moves 
 
Note: End payoffs (and corresponding final climate account values in parentheses) to 
the row player given round-nine moves. Entries on or below the antidiagonal are certain, 
while the starred entries are expected values based on the 50% probability of account 
loss. 
 
 
Table 4.4: A coordination game situation 
   
Note: A coordination game situation: end payoffs (and corresponding final climate 
account values in parentheses). ‘Selfish’ refers to the strategy of giving €0 in each of the 
active rounds (10 rounds in the left matrix, 7 in the remaining two), ‘Fair’ to giving 
€2/active round. While all matrices are based on an initial endowment of €40, in the 
games introduced here the endowment before round 4 is either €34 for all players 
(centre matrix), or alternatively €28 for ‘poor’ row players and €40 for ‘rich’ column 
players (right matrix). Payoffs above the antidiagonal are certain, while the starred 
entries are expected values based on the 50% probability of account loss. 
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Table 4.5: OLS and tobit estimation results on contributions across treatments 
 OLS Tobit 
VARIABLES ci1_10 ci1_10 
Pledge 1.107 1.110 
 (1.205) (1.170) 
Base-Fair 1.169 1.132 
 (0.898) (0.880) 
Pledge-Fair 1.237 1.202 
 (1.084) (1.071) 
Q2a 1.068 1.056* 
 (0.639) (0.622) 
Q4a_3 -2.913*** -2.898*** 
 (0.838) (0.824) 
Q4a_8 -4.647*** -5.055*** 
 (1.398) (1.710) 
Q5a_3 -4.107*** -4.094*** 
 (0.747) (0.731) 
Q5a_8 -6.328*** -6.330*** 
 (0.855) (0.833) 
Q5a_12 4.954*** 4.927*** 
 (1.129) (1.104) 
Q7_2 -6.686*** -6.815*** 
 (1.357) (1.382) 
Q7_3 -1.614*** -1.614*** 
 (0.546) (0.535) 
Constant 16.11*** 16.16*** 
 (2.337) (2.270) 
Observations 240 240 
OLS and tobit estimation on individual contributions; robust standard errors in 
parentheses (clustered at group level); significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Definitions of variables: 
ci1_10 = average contribution of player i over all rounds, 
Base = 1 if player in treatment Base, 0 otherwise, 
Pledge = 1 if player in treatment Pledge, 0 otherwise, 
Base-Fair = 1 if player in treatment Base-Fair, 0 otherwise, 
Pledge-Fair = 1 if player in treatment Pledge-Fair, 0 otherwise, 
Q2a = answer to the question which is the fair contribution/active round of the rich 
(possible answers: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4), 
Q4a_3 = 1 if motivation for contribution decision is self-interest, 0 otherwise, 
Q4a_8 = 1 if motivation for contribution decision is belief that 120 would not be 
reached (abandon the ship), 
Q5a_3 = 1 if motivation for final round contribution decision is self-interest, 0 
otherwise, 
Q5a_8 = 1 if motivation for final round contribution decision is belief that 120 would 
not be reached (abandon the ship), 
Q5a_12 = 1 if motivation for final round decision is compensation for others, 
Q7_2 = 1 if risk seeker, 0 otherwise, 
Q7_3 =1 if risk neutral, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 4.6: Probit estimation results on success across treatments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Success Success Success Success 
Base -0.100 0.320 -0.205  
 (0.224) (0.211) (0.218)  
Pledge 0.108 0.483***  0.205 
 (0.230) (0.174)  (0.220) 
Base-Fair -0.400**  -0.479*** -0.318 
 (0.187)  (0.168) (0.206) 
Pledge-Fair  0.404** -0.107 0.101 
  (0.194) (0.229) (0.224) 
Observations 240 240 240 240 
Numbers are marginal effects at the mean of the independent variable; 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at group level); 
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Definitions of variables (see also Table 4.5): 
Success = 1 if individual’s group reached the €120 threshold, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
Table 4.7: Probit estimation results on success across treatments with pledges 
VARIABLES Success 
Pledge-Fair -0.244 
 (0.197) 
Diffpledge1 -0.0397*** 
 (0.0129) 
Diffpledge2 -0.0629** 
 (0.0299) 
Observations 120 
Numbers are marginal effects at the mean of the independent variables; 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at group level); 
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Definitions of variables (see also Tables 4.5 and 4.6): 
Diffpledge1 = difference between individual contribution and pledge in rounds 4-10, 
Diffpledge2 = difference between individual contribution and pledge in rounds 8-10. 
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Table 4.8: Questionnaire and responses – Part I 
Question Answer No. % 
(1) Do you agree with the following statement? “Those who began in 
round 4 with a starting capital of EUR 40 should pay more into the climate 
account in the following seven rounds than the other players.” 
Agree 
Disagree 
Neither 
91 
12 
17 
75.83 
10.00 
14.17 
What would you consider a 
fair average investment for the 
following seven rounds for 
those beginning with EUR 40? 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
2 
2 
30 
190 
16 
0.83 
0.83 
12.50 
79.17 
6.67 
(2) Please assume that three players of a 
group begin in round 4 with a starting 
capital of EUR 40 (because they have 
not paid anything into the climate 
account yet) whereas the other three 
players begin with a starting capital of 
EUR 28 (because they have paid EUR 4 
into the climate account in each of the 
first three rounds). 
What would you consider a 
fair investment for the 
following seven rounds for 
those beginning with EUR 28? 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
9 
143 
85 
3 
0 
3.75 
59.58 
35.42 
1.25 
0.00 
(3) Please try to remember the decisions made by your fellow players 
during the game. In your opinion, which players have been motivated by 
following reasons? Please write one or more names next to each motive. 
Do you think there were any other motives for your fellow players besides 
the given? Possible motives are 
- Monetary self-interest 
- Fairness consideration 
- Advancement of the common coordination process 
- Other motives (please specify and state name) 
   
(4) Please briefly describe the three most important reasons for your 
investment decisions in a descending order of importance. Possible 
examples are: 
- Group or own investments in the preliminary round, 
- Cumulated group or own investments starting in round 4, 
- Cumulated group or own investments starting in round 1, 
- Monetary self-interest, 
- Fairness consideration, 
- Achievement of the EUR 120 limit, 
- Adherence to declarations of intent, 
- Other reasons (please state). 
   
(5) What has been your motivation for your investment decision in the last 
round (round 10)? Please state your three most important reasons in a 
descending order of importance (for possible answers see previous 
question) 
   
(6) If you were to play the game again, would you make different 
decisions? Please state your three most significant changes in a descending 
order of importance. 
   
 ∑ 240 100.00 
Notes: Question 1 was asked in the asymmetric treatments Base-Fair and Pledge-Fair only. Question 2 was 
asked in all treatments; therefore it was hypothetical in the symmetric treatments Base and Pledge while it was 
real in the asymmetric treatments. No responses are provided for the open questions 3-6.  
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Table 4.9: Questionnaire and responses – Part II 
Question Answer No. % 
(7) Please imagine the following situation: You 
have EUR 40. With a probability of 50 % you 
will lose all EUR 40. You could abide the risk 
by giving away EUR 20 of the EUR 40. Would 
you pay EUR 20 to avoid the risk? 
 
Yes 
No 
Indifferent 
 
165 
22 
53 
 
68.75 
9.17 
22.08 
(8) Did you ever donate money of goods to a 
charity organisation? 
 
Often 
Sometimes 
Rarely 
Never 
14 
77 
102 
47 
5.83 
32.08 
42.50 
19.58 
(9) Do you agree with this statement? “I think 
social differences should be levelled out more 
in Germany.” 
Agree 
Disagree 
Neither 
110 
47 
83 
45.83 
19.58 
34.58 
(10) Do you think the problem of global climate 
change is being estimated correctly or not? 
In my opinion, the problem is being 
Rather overestimated 
Rather correctly estimated 
Rather underestimated 
I don’t know 
51 
83 
89 
17 
21.25 
34.58 
37.08 
7.08 
(11) In your opinion which challenges in 
Germany are currently the greatest? Please state 
the three greatest challenges in a descending 
order of importance. 
Old age provisions 
Unemployment 
Poverty 
Educational policy 
Energy supply 
Health care 
Climate protection 
Crime 
Social security 
Fiscal policy 
Terrorism 
Environmental protection 
Economic upturn 
Immigration/Integration 
Other (please state below) 
18 
48 
6 
66 
3 
3 
13 
1 
4 
6 
0 
3 
40 
7 
22 
7.50 
20.00 
2.50 
27.50 
1.25 
1.25 
5.42 
0.42 
1.67 
2.50 
0.00 
1.25 
16.67 
2.92 
9.17 
(12) Which of the following guiding principles 
describes your understanding of fairness best in 
the context of international climate 
negotiations? 
Countries with high emissions in the 
past should reduce more emissions. 
Countries with high economic 
performance should reduce more 
emissions. 
Countries should reduce their emissions 
in such a way that emissions per 
capita are the same for all countries. 
Countries should reduce their emissions 
in such a way that the emissions 
percentage is the same for all 
countries.  
Other principle (please specify) 
56 
 
53 
 
 
41 
 
 
53 
 
 
 
37 
23.33 
 
22.08 
 
 
17.08 
 
 
22.08 
 
 
 
15.37 
(13) What are the reasons for your answer in 
the previous question? Please state the three 
most important reasons in a descending order of 
importance. 
   
 ∑ 240 100.00 
Notes: The responses to question 11 refer to the first of the three greatest challenges. No responses are provided 
for the open question 13. 
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4.6.2 Figures 
Figure 4.1: Success rate by treatment 
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Figure 4.2: Contribution patterns in each treatment 
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Note: Contribution patterns in each treatment, starting with round 3. 
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Figure 4.3: Use of pledges in successful groups and failing groups 
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Note: The graphs show individual pledges on the vertical axis and individual 
contributions on the horizontal axis. A small noise (5%) is inserted to make all 
observations visible. 
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Figure 4.4: Burden sharing in successful groups and failing groups 
 
Note: In successful groups partaking in the treatments with unequal endowments (Base-
Fair and Pledge-Fair), the rich compensated the poor by investing more in the active 
rounds and equalizing cumulative contributions over the entire game at €20 (A). In 
failing groups such wealth redistribution did not take place to the same extent: The 
initial gap of €12 between the rich and poor was not fully offset, as the rich invested 
€13 on average while the poor invested €18 (B). 
 
 
4.6.3 Experimental instructions 
Experimental instructions for the treatments Pledge and Pledge-Fair 
Welcome to the experiment! 
1. General Notice 
In this experiment you can earn money. To make this experiment a success, please do 
not talk to the other participants at all or draw any other attention to you. Please read the 
following rules of the experiment attentively. Should you have any questions please 
signal us. At the end of the instructions you will find several control questions. Please 
answer all questions and signal us when you have finished. We will then come to you 
and check your answers. 
2. Climate Change 
Now we will introduce you to a game simulating climate change. Global climate change 
is seen as a serious environmental problem faced by mankind. The great majority of 
climate scientists expect the global average temperature to rise by 1.1 to 6.4 degrees 
Celsius until the year 2100. There is hardly any denial that mankind largely contributes 
to climate change by emitting greenhouse gases, especially carbon dioxide (CO2). CO2 
originates from burning of fossil fuels like coal, oil or natural gas in industrial processes 
and energy production, or combustion engines of cars and lorries. CO2 is a global 
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pollutant, i.e. each quantity unit of CO2 emitted has the same effect on the climate 
regardless of the location where the emission has occurred.  
3. Rules of Play 
In total, 6 players are involved in the game, so besides you there are 5 other players. 
Every player faces the same decision making problem. At the beginning of the 
experiment you will receive a starting capital (= EUR 40) credited to your private 
account. During the experiment you can use money from your account or not. In the end 
your account balance will be paid out to you in cash. You will be making your decisions 
anonymously. To guarantee for this you will be assigned a nickname for the playing 
time. The nicknames are the moons of our solar system (Ananke, Telesto, Despina, 
Japetus, Kallisto or Metis). You will find your name on the lower left side of your 
screen.  
During the course of the experiment you will be playing exactly 10 climate rounds. In 
these rounds you can invest into the attempt to protect the climate and to evade 
dangerous climate change. Among others, dangerous climate change will result in 
significant economic losses which will be simulated in this experiment. In each climate 
round of the game all six players will be asked simultaneously: 
"How much do you want to invest into climate protection?" 
Possible answers are EUR 0, 2 or 4. Only when each player has made his choice, all 
decisions will be displayed simultaneously. After that the computer will credit all 
invested amounts to an account for climate protection (‘climate account’). 
At the end of the game (after exactly 10 rounds) the computer will compare the climate 
account balance with a predetermined amount (= EUR 120). This amount must be 
earned to evade dangerous climate change. It will be earned if every player averagely 
pays EUR 2 per round into climate protection. If this is the case, EUR 12 are be paid 
into the climate account per round. If the necessary EUR 120 have been earned, all 
players will be paid out the amount remaining on their private accounts. The remaining 
amount consists of the starting capital of EUR 40 minus the sum paid into the climate 
account. If the necessary EUR 120 have not been earned, dangerous climate change will 
occur with a probability of 50% (in 5 out of 10 cases) and this will result in significant 
economic losses. If this probability arises you will lose all money left on your account 
and no one will be paid out anything. With another probability of 50% (in 5 out of 10 
cases) you will keep your money and will be paid out the amount on your private 
account after the game. We will draw the probability by lot in your presence. The 
payout will be made anonymously. Your fellow players will not learn about your 
identity. 
Please note the following two particularities in the game: First, the decisions of the six 
players in the first three rounds are predetermined by the computer. Meaning, you - 
and your fellow players - cannot decide freely how much you want to invest into 
climate protection in the first three rounds. You will be offered an option instead which 
you have to choose. Please note that the predetermined investments of the first three 
rounds will already change the amounts on the climate account and the players’ 
accounts! Starting in round 4 you will decide freely which amounts you want to invest 
into climate protection.  
Second, all players can issue declarations of intent about how much they want to 
invest into climate protection in the following rounds. The declarations are not binding 
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for the investment decisions in the following rounds. The first declaration of intent is 
issued after round 3. All players will simultaneously state how much they plan to invest 
into climate protection in the next seven rounds in total. When all players have stated 
their declarations of intent, the ‘planned climate account’ will be displayed. The 
planned climate account shows the investments of each player of the first 3 rounds plus 
the investments planned for the remaining seven rounds. After round 7 all players will 
be given the opportunity to revise their declarations of intent. All players then 
simultaneously state their planned total investments into climate protection for the next 
three rounds. When all players have stated their declarations of intent the ‘newly 
planned climate account’ will be displayed. The newly planned climate account shows 
how much each player has already invested in the first seven rounds plus the planned 
investments for the remaining three rounds. 
4. Example 
In this example you see the decisions made by the six players in one round (round 6). 
 
The column on the right side (“Investitionen Runde 6”) shows the investments made in 
the current round. Players Ananke, Telesto and Despina have not paid anything into the 
climate account, whereas players Japetus, Kallisto and Metis each have paid EUR 4. In 
total EUR 12 have been paid and by that been credited to the climate account. The 
column in the middle (“Investitionen Runden 1-6 insgesamt”) shows the total 
investments made by each player in rounds 1-6. Players Ananke, Telesto and Kallisto 
each have paid EUR 12 into the climate account in the first 6 rounds. Despina has paid 
EUR 14, Japetus EUR 10 and Metis EUR 8 in the first six rounds. By that a total of 
EUR 68 has been paid into the climate account. 
The column on the left (“geplantes Klimakonto Runden 1-10”) shows the planned 
climate account after the first declaration of intent. The value stated per player shows 
the investments made in the first three rounds plus the planned investments for the 
remaining seven rounds. Exactly this information will be displayed after each climate 
round. 
5. Usage of the Money on the Climate Account 
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If the necessary EUR 120 have been earned to evade climate change, we will buy CO2 
emission certificates of the total amount on the climate account and retire them. If the 
necessary EUR 120 have not been earned, we will use half of the amount on the climate 
account to buy CO2 emission certificates and retire them (we will keep the rest of the 
money). By purchasing and retiring the CO2 emission certificates we contribute to the 
abatement of climate change. We will now explain you how this works: 
In 2005 the European Union has implemented the emissions trading system for carbon 
dioxide (CO2). Emissions trading is the central instrument of climate policy in Europe. 
It follows a simple principle: The European Commission, together with the member 
states, has determined the amount of CO2 to be emitted altogether in the respective 
sectors (energy production and energy intensive industries) until 2020. This total 
amount will be distributed to the companies by the state in the form of emission rights 
(‘certificates’). For each quantity unit of CO2 emitted, the company has to give a 
certificate to the state. The certificates can be traded between companies.  
For each quantity unit of CO2 emitted e.g. by a power plant, the plant operator has to 
prove his permission to do so in the form of a certificate. This leads to an important 
consequence: If the total amount of certificates is reduced, the total emissions will be 
lower, simply because plant operators do not possess enough emission allowances. That 
means if a certificate for one quantity unit is obtained from the market and is being 
‘retired’ (i.e. deleted) the total CO2emissions are reduced by exactly this quantity 
amount. The opportunity to retire certificates actually exists in the framework of the EU 
Emissions Trading System. In Germany the German Emissions Trading Authority 
(DEHSt) regulates Emissions trading. The authority holds a retirement account with the 
account number DE-230-17-1. 
If certificates are transferred to this account they will be withdrawn from circulation, i.e. 
deleted, by the end of each year. ZEW has opened an own account at the DEHSt (DE-
121-2810-0). The purchasing and retiring of the certificates will furthermore be attested 
by a notary public. 
Summarizing: if all players have for example paid a total of EUR 120 into the climate 
account, we will buy certificates for about 8 tons of CO2 (the price per ton is currently 
at about EUR 15). This equals the emissions of a ride in a VW Golf (1.4 TSI) one and a 
half times around the world. 
6. Control questions 
If you have finished reading the instructions and do not have questions, please answer 
the following control questions. 
a. Which total amount does each player have to averagely invest into climate 
protection in the 10 rounds to evade dangerous climate change (please tick the 
according box)? 
O EUR 12  O EUR 20  O EUR 40  O EUR 120 
b. Please assume that the necessary amount of EUR 120 to evade climate change 
has been earned and you have invested a total of EUR 16 in the 10 rounds. How 
much money will you be paid out? 
My payout is EUR ________. 
c. In how many rounds can the players decide freely about their investments into 
climate protection (please tick the according box)? 
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O in 3 rounds  O in 5 rounds  O in 7 rounds  O in 10 
rounds 
d. Please refer to the example stated under point 4 for the numbers. What do the 
balances on Despina’s and Metis’ private accounts state? 
Despina’s balance states EUR _________. Metis’ balances states EUR _______. 
e. Please refer to the example under point 4 again. How much would the group 
have to pay into the climate account in the next four rounds in total to abate 
dangerous climate change (please tick the according box)? 
O EUR 12  O EUR 52  O EUR 68  O EUR 120  
f. When do the players state their first declaration of intent and when can they 
revise this declaration? 
First declaration after round: ______.  Revision after round: 
_______. 
g. In your first declaration of intent after round 3 you are asked to state how much 
you want to invest in climate protection in the following seven rounds in total. If 
you want to invest averagely EUR 2 per round, which amount would you have 
to state in your declaration of intent (please tick the according box)?  
O EUR 2  O EUR 12  O EUR 14  O EUR 20  
h. Are the declarations of intent binding for the investment decisions in the 
following rounds (please tick the according box)? 
O Yes  O No 
i. Please refer to the example under point 4 again. What do the figures in the left 
column ‘Planned climate account’ stand for (please tick the according box)? 
O the invested amounts of the first three rounds 
O the planned investments for the last seven rounds  
O the invested amounts of the first three rounds plus the planned investments for 
the last seven rounds 
j. Please refer to the example stated under point 3 for the numbers again. Please 
assume that all players adhere to their declaration of intent (see ‘geplantes 
Klimakonto’). Would the investments be enough to evade dangerous climate 
change (please tick the according box)? 
O Yes  O No 
k. Please assume that the necessary amount of EUR 120 has not been earned. With 
which probability will you lose the remaining amount on your private account 
(please tick the according box)?  
O 10%  O 30%  O 50%  O 70%           O 90%         O 100% 
If you have answered all control questions, please signal us. We will come to you and 
check the answers. After having checked the answers of all players and there are no 
remaining questions, the game starts. Good Luck! 
 
  
 Part II 
Other-regarding preferences 
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5 The social preferences of climate negotiators 
5.1 Introduction 
In reaching an agreement in climate negotiations the overall abatement target and with 
this total implementation costs of a climate treaty have always played an important role. 
All the same, there is also evidence that climate talks are, to a great extent, centered 
around the question of how to share a given abatement burden. The 1992 Climate 
Change Convention already states the basic principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” (UNFCCC 1992), and numerous other negotiation documents are 
permeated by the language of equity. The experiment presented in the previous chapter 
clearly shows that a common fairness notion is decisive for the coordination of efforts 
to provide a public good. The lack of agreement about the fair burden sharing often 
causes coordination failure and therefore a collective damage. The impression that 
equity considerations also play a major role in real-world climate negotiations is 
supported by a recent survey (Lange et al. 2007) asking participants in the climate 
negotiation process about their views on equity. Nearly 80 percent of all respondents 
state that equity is of very high or high importance in the climate talks. Moreover, this 
survey identifies important fairness principles that motivate negotiating positions of 
major negotiation blocks. The EU, for example, is mainly seen as being driven by the 
polluter-pays principle while many respondents associate the United States with the 
sovereignty rule.24 
Essentially, this evidence may be interpreted in two different ways. First, it could mean 
that equity principles enter climate negotiations because they reflect deep and serious 
convictions of the parties involved. Second, one might conjecture that equity arguments 
are used strategically in order to hide goals which may largely be traced back to pure 
material self-interest. Lange et al. (2010), for example, argue that negotiation parties 
may invoke fairness principles to influence the bargaining outcome in their interest. The 
                                                 
24 Not only the political but also the academic debate is concerned with equity issues. Several papers 
explore the equitable burden sharing of a given reduction target, e.g. Bosello and Roson (2002), LeCocq 
et al. (2000), Ridgley (1996), Rose and Stevens (1993), and Rose et al. (1998). A second branch of the 
literature tries to find reduction measures that maximize human welfare, e.g. Nordhaus and Yang (1996) 
Peck and Teisberg (1991, 1995), and Tol (1999). A third approach combines equity rules, permit 
allocation schemes and coalition stability, e.g. Bosello et al. (2003) and Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus 
(2006). As Kemfert and Tol (2002, p. 24) note, however, these attempts “are based on a narrow neo-
classical interpretation of justice”, i.e. they do not include a preference for equity in the utility function. 
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previous chapter also provides some empirical evidence of the existence of a self-
serving use of fairness notions. 
Contrary to the latter argument, there is much evidence that human behavior is indeed to 
a certain extent driven by equity considerations. Within experimental economics, ample 
evidence has been collected contradicting the standard economic model of man based 
on the two pillars of rationality and pure selfishness. People cooperate in social 
dilemmas such as public good games (Ledyard 1995), they reject large amounts of 
money in the ultimatum game (Güth et al. 1982, Camerer 2003) and they make positive 
contributions in the dictator game (Kahneman et al. 1986, Forsythe et al. 1994). The 
contradiction between the standard economic model of selfish behavior and empirical 
observations has been a challenge for both theorists and experimentalists. In the past 
years a number of theories that try to close this gap in explanatory power has been 
developed. Most of these theories are based on the assumption that people have some 
sort of other-regarding, or social, preferences. These approaches seek to overcome the 
discrepancies between standard game-theoretical prediction and experimental 
observation by altering the underlying utility function of subjects, but adhere to the 
assumption that subjects behave rationally. The models developed by Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) are prominent examples of this approach. They 
assume that people suffer from inequality, i.e. they are willing to sacrifice money in 
order to avoid unequal payoff distributions.  
These theoretical approaches have the potential to greatly facilitate the explanation for 
voluntary cooperation in dilemma situations. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) (in the following 
F&S) prove that partial cooperation may be an Nash equilibrium in a public good game 
if at least some subjects show a sufficiently strong inequality aversion. Within the 
framework of a two-stage coalition formation game, Lange and Vogt (2003) prove that 
coalitions which involve a rather large fraction of countries may be stabilized as an 
Nash equilibrium when a sufficient number of countries with a sufficiently high 
inequality aversion is involved. This result is in sharp contrast to the corresponding 
results of coalition games which assume a standard preference structure. In these games, 
only small coalitions that achieve very little in terms of pollution abatement and welfare 
can be stabilized (Barrett 1994, Carraro and Siniscalco 1993). The cooperation 
enhancing effect of equity preferences might also be of practical relevance to real-world 
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climate policy. However, whether the critical conditions for cooperative behavior are 
fulfilled is a question which may only be answered empirically.25 
If the chances to come to an agreement depend on the degree of inequality aversion, this 
should be taken into account in real-world cooperation problems. International climate 
negotiations involve teams of negotiators who, on the one hand, must work on the basis 
of the political realities of their home countries and, on the other hand, set the agenda 
for the negotiation process and influence the public dispute. In the process, the 
individual preferences of negotiators affect the outcome of negotiations. A priori it is 
not clear whether real-world negotiators have differing preferences for equity. 
Additionally, the issue of how negotiators’ individual equity preferences relate to the 
corresponding collective preferences of governments (or countries) must be considered. 
The innovative contribution of the experiment in this chapter consists in making a first 
attempt at the elicitation and quantification of such equity concerns and suggesting a 
simple way to include equity preferences in the global climate policy context. To this 
end an online experiment was conducted with individuals who had been involved in 
international climate policy. 155 participants from all regions of the world took part in 
the experiment that basically consisted of two simple non-strategic games suited to 
measure individual inequality aversion. Thereby one can distinguish between two types 
of inequality aversion: If an individual dislikes being better off than others this is called 
‘aversion to advantageous inequality’. If an individual suffers from being worse off than 
others we call this ‘aversion to disadvantageous inequality’. The participants of the 
experiment show aversion to advantageous inequality to a considerable extent while 
their aversion to disadvantageous inequality is moderate. Regarding the geographical 
variety in the data, the degrees of inequality aversion are rather similar across different 
regions of the world. This also applies to the expected collective preferences. Therefore, 
different positions in international climate policy seem to be caused by national interests 
rather than by different equity preferences.  
                                                 
25 Several experiments test the empirical relevance of the F&S theory in the lab (e.g. Blanco et al. 
forthcoming, Brosig et al. 2007, Dannenberg et al. 2007). The evidence is rather mixed but the general 
impression is that the individual behavior across games is not reliably consistent with F&S. However, the 
measurement of social preferences in the lab involves some difficulties which is the object of Chapter 7. 
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This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 5.2 briefly explains the theoretical 
background underlying the experiment. Section 5.3 describes the experimental design, 
followed by a short description of the subject pool in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 presents 
the results and Section 5.6 concludes. 
 
5.2 Theoretical background 
5.2.1 Preferences: the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
According to F&S individuals are not exclusively motivated by the absolute payoff they 
may earn but also value allocations due to their distributional consequences. Particularly, 
assuming that individuals suffer from inequality, F&S introduce the following utility 
function for subject i : 
        
n
ij
jii
n
ij
ijiijii nn
U 0,max
1
10,max
1
1,    (5.1) 
where i  and jπ  denote the absolute payoffs to subjects i  and j , respectively, n  
denotes the total number of players involved in a decision problem, 0i  measures the 
impact of i ’s disutility from disadvantageous inequality while 0i  measures the 
corresponding impact of advantageous inequality. F&S assume 1i , i.e. players are 
not willing to ‘burn’ their money in order to eliminate advantageous inequality. In 
addition, they assume that players put a greater weight on disadvantageous inequality, 
i.e. ii   . 
 
5.2.2 The voluntary contribution game 
The voluntary contribution game as a special form of a public good game26 represents 
the basic strategic incentives of a situation where n  players have the chance to 
contribute to the production of a global public good, such as climate protection. Let iy  
denote the initial endowment of player i ,  ii yg ,0  his or her contribution to the 
                                                 
26  Sturm and Weimann (2006) discuss the relevance of this game to experiments in environmental 
economics. 
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public good, and m  the marginal per capita return (MPCR) of an investment to the 
public good with 11  mn . Then, player i’s payoff is derived as  



n
j
jiii gmgy
1
 .       (5.2) 
Assuming standard preferences in a voluntary contribution game, not to contribute to 
the production of the public good is the Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies, 
although from a social point of view mutual cooperation would be preferable. In other 
words, 0ig  is the best choice for each player i independently of the other players’ 
contributions.  
F&S have shown that this result is fundamentally altered if players are endowed with 
inequality aversion according to (5.1). They prove the following results: 
1. If 1 im  , then it is a dominant strategy for player i  to choose .0ig  
2. Let k, with nk  , denote the number of players with 1 im  . Then, if 
  21 mnk  , a unique equilibrium with gi  0 i  1,...,n  exists. 
3. If for all players  nj ,...,1  with 1 jm   the condition 
     jjjmnk   11      (5.3) 
holds, then equilibria with positive contributions to the public good exist. All k players 
with 1 im   choose 0ig  while all other players contribute  ygg j ,0 . 
The intuition behind these results is not too difficult. First, if a player with 1 im   
invests one monetary unit in the public good, his monetary return is m  while he gains a 
maximum non-monetary utility of i . Now, if the sum of both returns is less than one, 
the best strategy is evidently not to invest in the public good, irrespectively of what 
other players do. Second, if there is a sufficient number of players with 1 jm  , then 
player j  will not be willing to contribute even if he shows stronger inequality aversion, 
i.e. for him 1 jm   holds. The reason is that relatively few ‘fair’ players are unable 
to sufficiently reduce disadvantageous inequality. Third, if there is a sufficient number 
of players with 1 jm  , they are able to sustain cooperation amongst themselves, 
“even if the other players do not contribute. However, this requires that the contributors 
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are not too upset about the disadvantageous inequality toward the free riders” (Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999, p. 840).  
In the following, condition (5.3) is used to discuss the meaning of j  and j  for the 
prospects of cooperation explicitly. Let us define     jjjcrit mnk   11: , 
the critical number of non-cooperative countries. First, it is to observe that 
    211 jjjjcrit mnk    which is positive since the MPCR is always 
less than 1. Hence, an increasing aversion to advantageous inequality makes 
cooperation in the voluntary contribution game more likely since (5.3) is more easily 
met. Second, considering j  we find     211 jjjjcrit mnk   . For 
subjects with 1 jm   this derivative will clearly be negative implying that an 
increasing aversion to disadvantageous inequality makes it more difficult to sustain 
cooperation amongst ‘fair’ subjects.27  
To summarize, while stronger aversion to advantageous inequality always improves the 
prospects for a cooperative solution this is not the case for aversion to disadvantageous 
inequality. However, for a given value of j , high values of j  are only necessary but 
not sufficient to ensure stable cooperative outcomes. To attain such a socially preferable 
outcome, i.e. to exceed the critical value critk  of non-cooperative countries, the benefit-
to-cost ratio of the contribution to the public good has to be sufficiently high. 
 
5.3 Experimental design 
The experiment involves two simple non-strategic games (games A and B) introduced 
by Blanco et al. (forthcoming) suited to measure individual inequality aversion as 
captured by the F&S model. Both games were neutrally framed as two-person games of 
sharing a pie (see Section 5.7.3 for experimental instructions). Game A is designed to 
measure subjects’ aversion to disadvantageous inequality, namely j . The game 
                                                 
27 The parameter iα  has additional importance for a public good game with a chance to punish other 
subjects at one's own expense. In such a game, subjects with a sufficiently high iα  may enforce 
cooperation of selfishly motivated subjects. The reason for this is that such ‘enforcers’ are able to exercise 
a credible threat to punish free riders in order to reduce disadvantageous inequality. See Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) as well as Dannenberg et al. (2007).  
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resembles the responder’s basic decision situation in the ultimatum game but abstracts 
from strategic interaction, so that it rules out individual behavior caused by strategic 
considerations such as intentions or reciprocity.28 This game consists of 22 decisions 
(numbered from #1 to #22), in which each subject in the role of Person 1 has to choose 
between two pairs of payoffs (pair I and pair II), each with an amount of money for 
him- or herself and another subject (Person 2). Except for #1 subjects always have to 
choose between pair I, a disadvantageously unequal division of $200.00, and pair II, an 
equal distribution with $40.00 for both players (see the left part of Table 5.1). All 
decisions are arranged by the amount of money subjects could earn with pair I in 
descending order. In this game, a rational and purely selfish subject is expected to 
choose pair I from #1 to #20 and pair II for #21 and #22. Subjects with F&S preferences 
are expected to switch from pair I to pair II at some point between #2 and #21.  
Individual behavior in game A is described as consistent if (1) a subject has a unique 
switching point from pair I to pair II and (2) this switching point is between #2 and #21. 
Regarding the first condition, a subject with aversion to disadvantageous inequality 
consistent with the F&S model who switches at some point from pair I to pair II should 
in all subsequent decisions choose pair II. As the payoffs for Person 1 in pair I are 
arranged in descending order, a switch back to pair I in any of the subsequent decisions 
is not consistent. This would lead to a lower payment for Person 1 and to higher 
disadvantageous inequality than the payoff that was rejected before. In relation to the 
second condition, it is useful to consider the decisions outside of the ‘consistent area’ 
between #2 and #21. A subject who chooses pair II already in #1 is not regarded as 
consistent because he or she could attain an equal allocation with higher payoff for him- 
or herself by choosing pair I. A subject who chooses pair II in #22 is in favor of 
disadvantageous inequality, i.e. 0i , and is therefore not consistent with the F&S 
model. The subject’s switching point determines the upper and lower bounds of the 
individual i . The individual value for i  is approximated by choosing the mean of 
the corresponding interval (see Table 5.1).29 
                                                 
28 The difference to the payoffs in the original ultimatum game is the fact that the conflict point payoffs 
(in $) are changed to (40, 40) instead of the original (0, 0). 
29 There are two exceptions to this rule. Firstly, there is no upper bound for iα  of a subject who switches 
from pair I to pair II in #2. Therefore, the value of the lower bound, 18.2i , is assigned to these 
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Game B – which resembles the decision problem in the dictator game – is designed to 
measure subjects’ aversion to advantageous inequality, namely j .30 Again, there are 
22 decisions (from #1 to #22; see the right part of Table 5.1) in which each subject in 
the role of Person 1 has to choose between two pairs of payoffs (pair I and pair II), each 
with an amount of money for him- or herself and another subject (Person 2). Subjects 
have to choose between pair I, an extremely unequal but advantageous distribution of 
$200.00, and pair II, an equal distribution of different amounts ranging from $0.00 to 
$210.00 for each player. In this game, a rational and purely selfish subject would choose 
pair I from #1 through #20 and pair II for #22. In #21, this subject would be indifferent 
between pair I and pair II. Subjects with F&S preferences are expected to switch from 
choosing pair I to pair II between #2 and #22.  
Individual behavior in game B is labeled as consistent if (1) a subject has a unique 
switching point from pair I to pair II and (2) this switching point is between #2 and #22., 
i.e. if the aversion to advantageous inequality meets 10  i . Relating to the first 
condition, a subject with aversion to advantageous inequality consistent with the F&S 
model switching from pair I to pair II at one point, should also choose pair II in all 
subsequent decisions. As the payoffs for Person 1 are arranged in an ascending order in 
pair II, a switch back to pair I in any of the subsequent decisions is not consistent. This 
would lead to the same advantageous inequality that was rejected before but now with 
the higher opportunity costs of a lost payoff. For the second condition, consider again 
the decisions outside of the ‘consistent area’ between #2 and #22. A subject choosing 
pair II already in #1 has 1i , i.e. is willing to ‘burn’ money in order to produce equal 
payoffs. A subject who does not switch at all displays affection for advantageous 
inequality, i.e. 0i . Both behavioral patterns are not consistent with F&S. As before, 
the subject’s switching point determines the upper and lower bounds for the individual’s 
i . The individual value of i  is approximated by choosing the mean of the 
                                                                                                                                               
subjects. Secondly, 0i  is assigned to a subject who switches from pair I to pair II in #21, although 
the corresponding interval for this case is 04.008.0  i . 
30 Strictly speaking, game B is equivalent to a reduced form of the dictator game only in decision #11. 
However, similar to the dictator game, game B creates a trade-off between a subject's own monetary 
payoff which creates advantageous inequality and a lower but equally distributed payoff. 
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corresponding interval (see Table 5.1).31  The above described consistency rules are 
relatively strict. However, applying these strict rules helped to exclude subjects who had 
not fully understood the rules of the experiment and those who did not care about their 
payoff but rather made random choices. 
A basic assumption underlying the design of the two games is that individuals are only 
driven by equity preferences. There is, however, an alternative interpretation of non-
selfish behavior in these games since the parameters i  and i  are inevitably linked to 
efficiency concerns. An example will help to illustrate this point: In game B, the sum of 
both payoffs in pair II rises from $0 in #1 to $420 in #22. An individual caring for 
efficiency only will switch from pair I to pair II after #10 or #11. In other words the 
aversion to advantageous inequality measured by i  may also be interpreted as a 
preference for efficiency (here with 0.53i  ). In the experiment 30 % of subjects have 
0.53i   and thereby may care for equity or efficiency only or a mixture of both 
motives. It is not possible to distinguish between the underlying motives of behavior, i.e. 
there are no unbiased ‘efficiency free’ i  and i  values.32 However, the implications 
for the willingness to cooperate in a social dilemma would not change if efficiency was 
included: If someone displays a i  value close to zero thereby caring neither for equity 
nor efficiency this person has consequently a low willingness to cooperate. If, in 
contrast, someone has high a i  value be it for equity or efficiency concerns or both, 
this person is willing to cooperate provided the conditions described in Section 5.2.2 are 
fulfilled. In the remaining chapter we will speak of equity preferences, however, one 
should keep in mind the possibility that some people do not only care for equity but also 
for efficiency. 
                                                 
31 As before, there is an exception to this rule. The value 0i  is assigned to a subject who switches 
from pair I to pair II in #22, although the corresponding interval in this case is 005.0  i . 
32 In experiments designed to disentangle the importance of equity and efficiency motives the evidence is 
mixed. While some papers identify situations where a preference for efficiency seems to have a dominant 
effect (see e.g. Engelmann and Strobel 2004, Andreoni and Miller 2002) others argue that efficiency 
concerns are dominated by fairness concerns, i.e. by inequality aversion (see e.g. Güth et al. 2003, Levati 
et al. 2007). 
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The experiment which was conducted through the internet33 ran over two courses, the 
first one lasting eight weeks from 1 June until 30 July 2007 and the second one lasting 
four weeks from 1 May until 31 May 2009. Participants obtained an individual login 
which ensured that every individual could take part only once. After subjects logged in, 
they read an introductory page where the decision problems in games A and B were 
explained. Participants were explicitly told that they could earn real money by taking 
part in this experiment. They were provided with a detailed explanation of how the 
payoffs from the experiment were determined: All participants made their decisions as 
Person 1 in both games (strategy elicitation method). In each of both experimental 
waves 10 subjects were randomly selected and matched into five pairs. For each pair 
one of the games (A or B) and one of the decisions (#1 to #22) were randomly selected. 
Finally, it was randomly decided who was to be Person 1 and Person 2 for each pair. 
Person 1 then received the money he or she had assigned to him- or herself in the 
selected decision of the selected game. Person 2 got the money Person 1 had assigned to 
Person 2 in that selected decision of the selected game. Since the payment mechanism 
involved several random draws, people were advised that the best strategy would be to 
make every decision as if it were to be realized. The instructions pointed out that each 
decision – if realized – would not only determine a subject's own payoff but also the 
payoff for another participant. After that, participants were presented the decision 
problems in games A and B (see Section 5.7.3). 
The time necessary to go through all parts of the experiment was approximately 30 
minutes. The expected mean payment per participant (given randomly distributed 
decisions and the estimate of 100 subjects per experimental wave, which had been 
announced in the instructions) was $8.63. The realized mean payment per selected 
winner (20 out of 155) was $107.00, i.e. $2140.00 were finally paid out. All random 
selections necessary for the payment were drawn up in the presence of a notary.34 The 
money was transferred via Western Union or bank transfer and all participants were 
informed about their payoff via email. Participants and winners of the experiment 
remained anonymous, i.e. only the experimenters know their identity and their payoff. 
                                                 
33  One might ask how it is possible to infer ‘other-regarding preferences’ by means of an internet 
experiment where there is no visible ‘other’. In the context of climate change, however, we believe this to 
be justified since climate change mitigation tend to involve less visible ‘abstract others’. 
34 For the sake of credibility, the contact details of the notary were announced to the subjects (see 
Dannenberg et al. 2010). 
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So far the study elicits negotiators’ individual preferences. However, real-world climate 
negotiations are not necessarily governed by the individual preferences of the 
negotiators. Although the equity preferences of negotiators may play some role in the 
policy process, they are definitely not the sole determinant of the negotiation process. 
Governments form some sort of collective preference. This preference formation is a 
complex matter influenced by factors such as voters’ preferences in their home country 
but also preferences of influential interest groups, for example.35 Despite the fact that it 
is nearly impossible to give a full explanation for this complicated formation process, 
this study tries to develop a first idea of what collective (governmental) preferences in 
climate policy negotiations might look like. The idea is based on the assumption that the 
participants in the study, who had actually been involved in climate negotiations, had 
the best understanding of how to assess the behavior of their government, i.e. they had 
an informational advantage regarding the collective preference of their home country. 
Therefore, participants were asked to imagine that the decisions in games A and B had 
to be made by a group of representatives of their home country at a Conference of the 
Parties (COP) or a meeting of the Subsidiary Bodies (SB). Respondents then had to 
indicate how they believed the delegates would decide. 
They were given the following opportunities for game A as well as for game B:36 
In your opinion, how would the group of representatives of your country decide? 
a) compared to my decision, the decision of the group would lead to a distribution with more 
money for Person 1. 
b) the same way as I did. 
c) compared to my decision, the decision of the group would lead to a distribution with less 
money for Person 1. 
d) I do not know. 
For both games, answer (a) “more money for Person 1”, would indicate that a subject 
expects a more selfishly oriented group of delegates compared to his or her own 
preference. Accordingly, answer (c) “less money for Person 1” would indicate that a 
subject expects a more fair-minded government. 
                                                 
35 Using a representative sample, Dohmen et al. (2008) show the importance of social preferences among 
the general population. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the median voter, who should have a 
decisive influence on the collective preference according to the median voter model, also has social 
preferences. See Congleton (2001) for a general discussion of the political economy of international 
environmental treaties. 
36 Answering the question regarding the expected collective preferences, subjects were not able to change 
their individual decisions in the games A and B completed before. 
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The experiment ended by asking participants to complete a final questionnaire in which 
they were requested to provide several personal characteristics such as gender, 
nationality, working field, and affiliation. 
 
5.4 Subject pool 
Approximately 2.000 people who had been involved in climate negotiations before were 
contacted via mail or email and asked to participate in the experiment. For this purpose, 
names and addresses were collected from official IPCC documents and websites. 
Overall, 155 people took part so that the response rate was roughly 8 %.37 Participants 
came from all over the world: 37 % were from Europe, 23 % from Africa, 19 % from 
Asia, 8 % from South America, 7 % from Australia and Oceania, and 6 % from North 
America. For direct comparison, the regional distribution of participants of the recent 
United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, December 2009 (COP 15) 
was: 32 % from Europe, 20 % from Africa, 22 % from Asia, 13 % from South America, 
5 % from Australia and Oceania, and 8 % from North America. Thus, the subject pool 
reflected the regional distribution of COP participants fairly well. A chi square 
goodness-of-fit test confirms that the difference in the distribution of participants 
between Copenhagen and the experiment is not significant. The experimental subjects 
worked mostly for national governmental organizations (70 %) and universities or 
research institutions (15 %). A few were employed in international governmental 
organizations (6 %), non-governmental organizations (NGO) (3 %), and private 
companies (1 %). Three quarters had been to a COP or SB meeting before (see 
Table 5.2 for further socio-economic characteristics).  
Out of 155 participants, 84 individuals (54 %) behaved consistently in game A and 103 
individuals (67 %) behaved consistently in game B. In total, 69 individuals (45 %) 
behaved consistently in both games.38 At a first glance these numbers appear somewhat 
disappointing. However, by applying the strict rules of consistency subjects who had 
not fully understood the rules and those who made random choices were excluded. 
                                                 
37 Note that the people who had been invited to participate constitute the population and not a sample of 
the population. Hence it was not possible to increase the number of participants by increasing the sample. 
38 While most people who were consistent in one game behaved rationally (in the sense that their choices 
were not random) in the other game, people who were not consistent in both games often made 
completely random choices. 
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Since the consistency of answers was one of the study’s priorities, the results described 
in the next section will focus on these three (sub-) groups. It is worth noting that the 
composition sometimes differs between all participants and the three groups. For 
example, while only about one quarter (28 %) of all participants come from the EU, 
they account for 42 % of the group who behaved consistently in game A and in game B. 
Conversely, approximately three quarters (72 %) of all participants are Non-EU but they 
only accounted for 58 % of the group who behaved consistently in game A and in game 
B. The reason for this may be that participants from the EU are more familiar with 
rather artificial decision situations such as economic experiments. 
 
5.5 Experimental results 
The participants of the study care about advantageous inequality while the majority is 
not concerned about disadvantageous inequality. More than 60 % of all subjects show 
an i  value of zero (see Figure 5.1). The mean value of iα  is 0.394, the median is 0. 
For iβ , there are two peaks, each with more than 20 % of observations, at the intervals 
(0.5, 0.6] and (0.7, 0.8]. The mean value of iβ  is 0.561, the median is 0.53.39 This 
means that 50 % of participants are willing to donate half of their endowment even if 
donating reduces total payoffs (which is the case from #2 to #11, see Table 5.1). In 
previous dictator game experiments, the percentage of subjects allocating half of their 
endowment to the other person typically ranges between 10 % and 30 %. Mean 
percentage allocation to the other person is mostly around 20 % (Camerer 2003). In 
studies which use non-student subject pools mean percentage allocation also typically 
ranges between 20 % and 30 % (e.g. List 2004b, Whitt and Wilson 2007). Since the 
present setting was not double-blind, i.e. the experimenters knew the identity of the 
participants, there may be a pro-sharing bias for example due to a matter of prestige. 
This effect could affect the individual i  and iβ  values, however, as all participants 
were subject to the same procedure, the effect should not bias regional differences 
                                                 
39 These values are based on the data of all subjects who were consistent in at least one game. However, 
the results do not significantly change if the data evaluation is limited to subjects who were consistent in 
both games. The student subject pool in a similar study (Dannenberg et al. 2007) showed significantly 
lower inequality aversion which may be explained by a higher share of economists (60 % versus 10 %) 
(e.g. Frey and Meier 2003) or an age effect as the climate negotiators are older (e.g. List 2004a, Sutter 
and Kocher 2007).  
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between the parameters. It turns out that there is no correlation between the two 
inequality parameters (Spearman’s ρ  for iα  and iβ  is 0.166 with a p-value of 0.173).40 
Since there is much geographic variety of respondents in the study, it is possible to 
examine the differences in equity preferences between different regions of the world. 
Table 5.3 summarizes the results. A series of Mann-Whitney U tests (MW U) and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (KS) shows that there are no significant differences in 
fairness parameters between EU respondents versus Non-EU respondents, G8 versus 
Non-G8 participants, and G77 versus Non-G77 participants. There is only a weakly 
significant difference at the 10 % level in iα  values between G77 and Non-G77 (see 
Figure 5.3). A regression analysis, with iα  and iβ  as dependent variables and region, 
gender, age and other socioeconomic characteristics as independent variables, confirms 
that neither region nor other socioeconomic variables have a significant effect on 
fairness parameters.41 This means that the variables collected in the experiment cannot 
explain the differences in individual fairness preferences. 
Next, let us turn to the respondents’ assumptions about collective fairness preferences. 
Interestingly, most participants have stated how they expect collective preferences to be 
related to their own preferences. Only about 18 % of subjects declared “do not know” as 
one possible answer to this question. Again, there are no significant differences between 
regions (MW U test, p > 0.05). This means that negotiators from the EU do not have 
different expectations from their government than non-EU participants. The same holds 
true for G8 versus Non-G8 and G77 versus Non-G77 comparisons. Figure 5.2 contains 
frequencies of answers separated for subjects whose inequality parameter values lie 
above and below the mean value.  
Consider i  first: Around 59 % of those who are less averse to disadvantageous 
inequality, i.e. who have an i  below the mean value, would also expect their country 
delegates to not act in a very fairness-oriented way. Approximately 17 % expect them to 
act even more selfishly. A clear majority of those who care more about equity and show 
                                                 
40 In addition, only 16 out of 69 subjects fulfill the F&S condition ii   . This behaviorial pattern is also 
observed for students in Dannenberg et al. (2007). Note, however, that from a theoretical point of view, 
ii    is not essential to the theory of F&S. Particularly, it is not a necessary condition for cooperative 
behavior in a public good game. Instead, F&S use this condition to simplify their proofs. 
41 The regression results are available from the corresponding author upon request. 
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i  values above the mean expect their country delegates to behave more selfishly: 
About 46 % of the respondents expect them to claim more money for Person 1 than they 
did for themselves. Roughly 29 % believe that their representatives would act similarly 
to them. The answers for the two subpopulations ‘above mean’ and ‘below mean’ are 
significantly differently distributed (two-sided Chi-square test p = 0.001). Furthermore, 
a Spearman’s correlation test shows that the individual i  values and expectations are 
negatively correlated (Spearman’s ρ  = -0.352, p = 0.003) insofar as expectations may 
be ranked. The ranking is 1 = “More for Person 1“, 2 = “Same way“, 3 = “Less for 
Person 1“. „Do not know“ responses are omitted. Summarizing, only a small minority 
of respondents expects country delegates to act in a more fairness-oriented way. A vast 
majority of both subpopulations expects the delegates of their home country to make 
rather selfish decisions: Most ‘below mean’ participants expect them to behave in the 
same way, i.e. to have equally low i  values, and the majority of the ‘above mean’ 
participants expect them to have lower i  values. 
Looking at i  the picture is slightly different and more ambiguous. Out of those who 
are less averse to advantageous inequality than the average, a quarter expect the same 
degree of inequality aversion regarding the collective preference, while nearly 38 % 
expect governments to be even more selfish, and approximately 20 % expect them to be 
less selfish. Roughly 35 % of those with values above the mean expect their delegates to 
behave in the same way as they did, but virtually the same percentage (37 %) expects 
representatives to act more selfishly. The answers for the two subpopulations are not 
significantly differently distributed (two-sided Chi-square test, p = 0.323). Furthermore, 
i  and expectations are not correlated (Spearman’s ρ  = -0.031, p = 0.781). Thus, again 
a majority of respondents does not expect governments to act in a more fairness-
oriented way: The majority of the ‘above mean’ participants believe that the 
representatives are equally fair or more selfish. The majority of the ‘below mean’ 
participants expect them to act in a similar manner or even more selfish than they did. 
 
5.6 Conclusions 
This chapter tries to shed some light on the question of how far equity considerations 
are important to individuals involved in climate negotiations. The notion of equity is 
122 | P a g e        S o c i a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  c l i m a t e  n e g o t i a t o r s  
 
 
operationalized by introducing the concept of inequality aversion developed by Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999). According to their approach, people are endowed with aversion to 
advantageous and disadvantageous inequality to a different degree. The degree of 
inequality aversion is measured with the help of two simple non-strategic games which 
resemble the decisions in a dictator game and an ultimatum game. The main finding is 
that inequality is of considerable importance for the negotiators. 
From a policy-oriented point of view, the most interesting and also most important 
question concerns the implications of the experimental findings for real-world climate 
negotiations. The answer is far from simple and one has to be very cautious: Real-world 
climate policy is a complex matter dealing with many more influences than equity 
attitudes only. Moreover, as already mentioned we have to be aware that equity 
preferences as measured in this study are probably not identical to collective 
preferences of countries. Despite this fact, the individual preferences elicited in this 
study may serve as a starting point for a discussion of the role of equity for the 
cooperation of countries in climate policy. As a vast majority of participants expects 
governments to not act in a more equity-oriented way, the individual preferences may 
be seen as an upper bound for inequality aversion reflected in collective preferences of 
countries. 
The voluntary contribution game introduced in Section 5.2 lacks many features of the 
real-world climate problem, e.g. an explicit modeling of costs and benefits of climate 
policy and their asymmetric regional distribution. However, it captures the essential 
incentive problem the international community is confronted with, namely the voluntary 
provision of the global public good climate protection. Thus, despite its extreme 
simplicity the model may shed some light on the problems of real-world climate 
negotiations. What do the experimental findings imply within this modeling context? 
The critical condition for achieving cooperation is given by 
     jjjmnk   11 . This condition (see Section 5.2) implies a lower bound 
for the critical value of k, critk , the number of countries that will defect in any case. We 
obtain for the lower bound jjcrit mmk   1010 . Naturally, a higher 
degree of aversion to advantageous inequality makes it easier to meet this requirement. 
To state it the other way around: Low values of i  imply that cooperation can only be 
S o c i a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  c l i m a t e  n e g o t i a t o r s        P a g e  | 123 
 
obtained if m , i.e. the MPCR of climate mitigation policies, is sufficiently high. In this 
study, the mean value for i  is 0.561. Let us for convenience neglect the - rather small - 
regional differences and consider this mean value for iβ  only. The empirical findings 
then imply that cooperation could be obtained only if 439.0m .  
Of course, currently nobody can tell whether the return of climate mitigation policies is 
above or below 0.4. However, what matters in real-world policies is the perceived 
return. Some countries have been very skeptical about the merits of mitigation policies 
in the past. The United States, for example, put a strong emphasis on the implied costs 
while at the same time expressing doubts about whether there are any benefits of 
climate policy at all. This observation leads to the conclusion that the perceived MPCR 
for the US in the past might have been very low, offering some explanation as to why 
the US has been so hesitant to adopt an active climate mitigation policy. So even if US 
Americans are concerned about equity issues as well, this does not automatically lead to 
the decision to contribute to the global public good climate protection. The simple 
voluntary contribution game shows that inequality aversion is not the sole determinant 
for the decision to cooperate, but sufficiently high returns of cooperative behavior have 
to be guaranteed as well. On the other hand, Europeans have mainly been optimistic 
about net benefits of climate policy, which may be an explanation for their self-declared 
leadership in climate policy. Thus, although equity may be important to Europeans and 
US Americans to roughly the same extent, this may not be sufficient for an agreement 
in climate mitigation policy. What is needed is a shared view of sufficiently high net 
benefits of such policies. 
Moreover, condition (5.3) may partly explain why the US dropped out of the Kyoto 
Protocol. If we interpret m  as the perceived MPCR of mitigation policies, one might 
speculate that for the Clinton-Gore administration, the return of active climate policy 
was sufficiently high to assure that 01 jm  , thus allowing for the possibility to 
take part in a climate treaty. Even if 01 jm  , the problem of what an acceptable 
number of countries not abiding by their own substantial obligations would remain. This 
issue has been discussed extensively in the US. The US Senate, for example, 
unanimously argued that important developing countries should not be allowed to stay 
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outside the Kyoto Protocol.42 In any case, for the Bush administration, the perceived 
MPCR of climate policy has presumably been much lower, so that 01 jm  , 
making participation in a climate treaty no longer worthwhile. This interpretation is in 
line with the quantitative results derived by Nordhaus and Yang (1996) who show that 
the net benefits of mitigation are lower for the US than for Europe. Evidently, the 
Obama administration has a different view on the benefit-to-cost ratio of mitigation 
policy, although it is too early to assume a fundamental change in US climate policy. 
In the following, we turn to a discussion of some more specific results of the study. 
Considering alternative groupings of countries such as G8 versus Non-G8 or EU versus 
Non-EU countries there are no significant differences, neither for individual preferences 
nor for expected collective preferences. Therefore, regional differences in addressing 
climate change are more likely to be driven by national interests than by different equity 
concerns. Given the huge differences in socio-economic circumstances between 
different regions of the world, the absence of significant differences in preferences 
seems to be a remarkable result. On average, inequality aversion appears to be rather 
similar across regions – at least if one compares individuals from a specific group, 
namely people involved in international climate negotiations. This finding is in line with 
the experimental literature on cross-country or cross-cultural comparisons. While there 
are often significant differences in individual behavior between countries or cultures 
(e.g. Henrich et al. 2001, Ferraro and Cummings 2007) these differences tend to 
disappear if experimenters use subjects with a common background such as students or 
business people (e.g. Bouckaert and Dhaene 2004). Therefore, it is possible that an 
investigation based on a broader data set would discover more asymmetrically 
distributed equity preferences. It might also be that those preferences – rather than 
negotiators’ views – are the driving force behind a country’s climate policy. However, 
given the relevance of negotiators’ personal preferences for the outcome of climate 
negotiations and the findings of other studies also analyzing negotiators’ opinions about 
equity (Lange et al. 2010) our line of reasoning seems most plausible. 
                                                 
42 This has been codified in the Byrd-Hagel resolution passed with unanimity before COP3 in 1997. The 
Byrd-Hagel resolution makes substantial reduction measures on the part of important developing 
countries a prerequisite for the US to participate in the Kyoto Protocol. Although many believe that this 
resolution was motivated purely strategically, our discussion shows that there might be some underlying 
economic rationale, since it could be the result of a positive return of climate policy which is, however, 
perceived as too low. 
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5.7 Appendix 
5.7.1 Tables 
Table 5.1: Payoffs in preference elicitation games 
   game A   game B   
   pair I pair II   pair I      pair II   
   payoffs (in $) for person 
iα  
 payoffs (in $) for person  
iβ     #   1 2 1 2  1 2  1  2  
sw
itc
hi
ng
 p
oi
nt
 fr
om
 p
ai
r I
 to
 p
ai
r I
I 
1  100.00 100.00 40.00 40.00  -  200.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 
2  88.80 111.20 40.00 40.00  2.18  200.00 0.00 10.00 10.00  0.98 
3  88.40 111.60 40.00 40.00  2.13  200.00 0.00 20.00 20.00  0.93 
4  87.80 112.20 40.00 40.00  2.02  200.00 0.00 30.00 30.00  0.88 
5  87.20 112.80 40.00 40.00  1.90  200.00 0.00 40.00 40.00  0.83 
6  86.40 113.60 40.00 40.00  1.77  200.00 0.00 50.00 50.00  0.78 
7  85.80 114.20 40.00 40.00  1.66  200.00 0.00 60.00 60.00  0.73 
8  84.80 115.20 40.00 40.00  1.54  200.00 0.00 70.00 70.00  0.68 
9  83.80 116.20 40.00 40.00  1.41  200.00 0.00 80.00 80.00  0.63 
10  82.80 117.20 40.00 40.00  1.30  200.00 0.00 90.00 90.00  0.58 
11  81.40 118.60 40.00 40.00  1.18  200.00 0.00 100.00 100.00  0.53 
12  78.40 121.60 40.00 40.00  1.00  200.00 0.00 110.00 110.00  0.48 
13  77.20 122.80 40.00 40.00  0.85  200.00 0.00 120.00 120.00  0.43 
14  76.20 123.80 40.00 40.00  0.79  200.00 0.00 130.00 130.00  0.38 
15  73.60 126.40 40.00 40.00  0.70  200.00 0.00 140.00 140.00  0.33 
16  70.60 129.40 40.00 40.00  0.58  200.00 0.00 150.00 150.00  0.28 
17  66.60 133.40 40.00 40.00  0.46  200.00 0.00 160.00 160.00  0.23 
18  57.00 143.00 40.00 40.00  0.30  200.00 0.00 170.00 170.00  0.18 
19  54.40 145.60 40.00 40.00  0.18  200.00 0.00 180.00 180.00  0.13 
20  44.40 155.60 40.00 40.00  0.10  200.00 0.00 190.00 190.00  0.08 
21  28.60 171.40 40.00 40.00  0.00  200.00 0.00 200.00 200.00  0.03 
22  2.00 198.00 40.00 40.00 -0.14  200.00 0.00 210.00 210.00  0.00 
Note: The computation of the F&S parameters is illustrated for parameter i  and a subject who switches from pair I to II in
#11: According to (5.2) for this subject the following conditions hold:  82.80 82.80 117.20 40.00i    and 
 40.00 81.40 81.40 118.60i   . Given these decisions we can compute the lower bound ( 1.113i  ) and the upper 
bound ( 1.244i  ) for the parameter. The mean value is (1.113 1.244) 2 1.18i    . 
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Table 5.2: Socio-economic characteristics of participants 
Participants  All Consistent  
in A 
Consistent  
in B 
Consistent  
in A and B 
Frequency  Abs. in % Abs. in % Abs. in % Abs. in % 
Gender 
Female 
Male 
No answer 
 
31 
119 
5 
 
20.0 
76.8 
3.2 
 
16 
64 
4 
 
19.0 
76.2 
4.8 
 
22 
78 
3 
 
21.4 
75.7 
2.9 
 
13 
54 
2 
 
18.8 
78.3 
2.9 
Age 
20 – 29 
30 – 39 
40 – 49 
50 – 59 
60 – 69 
No answer 
 
16 
49 
40 
41 
3 
6 
 
10.3 
31.6 
25.8 
26.5 
1.9 
3.9 
 
3 
27 
22 
26 
1 
5 
 
3.6 
32.1 
26.2 
31.0 
1.2 
6.0 
 
4 
32 
28 
33 
2 
4 
 
3.9 
31.1 
27.2 
32.0 
1.9 
3.9 
 
2 
22 
17 
23 
1 
4 
 
2.9 
31.9 
24.6 
33.3 
1.4 
5.8 
Continent 
AFR 
AOZ 
ASI 
EUR 
NAM 
SAM 
 
36 
10 
30 
57 
9 
13 
 
23.2 
6.5 
19.4 
36.8 
5.8 
8.4 
 
12 
5 
16 
40 
4 
7 
 
14.3 
6.0 
19.1 
47.6 
4.8 
8.3 
 
12 
5 
19 
51 
7 
9 
 
11.7 
4.9 
18.4 
49.5 
6.8 
8.7 
 
7 
4 
12 
35 
4 
7 
 
10.1 
5.8 
17.4 
50.7 
5.8 
10.1 
EU/Non-EU 
EU 
Non-EU 
 
43 
112 
 
27.7 
72.3 
 
33 
51 
 
39.3 
60.7 
 
40 
63 
 
38.8 
61.2 
 
29 
40 
 
42.0 
58.0 
G8/Non-G8 
G8 
Non-G8 
 
28 
127 
 
18.1 
81.9 
 
20 
64 
 
23.8 
76.2 
 
26 
77 
 
25.2 
74.8 
 
18 
51 
 
26.1 
73.9 
G77/Non-G77 
G77 
Non-G77 
 
83 
72 
 
53.5 
46.5 
 
37 
47 
 
44.1 
56.0 
 
40 
63 
 
38.8 
61.2 
 
28 
41 
 
40.6 
59.4 
Field 
Natural sciences 
Political sciences 
Economics/Business administration 
Law 
Engineering 
Other 
 
64 
8 
16 
6 
28 
33 
 
41.3 
5.2 
10.3 
3.9 
18.1 
21.3 
 
33 
5 
11 
3 
15 
17 
 
39.3 
6.0 
13.1 
3.6 
17.9 
20.2 
 
45 
8 
12 
4 
14 
20 
 
43.7 
7.8 
11.7 
3.9 
13.6 
19.4 
 
27 
5 
10 
2 
11 
14 
 
39.1 
7.2 
14.5 
2.9 
15.9 
20.3 
Organisation 
International governmental institution 
National governmental institution 
University or research institution 
Private company 
NGO 
Other 
 
9 
108 
23 
2 
5 
8 
 
5.8 
69.7 
14.8 
1.3 
3.2 
5.2 
 
5 
59 
11 
1 
3 
5 
 
6.0 
70.2 
13.1 
1.2 
3.6 
6.0 
 
6 
70 
18 
1 
2 
6 
 
5.8 
68.0 
17.5 
1.0 
1.9 
5.8 
 
4 
48 
10 
1 
2 
4 
 
5.8 
69.6 
14.5 
1.4 
2.9 
5.8 
COP/SBI or SBSTA participation 
Yes 
No 
No answer 
 
116 
32 
7 
 
74.8 
20.6 
4.5 
 
62 
18 
4 
 
73.8 
21.4 
4.8 
 
76 
23 
4 
 
73.8 
22.3 
3.9 
 
50 
16 
3 
 
72.5 
23.2 
4.3 
  155 100.0 84 100.0 103 100.0 69 100.0 
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Table 5.3: Regional differences for fairness parameters 
 alpha  beta 
regional split mean MWU test* KS test*  mean MWU test* KS test* 
     EU 0.388  0.525 
     Non-EU 0.398 0.379 0.784  0.584 0.234 0.242 
     G8 0.275  0.503 
     Non-G8 0.432 0.118 0.399  0.581 0.186 0.366 
     G77 0.472  0.603 
     Non-G77 0.333 0.075 0.219  0.535 0.102 0.160 
Notes: * columns contain p-value for the test of significance. Results remain virtually unchanged if the analysis 
is limited to subjects who are consistent in both games.  
 
5.7.2 Figures 
Figure 5.1: Joint distribution of fairness parameters 
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Notes: The number of 
observations is 69. A random 
noise (5% of the graphical area) 
is introduced to the data in the 
scatter plot before plotting. 
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Figure 5.2: Collective vs. individual fairness preferences 
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5.7.3 Experimental instructions 
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6 The effects of third-party input on voluntary public goods 
contributions 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates if third-party input to the provision of a public good affects the 
willingness to contribute to that public good. Unlike all previous chapters, the public 
good examined in this (and the following) chapter does not refer to climate change 
mitigation but to charitable donations. There are several reasons to take charitable 
donations (see Chapter 1) including the following two: First, charitable donations, e.g. 
to development aid, are well suited to measure the willingness to contribute to a specific 
public good. In contrast, it is very difficult to elicit the individual willingness to pay for 
climate protection because these contributions often take the form of behavior 
modifications, i.e. opportunity costs, instead of direct payment. Second, third-party 
input to the public good is given by the charity’s revenues. When individuals make a 
real-life donation decision, they usually do not have precise information about a 
charity’s income streams. They do not know whether and how much their neighbors or 
other people in their social community donate to a certain charity. Furthermore, it is 
questionable whether they are aware of the exact amount of government subsidies given 
to that charity. However, they probably have a belief about the charity’s size in terms of 
entire revenues, i.e. whether it is small or large. 
Therefore, this study examines the effects of information about the revenues of a charity 
on the willingness to donate to that charity. Various approaches may be relevant here: 
Theoretical models predict complete or incomplete crowding out of voluntary 
contributions by government financial support. Furthermore, an impact philanthropist 
may prefer to give to smaller charities to increase the relative impact of his or her 
donation, while the approaches of quality signaling and conditional cooperation predict 
that larger charities may be chosen more frequently. So far, however, experimental 
studies have examined either the effect of government financial support on voluntary 
contributions or the effect of social information on private donations but not the net 
effect. Experimental evidence hints at incomplete crowding out of private donations by 
government subsidies, while several studies on social information find a positive 
relation between others’ contributions and those of one’s own.  
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To fill this gap in the literature, a framed field experiment was conducted where a non-
student subject pool was asked to make a real donation decision. Half of the subjects 
could choose whether to give to a charity with relatively low annual revenues or to a 
charity with relatively high annual revenues. To the best of our knowledge, this study is 
the first that presents evidence on the net effect and it shows a negative relation between 
a charity’s entire revenues and private donations to that charity. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows: Section 6.2 summarizes the findings of the 
relevant theoretical and empirical literature and motivates the experimental framework. 
Section 6.3 describes the experimental setting and Section 6.4 part delivers the results. 
Section 6.5 concludes. 
 
6.2 Theoretical and empirical background 
Third-party contributions to a charity may stem from governmental subsidies or other 
individuals’ donations, respectively. Theoretical models and empirical studies have 
looked at the effects of both sources of charities’ income on private donations. 
The standard public goods model (Warr 1982, Roberts 1984, Bergstrom et al. 1986) 
predicts that private voluntary contributions are completely crowded out by government 
contributions to the same good. In this model, an individual derives utility from his 
private consumption as well as the total supply of the public good. If a contributing 
individual is taxed in order to finance the public good, he decreases his voluntary 
contributions by exactly the same amount, as long as the taxes to be paid do not exceed 
the voluntary contribution he made previously to the taxation. It is reasonable, though, 
to assume that a potential donor also derives positive utility from the mere act of 
contributing. Andreoni (1989, 1990) coined the term ‘warm glow’ to describe such 
preferences, where an individual’s utility increases with the amount contributed. In this 
case, government contributions are not a perfect substitute for voluntary contributions, 
which implies that the former crowd out the latter only incompletely: An individual’s 
contribution decreases by less than the exact amount of government contributions.43 
                                                 
43 Steinberg (1987) proposes a model of mixed motives in which donations may not necessarily be a 
normal good. He shows that individuals’ contributions may rise or fall in response to an increase in 
government’s contributions. Moreover, Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) show that with impurely altruistic 
preferences both asymptotically zero and asymptotically complete crowding out may occur. 
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The empirical evidence on the theoretical predictions of crowding out is mixed. In a 
literature review, Steinberg (1991) concludes crowding out of private charitable 
contributions by government spending to be between 0.5% and 35%. Also, more recent 
studies provide evidence for incomplete crowding out (among others Ribar and 
Wilhelm 2002, Gruber and Hungerman 2007, Andreoni and Payne 2010). There is, 
however, also empirical evidence for crowding in of voluntary contributions (Khanna et 
al. 1995, Khanna and Sandler 2000, Payne 2001). Arulampalam et al. (2009) use 
charity-level data for the special case of UK overseas development charities. They find 
no crowding out of donations to development by official development assistance. Their 
results rather hint at a modest positive effect of government grants on private giving. 
This implies that donors may be attracted to charities which receive substantial support 
from the state.  
Furthermore, several laboratory experiments try to test the hypothesis of complete 
crowding out. Andreoni (1993) compares two groups of subjects that use the same 
mechanism to provide a public good, but face different levels of government provision. 
A minimum contribution level of two tokens is meant to resemble a tax which is used to 
finance a public good. If there was complete crowding out, average contributions 
(including the two tokens tax) should be the same in both groups. However, the author 
finds that crowding out is incomplete. Chan et al. (2002) use the same mechanism to 
confirm the result and extend it by the finding that crowding out increases as the size of 
the involuntary transfer increases. Bolton and Katok (1998) let subjects play a dictator 
game and vary the initial endowments of dictators and recipients (from $15 for the 
dictator and $5 for the recipient to $18 and $2, respectively). They find that the 
proportion of non-givers does not differ across the treatments, but that individuals in the 
15-5 treatment give less, so there is some crowding out. Eckel et al. (2005) use the same 
mechanism, but control for fiscal illusion and the recipients are charities. If there is no 
fiscal illusion, i.e. the subject knows that the initial allocations are resulting from being 
taxed, there is support for the theoretical prediction of complete crowding out. In case 
of fiscal illusion, however, crowding out is zero. Konow (2010) keeps the endowment 
of the dictator fixed but changes the endowment of the recipient in the subsidy 
treatment from $0 to $4 and confirms the result of partial crowding out. 
As charities do not only earn income from government contributions, further theoretical 
approaches have to be taken into account. Duncan’s (2004) theory of impact 
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philanthropy relates to individuals who aim at having a distinct effect on the supply of a 
charitable good, i.e. they want to ‘personally make a difference’. Hence, an impact 
philanthropist may benefit from a charity’s lower income. This is because an increase in 
the revenues of a charity or others’ contributions causes negative externalities: The 
importance and the impact of the philanthropist’s donation are reduced. It then may be 
that an impact philanthropist – if provided with the choice between two charities of 
different size – chooses to give to the charity with smaller income streams because this 
increases the relative impact of his gift.44 Moreover, an impact philanthropist dislikes 
financing the administrative costs of a charity. If a philanthropist assumes larger 
charities to have greater administrative costs, he would prefer to give to the smaller 
organization. In yet another theoretical model, Andreoni (1998) assumes the existence 
of a non-convexity in the production function of the public good, i.e. a minimum 
threshold that must be met for the public good to be consumed. He shows that in this 
case others’ contributions may be regarded as substitutes for one’s own. 
On the other hand, however, models have been proposed which suggest that a positive 
effect of third-party contributions on individuals’ donations may prevail. One approach 
is to model contributions by other individuals as a signal of the charity’s quality as 
Vesterlund (2003) suggests. Typically, donations are not made simultaneously, but 
rather in a sequential manner, where high donations by other individuals suggest a high-
quality charity which may induce individuals to give larger amounts to that organization. 
Andreoni (2006) remarks that leadership gifts may also be perceived as a signal for the 
respective charity’s quality. To make this signal credible, however, the leadership gift 
has to be sufficiently high. So, if a charity with higher revenues is perceived to be of a 
higher quality it should be targeted by donors more likely than a charity with lower 
revenues. What is more, the phenomenon of conditional cooperation predicts that 
individuals will be more willing to contribute if they know that others contribute 
(Fischbacher et al. 2001). 
Several natural field experiments investigate how information about others’ 
contributions affects charitable donations. Frey and Meier (2004) present evidence from 
a large-scale field experiment on conditional cooperation. They find that when students 
                                                 
44 The theoretical model suggested by Duncan, however, leads to no clear predictions how a change in the 
endowment of a charity or in the contributions of others would affect the size of the gift. 
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are presented with information that many other fellows donated to certain charitable 
funds, their willingness to contribute increases. The studies of Croson and Shang (2008, 
2009) support this finding. Their setting is an on-air fundraising campaign for a public 
radio station where another member’s contribution is mentioned to participants before 
they make their own pledge. The results of their field experiment show that (social) 
information about others’ high contributions influences one’s own contributions 
positively. The information effect also works downwardly. When renewing donors are 
presented with information about another donor’s contribution which is either above or 
below their last year’s contribution, respondents adjust their contribution in the 
direction of the information (Croson and Shang 2008). Croson and Shang (2010), 
however, demonstrate a natural limitation of the social information effect. When the 
social information is too extreme, it may lead to lower individual contributions. Also, 
Martin and Randal (2008) show that donors positively respond to information about 
others’ contributions. Using field data from an art gallery, they find that depending on 
the composition of coins and bills in a transparent donation box, the more bills are 
exhibited relative to coins the lower is the participation rate and the higher is the 
average donation. While these two opposing effects level off, so that similar total 
donation amounts are realized across these treatments, a displayed donation box which 
is empty induces lower overall donations.45  
In summary, previous experimental studies indicate that there is incomplete crowding 
out of voluntary contributions by government contributions and that providing 
information about others’ contributions increases either the propensity to donate, the 
size of the donation, or both. The experimental approach used here differs from 
previous experiments in two important aspects. First, the information presented to each 
subject in our experiment consists of two intervals stating the yearly revenues received 
by an organization which comprises donations, membership fees and public subsidies. 
This kind of information is deemed to be very close to the situation potential donors 
find themselves in the real world, as they usually cannot distinguish the size of other 
donors’ gifts and may not be aware of the extent to which a charity receives government 
                                                 
45 The experimental literature on seed money may also be used to study the effect of information on 
charitable giving. In seed money experiments, it is announced that some particular amount has already 
been collected or provided by an anonymous donor or institution. List and Lucking-Reiley (2002), Landry 
et al. (2006), and Rondeau and List (2008) all find a positive effect of seed money on individual 
donations. 
T h e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h i r d - p a r t y  i n p u t                    P a g e  | 139 
 
subsidies. The information is provided to distinguish charities by their size. Donations 
to larger organizations could mirror the fact that charities’ revenues serve as a signal for 
good quality of a charity whereas donations to smaller organizations might reflect 
crowding out at the organization level or the aim at having a higher relative impact 
through the donation. This framework, however, is not meant to test for crowding out of 
voluntary contributions to a certain public good, e.g. development aid. If a subject 
chooses to give to a small development organization instead of the large one, he or she 
still consumes the public good. Hence, crowding out rather happens on the 
organizational level. 
Second, a framed field experiment is used rather than a natural field experiment or a 
conventional lab experiment. Unlike in a natural field experiment, subjects in a framed 
field experiment undertake the task in an artificial environment and know that they are 
part of an experiment (Harrison and List 2004). Although this may bias the subjects’ 
behavior to some extent, a framed field experiments offers advantages in terms of more 
control and the elicitation of personal characteristics of the participants. In addition, the 
donation decisions are made completely anonymously in the experimental setting. In 
door-to-door-fundraising, solicitation letter campaigns or other kinds of donation 
campaigns the identity of the donor is usually known to the organization. By means of 
the double-blind procedure, however, neither other experimental subjects nor the 
experimenter know the amount of the donation made by a certain donor. This procedure 
rules out an experimenter effect or certain motivations such as signaling of wealth, 
prestige or social approval. That such social incentive effects can arise from removing 
anonymity is shown in the field (Soetevent 2005) as well as in the lab (Hoffman et al. 
1994, Andreoni and Petrie 2004).  
Furthermore, framed field experiments are characterized by a non-student subject pool 
and a field context in the commodity, and therefore offer more realism than 
conventional lab experiments (Harrison and List 2004). A weakness of lab experiments 
is often seen in the weak representativeness of the sample and thus the lacking 
generalizability of results. Especially in the case of donation decisions 
representativeness might be important. Carpenter et al. (2008) for example show in a 
laboratory experiment that students tend to be less likely to donate to a charity than 
members from the broader community.  
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6.3 Experimental design 
6.3.1 Implementation and participants 
For subject recruitment, invitation letters were randomly distributed in the city of 
Mannheim, Germany. The letter contained an invitation to take part in a scientific study 
and informed people that they would receive €40 for participation. It was announced 
that there would be a kind of survey in which they could (voluntarily and anonymously) 
make consumption decisions. A relatively high show-up fee was used in order to avoid 
underrepresentation of people with high opportunity costs of time. Furthermore, the 
invitation letter already emphasized that the money was a reward for participation in the 
study in order to make people feel entitled to their endowment and to avoid a bias due to 
unexpected gift money. The experiment took place in July 2009 on the premises of the 
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim. A total of 223 
participants took part in the experiment. At the beginning of each session, participants 
individually drew lots to determine their ID number (which remained unknown to other 
participants and the experimenters) and chose a table. The tables had privacy screens on 
every side to ensure private decisions and answers. Participants were not allowed to talk 
to each other. If they had questions, the experimenters answered them privately. The 12 
experimental sessions lasted around 60 minutes each. Within one session, all subjects 
performed exactly the same task. At first, all participants obtained detailed instructions 
about the course of the experiment (see Section 6.6.3 for experimental instructions). The 
main features were orally repeated. It was emphasized that all information given in the 
instructions was true. Participants in all treatments filled out a questionnaire with 
questions about socio-demographic characteristics, their donation habits, and their 
attitude toward their own social standing within society and toward governmental 
responsibilities. The attitudinal questions were taken from the German General Social 
Survey (ALLBUS) which is conducted every two years with a representative sample of 
the German population.46 At the end of each session, participants had the chance to 
comment on the experiment and to give reasons for their decisions (see Figure 6.3 for 
an overview of the experimental proceedings). 
                                                 
46  For detailed information, see http://www.gesis.org/en/services/data/survey-data/allbus/ (accessed in 
October 2010). 
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Participants’ socio-demographic characteristics are shown in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. The 
subject pool is highly diversified with, for example, age ranging from 18 to 75 years. 
Although it is not fully representative of the German resident population, it is 
sufficiently diversified in all socio-demographic variables in order to examine the 
influence of each variable on charitable behavior. Moreover, in case of gender, income, 
and religion, the distribution of the subject pool does not significantly differ from that of 
the German population (chi squared test, t-test, p>0.1).47 More precisely, 46.2% of 
subjects are male. 22.9% dispose of a monthly net household income of less than €1,000, 
most of the subjects live in households with incomes between €1,000 and €3,000 and 
only 13.0% have more than €3,000 per month disposable. With regard to religion, 
Catholics (31.4%) and Protestants (31.8%) are equally represented, whereas 6.7% 
possess another religious affiliation and 30.0% of all subjects do not belong to any 
religious community. Participants’ responses to questions regarding their giving 
behavior in the past as well as their attitudes are displayed in Tables 6.8 and 6.9.  
 
6.3.2 Experimental treatments 
The experiment comprised two treatments which both contained a real donation stage 
where subjects simultaneously and independently decided how much (if any) of their 
endowment to donate to a certain charity. Subjects were informed that all of the selected 
charities have obtained the ‘DZI Spendensiegel’, a label for charities that use their funds 
economically and according to their statutes. 48  Subjects could choose one of four 
charitable causes, namely disabled care, development aid, medical research, and animal 
protection, whereby subjects knew only the purpose but not the name of the 
organizations to avoid any reputation effects. All donation decisions were completely 
voluntary and anonymous. We used a double-blind procedure in which neither other 
subjects nor experimenters came to know if, how much and to which cause a subject 
donated. Subjects received a large envelope containing two small envelopes and the 
endowment of €40 broken into two 10-euro notes, one 5-euro note, six 2-euro coins, and 
three 1-euro coins. This breakdown enabled subjects to donate any integer amount 
between €0 and €40 and abated incentives to only give the coins. Subjects placed the 
                                                 
47 Unless stated otherwise, all tests in this chapter are two-sided. 
48 For more information (in German language), see www.dzi.de (accessed in October 2010). 
142 | P a g e                    T h e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h i r d - p a r t y  i n p u t  
 
 
amount they wished to donate in one of the small envelopes assigned to donations, 
labeled the envelope with their ID number and, in case they were willing to give a 
positive amount, the charitable cause to which they wished to donate. The amount of 
money subjects wished to keep for themselves was placed in the other small envelope. 
Afterwards, subjects dropped the sealed envelope specified for donations in a box.  
The baseline treatment (‘NoInfo’) with 113 subjects involved the above described 
donation stage and afterwards the completion of the questionnaire. The 110 subjects in 
the treatment ‘Info’ were informed not only about the charitable cause of the 
organizations but also about their revenues taken by donations, membership fees and 
public subsidies in 2006. For each charitable cause, two organizations were offered: one 
relatively small organization with revenues between €40,000 and €300,000 and one 
relatively large organization with revenues between €5 million and €11 million. Thus, 
subjects in this treatment could choose one of eight organizations for their donation. All 
donations made during the experiment were transferred in full to the respective 
organizations. In case of the NoInfo treatment, donations were equally assigned to small 
and large organizations of the same cause. The counting of donations and the transfer to 
the organizations were notarially monitored and certified. This procedure and the name 
of the notary were already announced in the experimental instructions.49 
 
6.4 Experimental results 
6.4.1 Treatment effects 
In total, €1,225 are donated to the charities. Mean donation per participant is €5.49 or 
13.7% of the endowment, median donation is €3.00. Broken down by purposes, €448 
are donated to disabled care, €318 to development aid, €274 to medical research, and 
€185 to animal protection. Disabled care is not only the purpose which is selected most 
frequently (21%) but which also receives the highest average donations (9.53€). While 
individual donations do not differ significantly between the four purposes, subjects 
select animal protection less frequently than the other three purposes (binomial test 1% 
                                                 
49 Some participants also completed another task (a dictator game) in the experiment which is not part of 
this chapter (see Chapter 7). As this task did not affect the donation decision, the data was pooled. 
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significance). Overall, 33 % of the subjects do not make a donation at all. Table 6.1 
contains the descriptive statistics of the donation distribution. 
In the NoInfo treatment in which subjects did not obtain information about charity 
revenues, mean donation per participant is €5.56 and in the Info treatment in which 
subjects obtain this information, mean donation is €5.43 (compare Table 6.2). 
Interestingly, providing participants with this information neither has an impact on 
individual donations nor on the probability to select a certain charitable cause. However, 
it shifts donations within the group of subjects who obtained the information: €455 are 
donated to small organizations and €132 are donated to large organizations. On average, 
participants donate €8.92 to small organizations and €6.95 to large organizations; this 
difference, however, is not statistically significant.  
Out of the 110 subjects who received the information and made a positive donation, 
73% choose the small organization, and only 27% choose the large organization. Thus, 
the shift of donations occurs mainly because small organizations are selected more 
frequently than large organizations (binomial test 1% significance). This effect is 
observed for all charitable causes (at least 5% significance each) as illustrated in Figure 
6.1. The preference for small organizations appears to be very pronounced in the case of 
disabled care: Here, 86% of donors choose the small organization and 14% choose the 
large one. In case of development aid (medical research, animal protection), 68% (64%, 
69%) of donors select the small organization. 
The theoretical part in Section 6.2 proposes different explanations why people may 
prefer small organizations to large ones. However, one cannot be sure whether these 
reasons actually induced the subjects to choose the small organization. There are several 
other possible reasons for people’s preferences which are not captured by the theoretical 
models. For example, small organizations might be associated with more local activities.  
For this reason, an ex-post online survey was conducted with the subjects who 
participated in the Info treatment. The survey was completely anonymous and contained 
questions about the decisions in the experiment, namely (i) whether subjects donated a 
positive amount, if so (ii) to which charitable cause, (iii) to a small or a large 
organization, and given that choice (iv) for what reason they chose the small or the large 
organization. All questions offered predetermined answers including the option “I 
cannot remember”. If participants had chosen the small organization, they were 
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provided with the following answers: “For my decision to donate to the small 
organization, it was decisive that (a) my donation to the small organization has a higher 
impact compared to a large organization, (b) small organizations are discriminated 
against compared to large ones and therefore need more support, (c) small organizations 
have lower administrative costs compared to large ones and therefore my donation is 
more likely to benefit the actual charitable cause, (d) small organizations are more 
likely to act on a local level compared to large ones, (e) small organizations are more 
specialized in certain fields of activity compared to large ones, (f) other reasons.” If 
participants had chosen the large organization, they were provided with these options: 
“For my decision to donate to the large organization, it was decisive that (a) the large 
organization was able to already collect many funds (consisting of donations, 
membership fees and public subsidies), (b) large organizations can achieve more with 
my donation than the small ones, (c) large organizations have a higher level of 
familiarity compared to small ones, (d) large organizations are more likely to act 
professionally compared to small ones, (e) other reasons.” In both cases, the 
predetermined options randomly varied between participants, they could select several 
options and give further reasons in an open description field.  
Out of the 104 individuals who were invited to the survey 81 individuals took part.50 
The statements made in the survey are consistent with the observed behavior in the 
experiment, i.e. there are no significant differences between the survey data and the 
experimental data. For example, the 68% of responders stating in the survey that they 
donated a positive amount correspond to 64% who in fact donated a positive amount in 
the experiment. Let us first consider the people who had chosen the small organization. 
The reasons for this decision which are mentioned most frequently are lower 
administrative costs (50%) and a possible higher impact of the own donation (44%). 
Recall that these are the motives that are captured by the impact theory. Another reason 
which is mentioned frequently is the neediness of small organizations (39%), indicating 
the existence of a crowding out effect at the organizational level (see Figure 6.2).  
                                                 
50 As an incentive to participate, everyone who completed the survey took part in a drawing for 5 times 30 
Euros. A few people completed the survey via mail because they did not provide an email address. Six 
participants in the Info treatment were not invited to the survey because they did not provide any contact 
details. 
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Regarding the choice of the large organization the most frequently stated reason is the 
professionalism of large organizations (86%) followed by the effective achievement of 
objectives (43%) and the apparent ability to acquire funds (29%). All these motivations 
support the quality signaling approach. However, this signal appears to attract only few 
donors. 
 
6.4.2 Effects of socio-demographic variables 
After looking at the effects of the experimental treatments, this section presents 
econometric estimations analyzing the impact of various socio-demographic variables 
which have been surveyed in the questionnaire. Around 33% of the subjects decided not 
to donate, hence there is a large number of observations clustered at zero donations. In 
this case, ordinary least squares estimates would not be accurate, so a maximum 
likelihood estimation of a Tobit model was conducted. The baseline estimation includes 
the following socio-demographic variables: age, household size as the absolute number 
of household members including children, dummy variables for male subjects, 
unmarried subjects, subjects not having any religious affiliation (no religion), voters of 
the left party, highly educated subjects (education, owning a graduate degree), high 
income subjects (monthly net household income of 2.000 € or more). 
It is very likely, however, that there are unobservable features influencing the donation 
decision. Therefore, additional estimations include four attitudinal variables taken from 
the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) to control for one’s perceived standing 
within society and the attitude towards the state. More precisely, the variable position is 
a dummy variable for subjects thinking they receive their fair share or more compared 
to others living in Germany. The variable disparities is coded as ‘1’ for those subjects 
believing that the social disparities in Germany are just. The variable state resp is a 
dummy for subjects who want the state to care for a good living in case of illness, 
misery, unemployment and old age. Similarly, the variable equalize takes the value ‘1’ 
if a subject indicated that it is the responsibility of the state to reduce income disparities. 
Although it is quite common to include attitudinal variables in econometric estimations 
(e.g. Corneo and Grüner 2002), the causality between these variables and the dependent 
variable (donations) may run in both directions, i.e. these variables may be endogenous. 
For this reason, Table 6.3 displays both estimations with attitudinal variables and those 
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without these variables in order to show whether effects are robust to this modification. 
The second specification furthermore includes a dummy variable for subjects that 
already made a charitable donation in the year 2009 (donor 2009) in order to control for 
offsetting effects. Furthermore, both estimations are presented with and without outliers. 
Outliers were defined as those subjects contributing more than half their endowment 
(€20) in the donation decision (five subjects).  
The estimation results show a positive and highly significant effect of age on charitable 
donations, whereas the coefficients for male donors and household size are not 
significant. This finding is robust across all four models. Moreover, across all four 
estimations, voters of the left party on average give significantly smaller amounts than 
all other subjects. Surprisingly, being unmarried affects the donation decision positively 
and significantly. It may be suspected that unmarried subjects, as they may have less 
responsibility for other people in their everyday life, feel more obliged to help others 
with their donation. 
Subjects without a religious affiliation make lower contributions, but the corresponding 
coefficient is only significant when outliers are excluded. As expected from previous 
empirical investigations, high income and high education both have a positive impact on 
donations although the significance levels vary according to the estimation specification. 
The relation between donations in the experiment and donations that have been made in 
the year 2009 previously to the experiment is, as expected, negative, though not 
significant. Furthermore, the attitudinal variables do not have any explanatory power.  
Table 6.4 presents the results from a Probit estimation model with the dependent 
variable being ‘1’ if a person donated a positive amount and ‘0’ if a person did not 
donate. The results basically confirm the findings presented in Table 6.3. The 
probability to donate significantly increases with age. People without religious 
affiliation and left party voters are less likely to donate than others. Unmarried people 
are more likely to donate but this effect is statistically weak and depends on the 
specification of the estimation. Interestingly, the variables education and income are not 
significant in this estimation model. Thus, while high education and high income have a 
positive effect on the donation amount, they do not significantly increase the probability 
to donate. 
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We have seen that small organizations are preferred by the donors and certain 
characteristics influence the donation behavior differently. In a further step we now 
have a closer look at whether subjects’ characteristics differ with respect to the choice 
of the organization. As there are three possible outcomes (no donation, donation to a 
small organization and donation to a large organization), a multinomial response model 
is appropriate. Presuming that adding another donation category, e.g. a medium sized 
organization, affects the donation decision of donors and non-donors differently, the 
assumption of the irrelevance of independent alternatives does not hold. Therefore, a 
nested logit model is used. In particular, two nests are defined in which one nest 
consists of all non-donors of the Info treatment while the other nest contains all donors 
that donated to either a small or a large organization. The outcome ‘small organization’ 
is used as baseline as it was selected most frequently by the subjects. The estimations 
include the same explanatory variables as in the first specification of Tables 6.3 and 6.4. 
The earlier defined outliers are included in the analysis as the decision to donate or not 
to donate is now the major point of interest (rather than the size of the donation). 
Moreover, the results do not change if the outliers are excluded. 
The results presented in Table 6.5 show that donors who donate to a small organization 
do not significantly differ from donors who donate to a large organization (column 2). 
When comparing the donors to the small organization with the non-donors (column 1), 
we see that donors to small organizations are more likely to be unmarried than the non-
donors (p<0.1). This result confirms the findings reported earlier in Table 6.3.51  
 
6.5 Conclusions 
This chapter’s experiment contributes to the understanding how the provision of 
information about charities’ revenues affects individual donation decisions. The results 
show that donors prefer to give to small charities with relatively low revenues as 
compared to large charities. Thus, the results support the models that predict a negative 
relation between a charity’s income and the willingness to donate to that charity: the 
theory of impact philanthropy by Duncan (2004) which assumes that donors try to 
                                                 
51 We also investigated in how far personal characteristics influence the choice of the charitable cause 
differently. The results turn out to be insignificant: A nested logit model shows that subjects who donated 
to disabled care do not have significantly different characteristics compared to people who donate to 
development aid, medical research or animal protection. 
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achieve the biggest impact possible with their charitable contribution and the public 
goods models, which predict incomplete crowding out of voluntary contributions by 
third-party contributions. The survey data shows that Duncan’s model, in particular, 
captures motives that play an important role for real donation decisions. The quality 
considerations as suggested by Vesterlund (2003) and Andreoni (2006) play a role only 
for those few donors that chose to give to large organizations.  
The type of information that was announced in the experiment differs from that used in 
other experiments: To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study which provides 
participants with the information about a charity’s entire revenues. This kind of 
information is deemed to be more realistic because in real-life donation decisions, 
individuals usually do not precisely know whether and how much other individuals 
have given and to which extent a charity is subsidized by government. While the 
announcement of other individuals’ contributions is likely to lead to the emergence of 
anchor points or the desire to comply with own or others’ expectations, the information 
provided in this experiment does not point in one specific direction but rather offers two 
charities of different size. Considerations like signaling of wealth (Glazer and Konrad, 
1996) or social approval (Holländer, 1990) are not relevant in the anonymous setting. 
Thus, varying the content of (social) information can be a fruitful area of further 
research. Furthermore, the experimental results indicate that small and large charities 
may converge over time as supporting small organizations seems to be more popular. 
The next step would be to test this hypothesis and to analyze drivers which were 
removed in the experiment but may counter this development in reality, such as 
reputation and search costs. 
The results of the experiment confirm previous findings that the individual donations 
increase with subjects’ age, income, and education (e.g. Pharoah and Tanner 1997, 
Schervish and Havens 1997). This suggests that donation decisions in the experiment 
are a good indicator of real-life decisions. Unmarried individuals donate significantly 
more and voters of the left party donate significantly less than others. As individuals 
with certain characteristics are more likely to react positively when provided with the 
opportunity to make a donation, fundraisers may be able to increase donations by 
specifically targeting those individuals. 
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6.6 Appendix 
6.6.1 Tables 
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics 
 Observations Share in % Total donation  
(in €) 
Average donation 
(in €) 
No donation 74           33           0 0    
Donation 149           67           1,225           8.22    
 Disabled care 47          21 448          9.53    
 Development aid 39           17          318           8.15    
 Medical research 38 17                    274           7.21    
 Animal protection 25           11          185          7.40    
Total         223          100          1,225          5.49     
 
Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics across treatments 
 Observations Share in % by 
treatment 
Total donation  
(in €) 
Average donation 
(in €) 
NoInfo treatment 113           100          628 5.56   
 No donation 35         31 0           0 
 Donation 78         69 628         8.05    
Info treatment 110          100 597 5.43 
 No donation 39 36 0 0 
 Small organization 51 46 455 8.92 
 Large organization 19 17 132 6.95    
Total         223          100          1,225          5.49     
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Table 6.3: Tobit estimation results 
 Including outlier Excluding outlier 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
_cons -11.27*** -9.088* -5.904* -5.685 
 (-2.671) (-1.931) (-1.782) (-1.532) 
age 0.232*** 0.236*** 0.170*** 0.183*** 
 (3.760) (3.780) (3.461) (3.648) 
male -1.563 -1.658 -0.773 -1.083 
 (-1.094) (-1.147) (-0.689) (-0.950) 
household size  -0.00620 -0.125 -0.298 -0.461 
 (-0.00738) (-0.147) (-0.451) (-0.686) 
unmarried 6.419*** 5.893*** 4.193*** 4.099** 
 (3.201) (2.939) (2.646) (2.572) 
no religion  -1.279 -1.200 -3.179** -3.120** 
 (-0.812) (-0.762) (-2.522) (-2.457) 
left party  -9.109*** -9.315*** -6.822*** -6.611*** 
 (-2.996) (-2.996) (-2.899) (-2.747) 
education   3.991*** 3.962** 2.187* 2.271* 
 (2.622) (2.593) (1.834) (1.890) 
income 4.695*** 4.614*** 3.357** 3.353** 
 (2.722) (2.675) (2.480) (2.470) 
donor 2009   -2.194  -1.369 
  (-1.333)  (-1.058) 
position  0.0959  -0.301 
  (0.0621)  (-0.248) 
disparities  0.988  1.730 
  (0.605)  (1.349) 
state resp  -2.541  -0.212 
  (-1.411)  (-0.145) 
equalize  1.100  -0.467 
  (0.748)  (-0.398) 
No. of observations 
LR Chi²  
Pseudo R²  
189 
44.53*** 
0.0418 
189 
49.09*** 
0.0460 
184 
39.95*** 
0.0414 
184 
43.39*** 
0.0450 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Estimations (3) and (4) exclude outliers. 
Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance.  
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 Table 6.4: Probit estimation results 
 Including outlier Excluding outlier 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.375 -0.364 -0.292 -0.338 
 (-0.620) (-0.528) (-0.479) (-0.487) 
age 0.0191** 0.0216** 0.0185* 0.0215** 
 (2.018) (2.181) (1.935) (2.142) 
male -0.165 -0.226 -0.161 -0.233 
 (-0.807) (-1.066) (-0.784) (-1.089) 
household size -0.0639 -0.0913 -0.0750 -0.102 
 (-0.542) (-0.740) (-0.630) (-0.825) 
unmarried 0.512* 0.486* 0.484* 0.471 
 (1.778) (1.647) (1.660) (1.576) 
no religion -0.399* -0.406* -0.460** -0.477** 
 (-1.836) (-1.835) (-2.083) (-2.117) 
left party -1.071*** -1.068*** -1.047*** -1.037*** 
 (-2.858) (-2.718) (-2.787) (-2.636) 
education 0.314 0.339 0.274 0.298 
 (1.414) (1.484) (1.230) (1.302) 
income 0.217 0.233 0.178 0.190 
 (0.855) (0.900) (0.696) (0.728) 
donor2009  -0.303  -0.298 
  (-1.260)  (-1.229) 
position  -0.0341  -0.0528 
  (-0.152)  (-0.234) 
disparities  0.322  0.347 
  (1.306)  (1.390) 
state resp  -0.0412  0.0430 
  (-0.152)  (0.155) 
equalize  -0.00234  -0.0685 
  (-0.0110)  (-0.315) 
No. of observations 
LR Chi2 
Pseudo R2 
189 
22.77*** 
0.0964 
189 
26.36** 
0.1116 
184 
21.97*** 
0.0946 
184 
25.83** 
0.1112 
Notes: z-statistics in parentheses. Estimations (3) and (4) exclude outliers. 
Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance. 
 
 
152 | P a g e                    T h e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h i r d - p a r t y  i n p u t  
 
 
Table 6.5: Nested logit estimation results 
 (1) (2) 
Variable No organization Large organization 
age -0.011  
(0.013)  
0.046 
(0.042) 
male 0.068 
(0.613)  
-0.587 
(1.251) 
household size       0.357 
(0.363)  
0.409 
(0.912) 
unmarried -1.008* 
(0.559) 
1.227 
(1.386) 
no religion        -0.571 
(1.169)  
-3.242 
(2.679)  
left party         -3.119  
(2.902) 
-5.259 
(4.168) 
education   -1.155 
(0.708)  
1.239 
(1.573) 
income -0.649  
(0.781)  
0.028 
(1.666) 
No. of observations 
Wald test: Prob > chi2 = 0.5375 
LR test for IIA:  Prob > chi2 = 0.0931 
279                         279  
Notes: base variable: small organization. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
Levels of significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 6.6: Socio-demographic characteristics of participants – Part I 
Variable State Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
Gender Male 
Female 
No answer 
103 
119 
1 
46.19 
53.36 
0.45 
Age 18 – 29 
30 – 44 
45 – 59 
60 – 75  
No answer 
73 
60 
54 
34 
2 
32.74 
26.91 
24.22 
15.25 
0.90 
Family Status Single 
Married 
Divorced 
Widowed 
No answer 
139 
45 
31 
6 
2 
62.33 
20.18 
13.90 
2.69 
0.90 
Children Yes 
No 
34 
189 
15.25 
84.75 
Household 
size 
1 
2 
3 
4 or more 
No answer 
102 
82 
21 
17 
1 
45.74 
36.77 
9.42 
7.62 
0.45 
Education University 
Gymnasium (12 years of education) 
Realschule (10 years of education) 
Hauptschule (9 years of education) 
Other 
No graduation 
88 
58 
35 
23 
17 
2 
39.46 
26.01 
15.70 
10.31 
7.62 
0.90 
Nationality German 
Turkish 
Italian 
Polish 
Other 
No answer 
192 
2 
3 
2 
23 
1 
86.10 
0.90 
1.35 
0.90 
10.31 
0.45 
   223 100.00 
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Table 6.7: Socio-demographic characteristics of participants – Part II 
Variable State Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
Household net 
income 
< 1,000 € 
1,000 – 2,000 € 
2,000 – 3,000 € 
3,000 – 4,000 € 
4,000 – 5,000 € 
> 5,000 € 
No Answer 
51 
85 
44 
13 
8 
8 
14 
22.87 
38.12 
19.73 
5.83 
3.59 
3.59 
6.28 
Religion Catholic 
Evangelic 
Muslim 
Other 
No religion 
70 
71 
5 
10 
67 
31.39 
31.84 
2.24 
4.48 
30.04 
Voting 
behavior 
The Christian Democratic / Christian 
Social Union 
The Social Democratic Party 
The Greens 
The Free Democratic Party 
The Left Party 
Other 
Nonvoter 
No answer 
43 
 
49 
42 
25 
17 
9 
17 
21 
19.28 
 
21.97 
18.83 
11.21 
7.62 
4.04 
7.62 
9.42 
   223 100.00 
 
 
Table 6.8: Charitable giving habits of participants 
Variable State Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
Donated before Yes 
No 
189 
34 
84.75 
15.25 
Modal charitable 
purpose1 
Child or disabled care 
Emergency aid 
Medical research 
Church and religious purposes 
Environment or animal protection 
Development aid 
General (e.g. Red Cross, 
charitable lotteries) 
Culture 
Politics 
Local welfare services, homeless 
persons, poverty 
No answer (incl. 34 subjects who 
did not donate before) 
46 
12 
13 
11 
32 
39 
20 
 
3 
2 
8 
 
37 
20.63 
5.38 
5.83 
4.93 
14.35 
17.49 
8.97 
 
1.35 
0.90 
3.59 
 
16.59 
Contribution 
receipt received 
Always 
Mostly 
Sometimes 
Never 
No answer (incl. 34 subjects who 
did not donate before) 
60 
36 
42 
49 
36 
26.91 
16.14 
18.83 
21.97 
16.14 
Donated in 2009 Yes 
No 
67 
156 
30.04 
69.96 
   223 100.00 
1) If subjects stated that they have donated before they were asked to which charity they donated most 
frequently. If subjects gave more than one answer the charity named first was included. 
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Table 6.9: Attitudes of participants 
Question / Statement Answer Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
Compared with how others live in 
Germany: Do you think you get 
your fair share, more than your fair 
share, somewhat less or very much 
less than your fair share? 
Very much less 
Somewhat less 
Fair share 
More than fair share 
Don’t know 
20 
61 
104 
19 
19 
8.97 
27.36 
46.64 
8.52 
8.52 
All in all, I think the social 
differences in this country are just. 
 
Completely agree 
Tend to agree 
Tend to disagree 
Completely disagree 
Don’t know 
14 
65 
90 
50 
4 
6.28 
29.15 
40.36 
22.42 
1.79 
It is the responsibility of the state 
to meet everyone’s needs, even in 
case of sickness, poverty, 
unemployment and old age. 
 
Completely agree 
Tend to agree 
Tend to disagree 
Completely disagree 
 Don’t know 
74 
104 
35 
4 
6 
33.18 
46.64 
15.70 
1.79 
2.69 
It is the responsibility of the 
government to reduce the 
differences in income between 
people with high incomes and 
those with low incomes. 
 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly disagree 
Can’t choose, don’t know 
32 
73 
39 
48 
17 
14 
14.35 
32.74 
17.49 
21.52 
7.62 
6.28 
 ∑ 223 100.00 
 
 
6.6.2 Figures 
Figure 6.1: Selection of organization size 
 
Note: Selection of organization size in the Info treatment [in % of donors]. 
0%
20%
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80%
100%
total disabled care development
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 small organization  large organization
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Figure 6.2: Reasons to choose the small organization 
 
Note: in % of donors. 
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Figure 6.3: Proceeding of the experiment 
1. Distribution of instructions 
2. Drawing of ID numbers 
3. Oral presentation of important instruction details 
4. Donation decision 
6. Questionnaire 
5. Collection of donations 
With information 
 Disabled care (low or high revenues) 
 Development aid (low or high revenues) 
 Medical research (low or high revenues) 
 Animal protection (low or high revenues) 
Without information 
 Disabled care 
 Development aid 
 Medical research 
 Animal protection 
Note: The treatments with information are identical to the treatments without information except for the fact that in the 
donation stage subjects could choose between a small organization (with revenues between €40,000 and €300,000) and 
a large organization (with revenues between €5 million and €11 million) for each charitable purpose. 
 
 
6.6.3 Experimental instructions 
Experimental instructions for the Info treatment (translated from German) 
Welcome! 
Thank you very much for participating in our study for the analysis of consumer 
behavior. Enclosed in this folder, you find information which you need during this event. 
You may return pages to which you have already gone through at any time. Please turn 
pages only up to the next ‘stop-sign’. You will be asked to turn to the next page. Please 
only read the respective text and do not act until you receive specific instructions to 
follow the assignment.  
Please follow the instructions carefully. We also would like to ask you not to talk to 
other participants.  
We want to emphasize that all information which we gain from today’s event will only 
be used to draw a comparison between the groups of participants. No individual data 
about the participants will be published or passed on.  
Shortly, we will come up to your seat and you will draw a piece of paper with a number 
on it. This number will serve as your personal identification number (ID) throughout the 
study. Please state your ID whenever you are asked to do so during the study. The ID 
ensures anonymity, as neither other participants nor we know your name or the ID that 
belongs to it. 
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-- STOP sign: Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
Part 1  
For your participation in the study, you will receive 40 Euros. Shortly, we will hand out 
the money in an envelope. Then we ask you to confirm the receipt. Afterwards, you will 
get the opportunity to donate any preferred amount of money to a charitable cause. 
There is a charitable organization behind every charitable cause. The money which you, 
if any, will donate, will be completely transferred to the respective charity. We 
guarantee that this will happen lawfully and will have the transfer supervised and 
verified by the director of the notary’s office, Dr. Rainer Preusche. 
All selected charitable organizations hold the ‘donation seal’ by the state-approved 
German Central Institute for Social Issues (Deutsches Zentralinstitut für soziale Fragen 
(DZI)). This assures that the organizations act autonomously and charitably and that the 
usage of their financial means is reviewable, economical and statutory. The names of 
the individual organizations will at this point – for scientific reasons – not be mentioned. 
We guarantee that all information you receive from us regarding the organizations is 
true. At the end of the experiment, we are happy to hand to you a list of all 
organizations upon request.  
Following, we present to you four different charitable causes to which you can donate in 
the course of this study.  
The four charitable causes are: 
 Medical research 
 Animal protection 
 Disabled care 
 Development aid  
[Additional part mentioned only in the Info Treatment:  
The organizations you can make a donation to do not only differ with regard to their 
charitable causes, but also their revenues, which these organizations have generated in 
2006 from donations, membership fees and government grants. For each charitable 
cause, we offer you a charitable organization with relatively small revenues between 
40,000 and 300,000 Euros and organizations with rather large revenues between 5 
million Euros and 11 million Euros.  
Therefore, we ask you, in the case you donate, to pick one of the following 
organizations: 
a. Medical research Revenues 2006: 40,000€ - 300,000€ 
b. Medical research Revenues 2006: 5 Mio. € - 11 Mio. € 
c. Animal protection Revenues 2006: 40,000€ - 300,000€ 
d. Animal protection Revenues 2006: 5 Mio. € - 11 Mio. € 
e. Disabled care Revenues 2006: 40,000€ - 300,000€ 
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f. Disabled care Revenues 2006: 5 Mio. € - 11 Mio. € 
g. Development aid Revenues 2006: 40,000€ - 300,000€ 
h. Development aid Revenues 2006: 5 Mio. € - 11 Mio. €] 
We now hand out to you an envelope with the money you receive for your participation 
in our study. 
 
-- STOP sign: Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
In the envelope, you find:  
- one white envelope 
- one blue envelope  
- 40 Euros, composed of two 10 Euro-bills, one 5 Euro-bill, six 2 
Euro-coins and three 1 Euro-coins   
- one receipt.  
We now ask you to sign the receipt you find enclosed. By doing so, you confirm that 
you have received 40 Euros from ZEW for the participation in this study. We need the 
receipt for administrative purposes. Without a receipt we are not allowed to give you the 
money. Your data is still handled confidentially and anonymized. We will now collect 
the receipts, the study will continue hereafter.  
 
-- STOP sign: Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
Now you can make a donation decision. You can decide freely and anonymously 
whether and how much money you want to give to one of the above-mentioned 
charitable organizations. The amount of money you put into the blue envelope will 
benefit a charitable cause and will be transferred completely to the respective charity 
after the experiment. You will keep the amount of money you put into the white 
envelope. 
The study proceeds as follows: 
1.) Make your donation decision. 
In case of a donation, please tick the desired charitable organization on the blue 
envelope. Please note that you have to choose one of the four [in the Info treatment: 
eight] charities given. It is not possible to choose more than one charitable organization 
for your donation. Please tick only one organization if you wish to donate. If you tick 
more than one organization, unfortunately, we will not be able to transfer the donation. 
If you do not wish to donate, please do not tick any organization.  
2.) Write down your ID-number into the predefined box on the blue envelope, 
irrespective of whether you wish to donate or not.  
3.) Put the desired donation amount into the blue envelope.  
4.) Put the amount of money you wish to keep into the white envelope.  
160 | P a g e                    T h e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h i r d - p a r t y  i n p u t  
 
 
Finally, you should have distributed 40 Euros completely to the two envelopes. Please 
note that any distribution in full amounts of Euros is possible. You may put any desired 
amount of money into both envelopes. It is also possible to put 40 Euros completely 
into one envelope.  
5.) Seal up both envelopes.  
When all participants have finished, we will come up to you and collect the blue 
envelope. When we do so, please put the blue envelope into the box. Please keep the 
white envelope. We guarantee that your donation will be transferred to the charitable 
organization lawfully and have the transfer supervised and verified by the director of the 
notary’s office, […].  
We will explain the most important items once again orally. Afterwards, please make 
your decision as described above.  
 
-- STOP sign: Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
Part 2 – Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions by ticking or filling out.  
If you have a question, please raise your hand. We will come up to you and answer your 
question. Please do not say your question out loud and please do not talk to other 
participants. 
1. What is your ID-number?    __________ 
2. How can your marital status be described? 
O unmarried 
O married 
O divorced 
O widowed 
3. Please state your gender: 
O male  
O female 
4. What is your year of birth?   __________ 
5. How many people, including you, live in your household?    
       __________ 
6. How many children live in your household? 
O 0-3 years old    __________ 
O 4-7 years old    __________ 
O 8-12 years old    __________ 
O 13-18 years old   __________ 
O older than 18 years   __________ 
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O none     
7. What is your religious affiliation? 
O Catholic 
O Protestant 
O Muslim 
O Jewish 
O Buddhist 
O other:     __________ 
O no religion 
8. What is your highest educational achievement? 
O University/College 
O higher education entrance qualification 
O middle school 
O secondary modern school 
O other:     __________ 
O none 
9. What is your original nationality?  
O German 
O Turkish 
O Italian 
O Polish  
O other:     __________ 
10. What is your first language?   __________ 
11. What are the monthly net earnings of your household (how much money per month 
is available for your household altogether?) 
O below 1,000 Euros 
O 1,000 – 2,000 Euros 
O 2,000 – 3,000 Euros 
O 3,000 – 4,000 Euros 
O 4,000 – 5,000 Euros 
O above 5,000 Euros 
O not specified 
12. Which party would you vote for if there were federal elections on the coming 
Sunday?  
O CDU/CSU 
O SPD 
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O Bündnis 90 / The Green Party 
O FDP 
O The Left 
O Other 
O I do not vote 
O not specified 
14. Have you made a donation to a charitable organization before?  
O yes  O no 
15. To which purpose have you to date donated most often?  
____________________ 
16. Have you already donated this year to a charitable organization? 
 O yes  O no 
17. If you answered question 16 with ‘yes’, in which month have you donated last?  
____________________ 
18. If you answered question 16 with ‘yes’, how much have you donated this year 
altogether?  
____________________ € 
19. Have you ever received a donation receipt for your donation?  
 O always 
 O mostly 
 O occasionally 
 O never 
20. Compared with how others live in Germany: Do you think you get your fair share, 
more than your fair share, somewhat less or very much less than your fair share? 
 O fair share 
 O more than fair share 
 O somewhat less than fair share 
 O very much less than fair share 
 O don’t know 
21. On the whole, I find the social differences in our country just.  
 O Completely agree. 
 O Tend to agree. 
 O Tend to disagree. 
 O Completely disagree.  
 O Don’t know 
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22. The State must ensure that people can live a decent income even in illness, hardship, 
unemployment and old age.   
 O Completely agree. 
 O Tend to agree. 
 O Tend to disagree. 
 O Completely disagree.  
 O Don’t know 
23. It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income 
between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.  
 O Agree strongly.  
 O Agree. 
 O Neither agree nor disagree. 
 O Disagree. 
 O Disagree strongly. 
 O Can’t choose.  
 
-- STOP sign: Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
We would like to ask you to write down general comments regarding our study. You 
may also give reasons for your donation decision. [11 empty lines follow] 
We would like to thank you for participating in our study and wish you a nice day! 
Please remember to take the white envelope with you. 
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7 On the construction of social preferences in experiments  
7.1 Introduction 
One of the most important questions in experimental economics is whether individual 
behavior in certain games is predictive for behavior in other games or contexts. Critics 
often claim that individual behavior in the lab is limited to that situation and does not 
contain much information about how people behave outside the lab. This question 
appears to be particularly relevant for other-regarding or social preferences, i.e. 
preferences which are not captured by the standard assumption of rational and purely 
payoff-maximizing agents and which have been largely investigated in the lab. 
One important class of theories which has been developed to explain other-regarding 
behavior sticks to the assumption of rational agents but introduces an additional motive 
to the utility function. This set of theories includes, among others, the ‘warm-glow’ of 
giving (Andreoni 1989, 1990), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and 
Ockenfels 2000) and the desire to comply with social norms (Levitt and List 2007). In 
order to test the various theories of social preferences in the lab, experimental 
economists have developed a wide range of games, like for example the ultimatum 
game, the dictator game, the trust game or the public good game. It has been shown that 
a substantial share of experimental subjects does not act selfishly, but shares their 
endowment, rewards pro-social behavior and contributes to public goods. Still, the 
results of the experiments testing the consistency of social preferences across multiple 
games or multiple contexts are ambiguous (see Bolton et al. 2008 and the next Section 
7.2 for examples).  
The discussion about whether preferences are consistent or not goes back to Stigler and 
Becker (1977), who propose that tastes are stable over time and similar among people. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981), in comparison, emphasize the importance of framing 
effects for shifts in individual preferences. There is also some empirical evidence that in 
certain situations preferences are constructed rather than existing. The constructive-
preference approach (Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006) suggests that individuals construct 
preferences when they are confronted with an unfamiliar decision situation. Thus, the 
nature of the task, the information available and the situational context have a strong 
impact on preference construction. With more experience in a certain situation, 
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preferences are said to consolidate over time and become more stable (Hoeffler and 
Ariely 1999). 
This chapter sheds light on this issue by investigating and comparing charitable 
donations and dictator game allocations in an experimental setting for a better 
understanding of what drives the decision in each task and whether behavior in one task 
is predictive of behavior in the other. The donation decision is a familiar decision 
situation where individuals are likely to have existing preferences. In contrast, the 
dictator game (Kahneman et al. 1986), though very simple, represents a rather 
unfamiliar decision situation for most subjects: It is hard to imagine real-life situations 
where one is asked to share a certain amount of money with a completely anonymous 
person. Therefore, it seems questionable that individuals have a well-defined set of 
existing preferences guiding their behavior in this game. Individuals faced with this 
game might rather construct their preferences ad hoc. Moreover, the dictator game has 
been shown to be relatively sensitive towards changes in the experimental setting: 
Methodological variables, such as anonymity and experimenter blindness, as well as 
structural variables, such as identity of recipients, communication, available action sets, 
entitlement to and information about the amount being divided, can have strong effects 
on the outcome (for an overview see Camerer 2003, List 2007). 
Unlike many of the previous experiments, the present study uses within-subject as well 
as between-subject tests and pays special attention to the sequence in which the games 
are played as this becomes important, if preferences are indeed constructed. 
Furthermore, a non-student subject pool is used for two reasons: First, those subjects are 
unlikely to have played a dictator game before. And second, supposedly all of them 
have either donated to a charity or at least been asked for donations before. The 
experimental results show that there is a significantly positive correlation between both 
decision tasks if – and only if – the more familiar donation decision is presented first 
and the rather unfamiliar dictator game is played thereafter. Moreover, the dictator game 
allocations depend on the sequence of games while the charitable donations do not. 
Hence, social preferences elicited in the donation context are predictive of subsequent 
behavior in the dictator game but not vice versa. Thus, if experimenters try to elicit 
social preferences to make predictions about behavior in other contexts, it seems 
reasonable to confront individuals with context-rich familiar decision situations where 
preferences exist and do not need to be constructed. Furthermore, special attention 
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should be paid to the sequence of games if they present a new decision situation for the 
experimental subjects. The outline of this chapter is as follows: Section 7.2 presents 
empirical findings from related studies. Section 7.3 describes the experimental setting 
and Section 7.4 delivers the results. The last Section 7.5 concludes. 
 
7.2 Empirical findings 
Looking at the findings from earlier empirical work, the question whether social 
preferences measured in lab experiments, and particularly in dictator games, are 
predictive of behavior in other games or other contexts, is still largely open. There are 
three different types of studies which are related to present approach. 
First, several lab experiments use (modified) dictator games to measure individual 
social preferences and relate the observed behavior to the performance in a different 
game by means of within-subject tests (e.g. Ashraf et al. 2006, Blanco et al. 
forthcoming, Brosig et al. 2007, Teyssier 2009). The experimental results are not 
coherent, thereby indicating that dictator game behavior is not reliably predictive of 
behavior in other games. All the listed studies use context-free games and test theories 
of other-regarding behavior. 
The second branch of literature deals with the consequences of context for decision 
making within economic experiments. These studies aim at comparing dictator game 
allocations with charitable donations (e.g. Eckel and Grossman 1996, Bettinger and 
Slonim 2006). They generally find that people give more to charities than to peers in a 
dictator game. Similarly, Brañas-Garza (2006) shows that dictators are more generous if 
they are informed that their recipients are poor compared with the behavior if not 
provided with this information. This branch seems to have the greatest similarity to our 
approach; however, they do not consider the correlation between games, i.e. whether 
the people who are generous in the dictator game are more likely to donate to charities.  
The third class of studies does consider the correlation between games but focuses on 
social dilemma games rather than dictator games. More precisely, the studies compare 
behavior in context-free social dilemma games with contributions to naturally occurring 
public goods using within-subject tests (e.g. Laury and Taylor 2008, de Oliveira et al. 
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2008). The experimental results indicate that cooperative behavior across multiple 
contexts tends to be consistent, albeit the relation is not always incontrovertible.52 
The focus of all studies mentioned above lies on the comparison of behavior across 
multiple games or multiple contexts, so the effects of sequence are of minor interest. 
Although some of the studies control for sequence effects by changing the order of the 
games, and some of these indeed find effects, none of them really dwell on those 
effects. This study narrows this gap as subjects have to make both charitable donation 
decisions and decisions in a conventional dictator game. In doing so, the order of play is 
changed to examine whether or not preferences are robust to this modification, thereby 
indicating if they are existent or constructed. 
 
7.3 Experimental design 
7.3.1 Participants and implementation 
For subject recruitment, invitation letters were randomly distributed in the city of 
Mannheim, Germany. The letter contained an invitation to take part in a scientific study 
and informed people that they would receive €40 for participation. It was announced 
that there would be a survey in which they could (voluntarily and anonymously) make 
consumption decisions. We used this relatively high show-up fee in order to avoid 
underrepresentation of people with high opportunity costs of time. The experiment took 
place in July 2009 on the premises of the Centre for European Economic Research 
(ZEW) in Mannheim with a total of 223 participants. At the beginning of each session, 
participants individually drew lots to determine their ID number – which remained 
unknown to other participants and the experimenters – and chose a table. The tables had 
privacy screens on every side to ensure private decisions and answers. Participants were 
not allowed to talk to each other. If they had questions, the experimenters answered 
them privately. The 12 experimental sessions lasted around 60 minutes each. Within 
one session, all subjects performed exactly the same task. At first, all participants 
obtained detailed instructions about the course of the experiment (see Section 7.6.3 for 
experimental instructions). The main features were orally repeated. It was emphasized 
                                                 
52 A fourth branch of literature tests whether individual other-regarding behavior in the lab and in the field 
correlates (e.g. Benz and Meier 2008, Fehr and Leibbrandt 2008, Carpenter and Myers 2010), which is 
often the case. 
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that any information given in the instructions was true. Participants in all treatments 
filled out a questionnaire about socio-demographic characteristics and donation habits. 
At the end of each session, participants also had the chance to comment on the 
experiment and give reasons for their decisions. 
Participants’ socio-demographic characteristics and donation habits are shown in Tables 
7.4 and 7.5. Although the subject pool is not fully representative of the German resident 
population, it is sufficiently diversified in all socio-demographic variables in order to 
examine the influence of each variable on charitable donations and dictator game 
allocations. The vast majority of participants (84.8%) had previously donated to a 
charity. The most common charitable purposes were child care and disabled care 
followed by development aid and environment or animal protection. This underlines 
that most experimental subjects show some kind of experience regarding the donation 
decision. 
 
7.3.2 Treatments 
The experiment comprised three treatments. Each treatment contained a real donation 
stage where subjects simultaneously and independently decided how much – if any – of 
their endowment they want to donate to a certain charity. All of the selected charities 
have obtained the ‘DZI Spendensiegel’, a label for charities which use their funds 
economically and according to their statutes. 53  Subjects could choose one of four 
charitable purposes, namely disabled care, development aid, medical research or animal 
protection and they only knew the purpose but not the name of the organizations.54 All 
donation decisions were completely voluntary and anonymous. A double blind 
procedure was used in which neither other subjects nor experimenters came to know if, 
how much and to which purpose a subject donated. Subjects received a large envelope 
containing two smaller envelopes and the endowment of €40 broken into two 10-euro 
notes, one 5-euro note, six 2-euro coins and three 1-euro coins. This breakdown enabled 
subjects to donate any integer amount between €0 and €40 and reduced incentives to 
only give the coins. Subjects placed the amount they wished to donate in one of the 
                                                 
53 For more information (in German language), see www.dzi.de (accessed in October 2010). 
54 Some of the participants also received information about the size of the charities. The effects of this 
information have been discussed in the previous Chapter 6. As there is no significant difference in 
donations between subjects who received the information and subjects who did not, the data was pooled.  
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small envelopes assigned to donations, labeled the envelope with their ID number and, 
in case they were willing to give a positive amount, the charitable purpose to which they 
wished to donate. The amount of money subjects wished to keep for themselves was 
placed in the other small envelope. Afterwards, subjects dropped the envelopes 
specified for donations in a box. All donations made during the experiment were 
transferred in full to the respective organizations. The counting of donations and the 
transfer to the organizations were monitored and certified by a notary. This procedure 
and the name of the notary had been announced in the experimental instructions. 
The baseline treatment (‘NoDG’) solely involved the donation stage and afterwards the 
completion of the questionnaire. Two treatments contained a conventional dictator game 
besides the donation stage. In those treatments, subjects received an additional 
endowment of €20. Subjects simultaneously and independently decided how much – if 
any – of this endowment they want to give to another participant. Recipients of this 
allocation were randomly selected from the NoDG treatment without dictator game. The 
procedure in the dictator game was the same as in the donation stage. Subjects did not 
get any information about the recipient except that the person participated in a different 
session and did not receive the additional €20. The dictator game decisions were 
completely voluntary and anonymous. Again, a double blind procedure was used in 
which neither other subjects nor experimenters came to know if and how much a subject 
allocated to the recipient. Subjects received a large envelope containing two smaller 
envelopes and the endowment of €20 broken into two 5-euro notes, two 2-euro coins, 
and six 1-euro coins. This breakdown enabled subjects to donate any integer amount 
between €0 and €20 and again reduced incentives to only give the coins.  
Subjects placed the amount they wished to allocate to the recipient in one of the small 
envelopes and labeled the envelope with their ID number. The amount of money 
subjects wished to keep for themselves was placed in the other small envelope. 
Afterwards, subjects dropped the envelopes with the allocations to the recipients in a 
box. Subjects knew that these envelopes were given to randomly selected recipients 
even if the envelopes did not contain any money. In one dictator game treatment 
(‘DGStart’), the dictator game was placed at the start of the session followed by the 
questionnaire and the donation stage. In the other dictator game treatment (‘DGEnd’), 
sessions started with the donation stage, proceeded with the questionnaire and ended 
with the dictator game. Recipients in the treatments without dictator game obtained the 
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envelopes with the allocations from the dictators always at the end of the session.55 
Figure 7.3 shows the proceeding of the experiment. Table 7.1 summarizes the features 
of all treatments including number of sessions and number of subjects. 
  
7.4 Results 
7.4.1 Average patterns 
In total, €1,225 are donated to the charitie.56 On average, €5.49 (14% of the initial 
endowment of €40) are donated to the charities and €4.70 (23% of the initial 
endowment of €20) are allocated in the dictator game. Overall, 33% of the subjects do 
not make a donation and 27% of the subjects do not allocate anything in the dictator 
game. Table 7.2 summarizes the most important descriptive findings.  
In the DGStart treatment, in which the dictator game is played at the beginning of the 
session, dictators allocate an average amount of €6.25. Allocations in the DGEnd 
treatment, in which the dictator game is played at the end of the session, are 
significantly lower: Here, dictators allocate €3.87 on average (Mann Whitney test, 1% 
significance). Figure 7.1 illustrates this difference: While only 10% of the dictators in 
DGStart do not allocate anything to an experimental peer, this percentage is much 
higher in the DGEnd treatment (36%). At the same time, the share of dictators who 
allocate at least €10 is twice as large in DGStart as in DGEnd. The average charitable 
donations made in the different treatments (€5.72 in NoDG, €6.25 in DGStart and €4.76 
in DGEnd) do not significantly differ. 
Why do dictators give less when this decision follows the donation decision? For a start, 
we suggest that an income effect might cause this observation. At the time of the 
dictator game decision, subjects in the DGStart treatment did not know that they would 
be asked for donations thereafter. In contrast, subjects in the DGEnd treatment had 
already made their donation at this stage, i.e. their remaining budget was smaller: While 
dictators in DGStart calculated with a total of €60, dictators in DGEnd calculated with 
€60 less the amount they had donated. If we take this into account and consider the 
                                                 
55 Due to no-shows there were a few more dictators than recipients. The amount of money that these 
dictators allocated to recipients (overall €7) was transferred to a randomly selected charity.  
56 For selection of charitable purposes and average donation to each purpose see Section 6.4.1 in the 
previous chapter. 
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relative dictator game allocation, i.e. the chosen allocation relative to the budget 
principally available at this stage, we find that the differences are decreasing: Dictators 
in DGStart allocate an average 10% of the available budget and dictators in DGEnd 
allocate 8% on average. Notably, dictators in DGStart allocate a larger share of their 
available budget, although the €40 for participation are not yet on the table. The 
difference in relative allocations is still significant (Mann Whitney test, 5% 
significance), indicating that the income effect can only partly explain the difference in 
dictator game allocations between DGStart and DGEnd.  
A similar reasoning applies to the donation decision. While subjects in DGStart 
calculated with €60 less their dictator game allocations, individuals in DGEnd 
calculated with €40 because they did not know that they would receive an additional 
€20 after the donation stage. Taking this into account, we find that in both treatments 
subjects donate an average 12% of their available budget to the charities. This 
percentage is not significantly different from the relative donations (14%) in the 
treatment without dictator game (Mann Whitney test). 
 
7.4.2 Individual patterns 
This section takes a closer look at individual patterns and compares individual behavior 
in both tasks. By applying Spearman’s rank correlation test, we observe that in DGEnd 
dictator game allocations and donations are positively and significantly correlated (1% 
significance) while the positive correlation is not statistically significant in the DGStart 
treatment.  
To shed more light on this observation, we define individual behavior as ‘consistent’ if 
a subject belongs to one of three categories: Subject’s giving in both games (i) is zero, 
(ii) is below the respective median values57 but non-zero in at least one decision task, or 
(iii) is equal to or greater than the respective median values. Given this classification, 
the probability of observing consistent behavior across games is significantly higher in 
DGEnd (75%) than in DGStart (63%) (binomial test, 5% significance), as can be seen 
from Figure 7.2. Figure 7.2 shows that 5% of the subjects in DGStart give nothing in 
                                                 
57 The median values are calculated in relative terms for each group: (a) relative donations in DGStart, (b) 
relative donations in DGEnd, (c) relative DG allocations in DGStart, (d) relative DG allocations in 
DGEnd. 
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both decisions while the share in the DGEnd treatment is 25%. This difference, however, 
is almost leveled off by the subjects who contribute below the respective median value 
in both games but give a positive amount in at least one decision task. More consistent 
contributions above median are observed in the DGEnd treatment.  
These findings about the consistency of individual behavior potentially provide an 
interesting feature of the elicitation of social preferences by means of simple 
experimental games. Our inexperienced subjects who play the dictator game at the 
beginning of the experiment face a new and unfamiliar decision situation. As they 
probably do not have existing preferences for this situation, they construct preferences 
ad hoc to reach a decision. For example, they may want to avoid extreme outcomes and, 
therefore, allocate a small or medium amount to an experimental peer rather than giving 
nothing. In contrast, if subjects face the dictator game decision after the more familiar 
donation decision, they may use the donation decision as an ‘anchor’ leading to a higher 
degree of consistency across games. As this anchor is not available when the dictator 
game is played first, individual behavior is less consistent. This result is an indication 
for how preferences may be constructed in an experiment. The constructive-preference 
approach may also explain why charitable donations are independent from the sequence 
of play, while the dictator game allocations are not. 
 
7.4.3 Econometric analysis 
In order to gain a further insight into the driving forces behind individuals’ behavior in 
the donation decision and the dictator game, the impact of various socio-demographic 
variables is analyzed by conducting an econometric analysis. In both tasks, around one 
third of the participants chooses zero contributions. Hence, there is a large number of 
observations clustered at zero. In this case, ordinary least squares estimates would not 
be accurate, so a Tobit estimation model is used. The following socio-demographic 
variables are included in the regressions: age, household size as the absolute number of 
household members including children, dummy variables for male subjects, unmarried 
subjects, subjects not having any religious affiliation (no religion), voters of the left 
party, highly educated subjects (education, owning a graduate degree) and high income 
subjects (monthly net household income of €2.000 or more). In order to verify how the 
sequence of the tasks influences our results, a dummy variable DGStart is included 
which is coded ‘1’ if the dictator game was played before the donation stage and ‘0’ if it 
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was played afterwards. In specification (1) in Table 7.3 the dependent variable is the 
amount donated in the donation decision while in specification (2) the dependent 
variable is the amount allocated in the dictator game. Specifications (3) and (4) exclude 
outliers which are defined as those observations lying outside the donation or allocation 
interval of three standard deviations from the mean.58 
First of all, the estimation results in Table 7.3 confirm the finding reported above: 
People choose higher dictator game allocations if they play the dictator game prior to 
the donation stage while donations are not significantly influenced by the order of the 
tasks. Comparing the results of specifications (3) and (4), we see that personal 
characteristics influence both contribution decisions similarly: While neither the 
donation nor the allocation decision is significantly affected by gender, religious 
affiliation, education and income, the variables age, family status and voting for the left 
party have the same directional and significant impact in both decision contexts: Older 
people and unmarried people donate more to the charities and allocate more money in 
the dictator game, whereas voters of the left party donate less and allocate less in the 
dictator game than all other individuals. The positive effect of individuals’ household 
size on donations and dictator game allocations, however, is significant only for the 
latter. To sum up, the same individual characteristics seem to be crucial for generosity 
in both tasks. 
 
7.5 Conclusions 
The experiment presented in this chapter contributes to the discussion whether social 
preferences measured in the lab are predictive of individual behavior in other games or 
decision contexts. As opposed to the assumption of consistent preferences, the 
constructive-preference approach suggests that individuals construct their preferences 
ad hoc if they are confronted with an unfamiliar decision situation. The experiment 
takes a closer look at this issue as the experimental subjects have to allocate money in a 
conventional dictator game and make a donation decision. While the donation context 
represents a familiar decision situation where individuals are supposed to have existing 
                                                 
58 More precisely, the cut-off threshold for donations is €22.16; the cut-off threshold for dictator game 
allocations is €12.88.  
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preferences, the dictator game is a rather unfamiliar decision situation where subjects 
are likely to construct their preferences ad hoc. Special attention is paid to the sequence 
in which both games are played by reversing their order to examine whether behavior in 
one situation is predictive of that in the other. 
The results show that dictator game allocations are significantly higher if this game is 
played at the beginning of experimental sessions as compared to the dictator game 
played at the end of a session. Charitable donations, in comparison, are independent of 
the sequence of play. This more stable pattern may result from existing preferences in 
the donation context. Moreover, we observe a significantly positive correlation between 
charitable donations and dictator game allocations provided that individuals are 
confronted with the more familiar donation decision situation first. Hence, subjects are 
more likely to be consistently generous or selfish across games or contexts if they start 
the experiment with the more familiar decision problem. An explanation for this may be 
that they use the more familiar donation decision as an anchor for the subsequent 
dictator game decision leading to a higher degree of consistency across games. As this 
anchor is not available when the dictator game is played first, individual behavior is less 
consistent. This result is an indication for how preferences may be constructed in an 
experiment. 
The discussion in this chapter suggests an important conclusion for the measurement of 
social preferences in lab experiments as it provides an explanation why some studies 
succeed and some studies fail to find a consistent behavioral pattern between a dictator 
game and different experimental task. It makes an enormous difference whether 
subjects in lab experiments find themselves in familiar decision situations or in 
unknown games, like the dictator game. Therefore, it is not so obvious in how far 
spontaneously constructed preferences can be predictive of behavior in other contexts or 
in real-life decision situations. In comparison, social preferences measured in more 
familiar decision contexts seem to have greater predictive power of behavior in other 
decision situations. Thus, experimenters trying to elicit social preferences in the lab 
should rather employ context-rich games where preferences exist and need not be 
constructed. The present experiment and previous literature have shown that the dictator 
game is particularly vulnerable to design changes and therefore not well suited for 
measuring social preferences. By adopting more robust tasks, such as a real donation 
decision, the measurement of social preferences within experiments may be improved. 
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Furthermore, special attention should be paid to the sequence of games if these present a 
new decision situation to the experimental subjects. 
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7.6 Appendix 
7.6.1 Tables 
Table 7.1: Treatments 
Treatment No. of charitable 
purposes 
DG Time of  
DG 
No. of 
sessions 
No. of 
subjects 
NoDG 4 no  6 108 
DGStart 4 yes     start 2 40 
DGEnd 4 yes     end 4 75 
Total    12 223 
 
Table 7.2: Descriptive statistics  
 No. of observations Average donation 
(in €) 
Average DG allocation 
(in €) 
NoDG 108 5.72 - 
DG 115           5.27    4.70 
 DGStart 40 6.25 6.25 
 DGEnd 75 4.76 3.87 
Total         223          5.49          4.70     
 
Table 7.3: Tobit estimation results 
 Including outliers Excluding outliers 
Variable Charitable donation DG allocation Charitable donation DG allocation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
age 0.253*** 0.159*** 0.229*** 0.138*** 
 (0.082) (0.050) (0.066) (0.044) 
male -2.134 -1.624 -1.839 -1.245 
 (1.894) (1.141) (1.523) (0.992) 
household size 0.702 1.117 1.131 1.283** 
 (1.131) (0.676) (0.902) (0.583) 
unmarried 9.132*** 4.538*** 7.873*** 4.780*** 
 (2.830) (1.693) (2.264) (1.476) 
no_religion 1.002 -0.582 -1.166 0.021 
 (2.074) (1.257) (1.684) (1.084) 
left_party -8.734** -3.638 -6.770** -3.498* 
 (3.944) (2.306) (3.106) (1.981) 
education 3.283 -0.315 1.526 0.735 
 (2.107) (1.284) (1.691) (1.126) 
income 2.364 1.217 0.744 -0.354 
 (2.271) (1.378) (1.826) (1.231) 
DGStart 0.929 2.827** 0.640 2.637*** 
 (1.900) (1.142) (1.533) (1.002) 
Constant -15.368*** -8.274** -12.719*** -8.150*** 
 (5.797) (3.484) (4.619) (3.051) 
No. of observations 
LR Chi²             
Pseudo R²           
98 
23.32*** 
0.042 
98 
25.20*** 
0.051 
96 
21.80*** 
0.043 
96 
27.20*** 
0.059 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses; levels of significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table 7.4: Socio-demographic characteristics of participants 
Variable State Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
Gender Male 
Female 
No answer 
103 
119 
1 
46.19 
53.36 
0.45 
Age 18 – 29 
30 – 44 
45 – 59 
60 – 75  
No answer 
73 
60 
54 
34 
2 
32.74 
26.91 
24.22 
15.25 
0.90 
Family Status Single 
Married 
Divorced 
Widowed 
No answer 
139 
45 
31 
6 
2 
62.33 
20.18 
13.90 
2.69 
0.90 
Children Yes 
No 
34 
189 
15.25 
84.75 
Household 
size 
1 
2 
3 
4 or more 
No answer 
102 
82 
21 
17 
1 
45.74 
36.77 
9.42 
7.62 
0.45 
Education University 
Gymnasium (12 years of education) 
Realschule (10 years of education) 
Hauptschule (9 years of education) 
Other 
No graduation 
88 
58 
35 
23 
17 
2 
39.46 
26.01 
15.70 
10.31 
7.62 
0.90 
Nationality German 
Turkish 
Italian 
Polish 
Other 
No answer 
192 
2 
3 
2 
23 
1 
86.10 
0.90 
1.35 
0.90 
10.31 
0.45 
Household net 
income 
< 1.000 € 
1.000 – 2.000 € 
2.000 – 3.000 € 
3.000 – 4.000 € 
4.000 – 5.000 € 
> 5.000 € 
No Answer 
51 
85 
44 
13 
8 
8 
14 
22.87 
38.12 
19.73 
5.83 
3.59 
3.59 
6.28 
Religion Catholic 
Evangelic 
Muslim 
Other 
No religion 
70 
71 
5 
10 
67 
31.39 
31.84 
2.24 
4.48 
30.04 
Voting 
behavior 
The Christian Democratic / Christian 
Social Union 
The Social Democratic Party 
The Greens 
The Free Democratic Party 
The Left Party 
Other 
Nonvoter 
No answer 
43 
 
49 
42 
25 
17 
9 
17 
21 
19.28 
 
21.97 
18.83 
11.21 
7.62 
4.04 
7.62 
9.42 
   223 100.00  
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Table 7.5: Charitable giving habits of participants 
Variable State Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
Donated before Yes 
No 
189 
34 
84.75 
15.25 
Modal charitable 
purpose1 
Child or disabled care 
Emergency aid 
Medical research 
Church and religious purposes 
Environment or animal protection 
Development aid 
General (e.g. Red Cross, 
charitable lotteries) 
Culture 
Politics 
Local welfare services, homeless 
persons, poverty 
No answer (incl. 34 subjects who 
did not donate before) 
46 
12 
13 
11 
32 
39 
20 
 
3 
2 
8 
 
37 
20.63 
5.38 
5.83 
4.93 
14.35 
17.49 
8.97 
 
1.35 
0.90 
3.59 
 
16.59 
Contribution 
receipt received 
Always 
Mostly 
Sometimes 
Never 
No answer (incl. 34 subjects who 
did not donate before) 
60 
36 
42 
49 
36 
26.91 
16.14 
18.83 
21.97 
16.14 
Donated in 2009 Yes 
No 
67 
156 
30.04 
69.96 
   223 100.00 
1) If subjects stated that they had donated before they were asked to which charity they donated most frequently. 
If subjects gave more than one answer the charity named first was included.  
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7.6.2 Figures 
Figure 7.1: Distribution of dictator game allocations across treatments 
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Figure 7.2: Consistent individual behavior across games 
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Note:  >> - Contribution is above or equal to the respective relative median in both the donation and 
dictator game allocation decision. << - Contribution is below the respective relative median in both the 
donation and dictator game allocation decision, with at least one decision with non-zero contribution. 0 0 
- Contribution is 0 in both the donation and dictator game allocation decision. 
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Figure 7.3: Proceeding of the experiment 
1. Distribution of instructions 
2. Drawing of ID numbers 
3. Oral presentation of important instruction details 
6. Questionnaire 
5. Collection of donations 
4. Donation decision 
 
 Disabled care 
 Development aid 
 Medical research 
 Animal protection 
Notes: The proceeding above reflects the DGEnd sessions. In the DGStart sessions the dictator game and the 
questionnaire were conducted before the donation stage. In the NoDG sessions no dictator game was played.  
7. Dictator game decision 
8. Collection of dictator game allocations 
 
 
7.6.3 Experimental instructions  
Experimental instructions for the DGEnd treatment (translated from German) 
Welcome! 
Thank you very much for participating in our study analyzing consumer behavior. 
Enclosed in this folder, you find information which you need throughout the study. You 
may return to pages you have already gone through at any time. Please do not look at 
the pages behind the next ‘stop-sign’. You will be asked to turn to the next page. Please 
only read the respective text and do not act until you receive specific instructions to 
follow the assignment.  
Please follow the instructions carefully. We also would like to ask you not to talk to 
other participants.  
We want to emphasize that all information which we gain from today’s event will only 
be used to draw a comparison between the groups of participants. No individual data 
about the participants will be published or passed on.  
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Shortly, we will come up to your seat and you will draw a piece of paper with a number 
on it. This number will serve as your personal identification number (ID) throughout the 
study. Please state your ID whenever you are asked to do so during the study. The ID 
ensures anonymity, as neither other participants nor we know your name or the ID that 
belongs to it. 
 
-- STOP sign: Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
Part 1  
You will receive 40 Euros for your participation in the study. Shortly, we will hand out 
the money in an envelope. Then we ask you to confirm the receipt. Afterwards, you will 
get the opportunity to donate any preferred amount of money to a charitable cause. 
There is a charitable organization behind every charitable cause. The money you donate 
if you decide to donate any will be completely transferred to the respective charity. We 
guarantee that this will happen lawfully and will have the transfer supervised and 
verified by the director of the notary’s office, Dr. Rainer Preusche. 
All selected charitable organizations hold the ‘donation seal’ by the state-approved 
German Central Institute for Social Issues (Deutsches Zentralinstitut für soziale Fragen 
(DZI)). This assures that the organizations act autonomously and charitably and that the 
usage of their financial means is reviewable, economical and statutory. The names of 
the individual organizations will at this point – for scientific reasons – not be mentioned. 
We guarantee that all information you receive from us regarding the organizations is 
true. At the end of the experiment, we are happy to hand to you a list of all 
organizations upon request.  
In the following, we present to you four different charitable causes to which you can 
donate in the course of this study.  
The four charitable causes are: 
 Medical research 
 Animal protection 
 Disabled care 
 Development aid  
 
We now hand out to you an envelope with the money you receive for your participation 
in our study. 
 
-- STOP sign: Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
In the envelope, you find:  
- one white envelope 
- one blue envelope  
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- 40 Euros, composed of two 10 Euro-bills, one 5 Euro-bill, six 2 
Euro-coins and three 1 Euro-coins   
- one receipt.  
We now ask you to sign the enclosed receipt. By doing so, you confirm that you have 
received 40 Euros from ZEW for the participation in this study. We need the receipt for 
administrative purposes. Without a receipt we are not allowed to give you the money. 
Your data is still handled confidentially and anonymously. We will now collect the 
receipts. The study will continue hereafter.  
 
-- STOP sign: Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
Now you can make a donation decision. You can decide freely and anonymously 
whether and how much money you want to give to one of the above-mentioned 
charitable organizations. The amount of money you put in the blue envelope will 
benefit a charitable cause and will be transferred completely to the respective charity 
after the experiment. You can keep the amount of money you put in the white envelope. 
 
The study proceeds as follows: 
1.) Make your donation decision. 
In case of a donation, please tick the desired charitable organization on the blue 
envelope. Please note that you have to choose one of the four [in the Info treatment: 
eight] given charities. It is not possible to choose more than one charitable organization 
for your donation. Please tick only one organization if you wish to donate. If you tick 
more than one organization, unfortunately, we will not be able to transfer the donation. 
If you do not wish to donate, please do not tick any organization.  
2.) Write down your ID-number in the predefined box on the blue envelope, 
irrespective of whether you wish to donate or not.  
3.) Put the desired donation amount in the blue envelope.  
4.) Put the amount of money you wish to keep in the white envelope.  
Finally, you should have distributed 40 Euros completely to the two envelopes. Please 
note that any distribution in full amounts of Euros is possible. You may put any desired 
amount of money into both envelopes. It is also possible to put 40 Euros completely 
into one envelope.  
5.) Seal up both envelopes.  
When all participants have finished, we will come up to you and collect the blue 
envelope. When we do so, please put the blue envelope into the box. Please keep the 
white envelope. We guarantee that your donation will be transferred to the charitable 
organization lawfully and have the transfer supervised and verified by the director of the 
notary’s office, […].  
We will explain the most important items once again orally. Afterwards, please make 
your decision as described above.  
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-- STOP sign: Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
Part 2 – Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions by ticking or filling out.  
If you have a question, please raise your hand. We will come up to you and answer your 
question. Please do not say your question out loud and please do not talk to other 
participants. 
1. What is your ID-number?    __________ 
2. How can your marital status be described? 
O unmarried 
O married 
O divorced 
O widowed 
3. Please state your gender: 
O male  
O female 
4. What is your year of birth?   __________ 
5. How many people, including you, live in your household?    
       __________ 
6. How many children live in your household? 
O 0-3 years old    __________ 
O 4-7 years old    __________ 
O 8-12 years old    __________ 
O 13-18 years old   __________ 
O older than 18 years   __________ 
O none     
7. What is your religious affiliation? 
O Catholic 
O Protestant 
O Muslim 
O Jewish 
O Buddhist 
O other:     __________ 
O no religion 
8. What is your highest educational achievement? 
O University/College 
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O higher education entrance qualification 
O middle school 
O secondary modern school 
O other:     __________ 
O none 
9. What is your original nationality?  
O German 
O Turkish 
O Italian 
O Polish  
O other:     __________ 
10. What is your first language?   __________ 
11. What are the monthly net earnings of your household (how much money per month 
is available for your household altogether?) 
O below 1,000 Euros 
O 1,000 – 2,000 Euros 
O 2,000 – 3,000 Euros 
O 3,000 – 4,000 Euros 
O 4,000 – 5,000 Euros 
O above 5,000 Euros 
O not specified 
12. Which party would you vote for if there were federal elections this Sunday?  
O CDU/CSU 
O SPD 
O Bündnis 90 / The Green Party 
O FDP 
O The Left 
O Other 
O I do not vote 
O not specified 
14. Have you made a donation to a charitable organization before?  
O yes  O no 
15. To which purpose have you donated most often?  
____________________ 
16. Have you already donated to a charitable organization this year? 
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 O yes  O no 
17. If you answered question 16 with ‘yes’, in which month have you donated last?  
 ____________________ 
18. If you answered question 16 with ‘yes’, how much have you donated this year 
altogether?  
 _____________________ € 
19. Have you ever received a donation receipt for your donation?  
 O always 
 O mostly 
 O occasionally 
 O never 
20. Compared with how others live in Germany: Do you think you get your fair share, 
more than your fair share, somewhat less or very much less than your fair share? 
 O fair share 
 O more than fair share 
 O somewhat less than fair share 
 O very much less than fair share 
 O don’t know 
21. On the whole, I find the social differences in our country just.  
 O Completely agree. 
 O Tend to agree. 
 O Tend to disagree. 
 O Completely disagree.  
 O Don’t know 
22. The State must ensure that people can live a decent income even in illness, hardship, 
unemployment and old age.   
 O Completely agree. 
 O Tend to agree. 
 O Tend to disagree. 
 O Completely disagree.  
 O Don’t know 
23. It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income 
between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.  
 O Agree strongly.  
 O Agree. 
 O Neither agree nor disagree. 
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 O Disagree. 
 O Disagree strongly. 
 O Can’t choose.  
 
-- STOP sign: Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
Part 3 
The participants of our study can be divided into two groups of equal size, which we 
call group A and group B. All participants who join the same session will be randomly 
assigned to one of the groups.   
Participants in group A will shortly receive a further envelope which contains 20 Euros. 
The participants receive these 20 Euros in addition to the 40 Euros which participants 
of both groups receive. Participants in group B will receive no additional money.  
Each participant in group A has the chance to give any desired amount of their 20 Euros 
to a participant from group B which will be randomly assigned. To this end, the 
participant in group A puts money into an envelope, which will later be given to a 
participant in group B. At no time will the participants in group A know which 
participants in group B have received their envelopes. It also applies that at no time, any 
participant in group B will know which person in group A the envelope is from. The 
participant in group B will receive the envelope even in the case that there is no money 
in it.  
Drawing of the group: 
The session which you participate in has randomly been assigned to group A. Therefore, 
you are a member of group A and receive an additional 20 Euros.  
[The session which you participate in has randomly been assigned to group B. 
Therefore you are a member of group B. We now hand out to you an envelope which 
comes from a randomly selected participant of group A.] 
 
-- STOP sign: Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
[Group B continues with the option to give general comments on the study. The 
following instructions are received by group A only.] 
In the envelope, you find:  
- one white envelope 
- one yellow envelope  
- 20 Euros, consisting of two 5 Euro-bills, as well as two 2 Euro-
coins and six 1 Euro-coins 
- one receipt. 
We now ask you to sign the receipt you find enclosed. By doing so, you confirm that 
you have received 20 Euros from ZEW. We only need the receipt for administrative 
188 | P a g e           T h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  s o c i a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  
 
 
purposes. Without a receipt we are not allowed to give you the money. Your data is still 
handled confidentially and anonymously. We will now collect the receipts. The study 
will continue hereafter.  
 
-- STOP sign: Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
Please distribute the 20 Euros to the white and the yellow envelope. You keep the 
amount of money you put in the white envelope. The amount you put in the yellow 
envelope will be given to a participant in group B, which will later be randomly chosen. 
This participant will receive the envelope at the end of their experiment even if there is 
no money in the it. 
We guarantee that the transfer of the envelope will be carried out lawfully. 
You make the decision whether and how much of the 20 Euros you want to distribute 
among you and an unknown participant freely and anonymously. 
The study will be carried out in the following chronological order: 
1.) Put the amount you wish to give to a participant of the experiment in the yellow 
envelope. 
2.) Put the amount of money you wish to keep in the white envelope.  
Finally, you should have distributed the 20 Euros completely to the two envelopes. 
Please note that any distribution in full amounts of Euros is possible. You may put any 
desired amount of money in both envelopes. It is also possible to put 20 Euros 
completely into one envelope. 
3.) Write your ID-number in the predefined box on the yellow envelope. 
 4.) Seal up both envelopes.  
When all participants have finished, we will come up to you and collect the yellow 
envelope. When we do so, please put the yellow envelope into the box. Please keep the 
white envelope. 
We will explain the most important items once again orally. Afterwards, please make 
your decision as described above.  
 
-- STOP sign: Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
We would like to ask you to write down general comments regarding our study. You 
may also give reasons for your donation decision. [11 empty lines follow.] 
We would like to thank you for participating in our study and wish you a nice day! 
Please remember to take the white envelope with you.  
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8 General conclusions 
Climate change has become a growing concern world-wide. The projected 
consequences include rising surface temperature, sea level rise, melting glaciers, 
changing precipitation patterns, increasing extreme weather events and changes in 
ecological and economic systems. However, climate change mitigation is a global 
public good and, therefore, suffers from underprovision due to strong free-riding 
incentives. The economics of climate protection – costs and benefits, uncertainty, and 
the regional distribution of effects – make the provision thereof one of the biggest 
challenges for the international community. Furthermore, the historical development of 
the problem and countries’ differences in responsibility, wherewithal, and vulnerability 
give leeway for different perceptions of fair burden sharing.  
As a consequence, only little has been done to actually mitigate global climate change 
so far. The Kyoto Protocol specified binding emission reduction obligations but failed 
to address the participation and enforcement problem properly. The Copenhagen 
Accord did not even attempt to implement binding reduction obligations but rather 
collected unilaterally declared pledges which cannot be expected to lead to significant 
changes in the atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration. These voluntary pledges were 
officially adopted in Cancún but the negotiations of an international agreement 
involving legally binding and long-term emission reduction target were postponed. The 
two largest CO2 emitters worldwide, the United States and China, seem to have adopted 
an ‘after you’ strategy: Advocating that the other country was to take the lead in terms 
of timing and magnitude of emission reductions on the grounds of reciprocity 
considerations, they have managed to stay clear of any legally binding commitments to 
date. Many other industrialized countries or regions, such as the European Union, Japan, 
Australia, and New Zealand, also make stringent emission reduction targets conditional 
on other countries’ actions. This strategy reflects the understanding that unilateral 
leadership will not have an effect on the global climate and that the climate change has 
to be addressed collectively. 
This thesis provided an experimental and theory based analysis of the voluntary 
provision of global public goods with a special focus on climate change mitigation. The 
objective was to analyze both subjects’ behavior in games designed to simulate climate 
change (Part I) and subjects’ behavior in related games designed to elicit other-
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regarding preferences (Part II). The first part examined the consequences of real (and 
possibly other-regarding) preferences for the subjects’ ability to solve the dilemma or 
coordination problem. The second part addressed the question of how to elicit other-
regarding preferences. It provided some methodological insights and an indication of 
other-regarding preferences of real policy makers and citizens. In the following, the 
main results of both parts are summarized. 
Part I presented three public goods experiments conducted in the lab with students: 
Chapter 2 tested the voluntary formation of coalitions in a dilemma situation. The 
success of a coalition to overcome free-riding incentives depends on two interlinked 
challenges: On the one hand, the institutional arrangements need to attract signatories 
(extensive margin). On the other hand, any given coalition should be able to internalize 
the mutual benefits from the public good among its members (intensive margin). 
Different institutions were tested with respect to their ability to succeed along these two 
dimensions. The experimental results showed, on the one hand, that institutions which 
exogenously force members to fully internalize their mutual benefits generate a rather 
low participation rate, just as theoretically predicted. The resulting provision levels of 
the global public good do hardly go beyond the ones achieved by a purely voluntary 
contribution mechanism. On the other hand, lowering the degree of internalization of 
benefits within the coalition does not attract more members and, accordingly, does not 
generate efficiency gains. Benefits arise, however, from institutions which allow 
members to endogenously determine the terms of the agreement as they attract more 
members: The smallest common denominator rule, where each coalition member can 
suggest a provision level, knowing that the smallest suggested level is binding for all 
coalition members, generates larger coalition sizes and larger average contributions. 
Thus, there is a clear tradeoff between extensive and intensive margin: The larger the 
(endogenously determined) requirements from coalition members, the less willing 
subjects are to enter the coalition. 
Chapter 3 provided further evidence on the effects of different negotiation procedures 
within a coalition. It shows the effects if signatories to an agreement apply qualified 
majority voting or simple majority voting to determine the terms of the agreement. The 
resulting public good provision and welfare levels were compared with those achieved 
by the smallest common denominator rule in which signatories apply a unanimity rule 
to determine their effort level. At first sight in line with theoretical predictions, the 
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experiment showed that a change of the voting scheme implemented in a coalition does 
not significantly change social welfare. However, changing the majority required to 
determine the terms of an agreement alters the depth and breadth of cooperation: The 
coalitions under the unanimity rule are relatively large and implement moderate effort 
levels, while the coalitions with majority votes implement very high effort levels but 
attract only few participants. 
Chapter 4 explored the relevance of inequality and commitments issues in affecting 
subjects’ ability to coordinate their efforts to avoid catastrophic climate change. The 
results showed that the real-world features introduced in the game have deep 
consequences on the cooperation level. Both claims that the inequality disrupts and the 
non-binding announcement of targets helps coordination were supported by the data. 
The experiment clearly showed the conditions under which subjects effectively 
coordinate their efforts to avoid the climate catastrophe: All successful groups agreed 
on a common equity notion and eliminated inequality completely while failing groups 
often disagreed about the reduction of inequality. In that context, the announcement of 
non-binding targets was particularly helpful to solve the coordination problem. 
Part II addressed the question of how to elicit other-regarding preferences. It started 
with Chapter 5 analyzing in how far equity considerations are important to individuals 
involved in climate negotiations. Equity preferences were measured with the help of 
two simple non-strategic games which resembled the decisions in a dictator game and 
an ultimatum game. The main finding was that inequality is of considerable importance 
for climate negotiators. Despite the simplistic nature of the experiment, the individual 
preferences might serve as a starting point for a discussion of the role of equity for the 
cooperation of countries in climate policy. As a vast majority of participants expects 
governments not to act in a more equity-oriented way, the individual preferences may 
be seen as an upper bound for the equity concerns reflected in collective preferences of 
countries. Considering alternative groupings of countries such as G8 versus Non-G8 or 
EU versus Non-EU countries there are no significant differences, neither for individual 
preferences nor for expected collective preferences. 
The experiments presented in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 were not directly linked to 
climate change mitigation. They investigated the willingness to contribute to public 
goods in the context of charitable donations. Chapter 6 contributed to the understanding 
how the provision of information about charities’ revenues affects individual donation 
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decisions. The experimental results show that donors prefer to give to small charities 
with relatively low revenues as compared to large charities. Thus, the results supported 
the models that predict a negative relation between a charity’s income and the 
willingness to donate to that charity: the theory of impact philanthropy, which assumes 
that donors try to achieve the biggest impact possible with their charitable contribution, 
as well as those public goods models which predict incomplete crowding out of 
voluntary contributions by third-party contributions. The results furthermore confirmed 
previous findings that the individual donations increase with subjects’ age, income, and 
education. This suggests that donation decisions in the experiment are a good indicator 
of real-life decisions. Unmarried individuals donate significantly more and voters of the 
left party donate significantly less than others. 
Chapter 7 contributed to the discussion whether social preferences measured in the lab 
are predictive of individual behavior in other games or decision contexts. As opposed to 
the assumption of consistent preferences, the constructive-preference approach suggests 
that individuals construct their preferences ad hoc if they are confronted with an 
unfamiliar decision situation. The experiment took a closer look at this issue as the 
experimental subjects had to allocate money in a conventional dictator game and made a 
donation decision. While the donation context represents a familiar decision situation 
where individuals are supposed to have existing preferences, the dictator game is a 
rather unfamiliar decision situation where subjects are likely to construct their 
preferences ad hoc. The results show that dictator game allocations are significantly 
higher if this game is played at the beginning of experimental sessions as compared to 
the dictator game played at the end of a session. Charitable donations, in comparison, 
are independent from the sequence of play. This more stable pattern may result from 
existing preferences in the donation context. Moreover, we observed a significantly 
positive correlation between charitable donations and dictator game allocations 
provided that individuals are confronted with the more familiar donation decision 
situation first. Hence, subjects are more likely to be consistently generous or selfish 
across games or contexts if they start the experiment with the more familiar decision 
problem.  
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What are the general conclusions of all these experiments with regard to the central 
topic of this thesis – global climate change? Despite the fact that the experiments in the 
final two chapters had a message of their own for the economics of charitable donations 
and the elicitation of other-regarding preferences, they might also contribute to the 
debate on climate protection. First of all, they confirmed that the behavior of citizens in 
experimental games is comparable with that of students. They showed, furthermore, that 
people are willing to contribute to global public goods even if these goods benefit 
mainly foreigners. Recall that development aid was the second most common cause 
selected by experimental subjects. This suggested that people would also be willing to 
contribute to climate protection even if that did not inure to their own benefit but rather 
to the benefit of poor people living in developing countries. At the same time, people’s 
donations were shown to be not purely altruistic but destined to satisfy own concerns as 
well. For example, donors try to achieve a large impact with their charitable 
contribution. Since the impact of individual contributions to climate protection is 
negligible, those people may choose another ‘good cause’ when facing an investment 
decision. 
Similarly, the online experiment with climate negotiators indicated that policy makers’ 
decisions in experimental games are in the range of students’ behavior. It showed 
furthermore that policy makers care about foreign colleagues even under anonymous 
conditions. At the same time, the study showed that climate negotiators do not expect 
their government to be equally generous but more selfish. As mentioned in the 
introduction of the thesis, it is not possible to measure the preferences of countries. We 
can only collect empirical evidence of the preferences of voters, delegates, and 
government representatives in order to provide input for the further development of the 
theoretical models. This was an important goal of the experiments presented in the 
second part of the thesis. The results generally supported the hypothesis mentioned in 
the introduction that countries can be expected to act not completely selfishly but more 
selfishly than individuals. 
This, in turn, confirmed the view that experimental findings should be taken into 
account in the analysis of climate negotiations and the respective policy advice 
(Weimann 2010). The experiments complement the theoretical analyses by showing the 
consequences of real preferences. Furthermore, they give an indication of human 
behavior where theory is ambiguous or blind and they are able to separate different 
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effects by using ceteris paribus comparisons. Hence, even if the experimental results 
cannot be transferred one-to-one to the real world, they provide valuable guidance for 
the evaluation of institutions with respect to their ability to secure the provision of a 
public good. An institution which neither works in theory nor in the lab is not likely to 
be helpful in reality – and vice versa.  
Having said this, what can we learn from the climate change games presented in the 
first part of the thesis? Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 reported the effects of different 
institutions for the formation of coalitions. They showed that people in the lab do not 
always act in line with the theory, but all the same, they are still far away from the 
social optimum. Thus, both the theoretical models and the experimental games indicate 
that under certain circumstances, first-best solutions are not available. In Chapter 4, we 
saw that the prospect of catastrophic climate change fundamentally alters the 
cooperation challenge. As the challenge is one of coordinating efforts rather than 
cooperating just to increase the effort level, many groups succeeded in avoiding 
catastrophe, especially when a communication opportunity was available. Inequality 
impeded effective coordination indicating that equity and fairness are important issues 
in climate negotiations, which may not help but rather hamper cooperation. If countries 
cannot agree on a common fairness notion, the lack of consensus may easily lead to 
political lock-ins as described at the beginning of this section. 
The implications of the experimental results are important for the ongoing policy 
discussions. A widespread view on the reason why climate negotiations have failed so 
far is that the problem was the process: The United Nations process involves nearly 200 
countries. The decision under the rules of the Framework Convention must be 
unanimous which gives every country a veto. The common argument is that this veto 
together with clearly varying interests of countries impedes an effective global 
agreement. The experimental results presented here, however, are not in line with this 
assessment. They show that even small groups of few symmetric players are not able to 
reach an effective global agreement. The abolition of the veto, i.e. the introduction of 
majority voting, does not help to secure the efficient public good provision. The 
experimental results suggest instead that, first and foremost, the prevailing free-riding 
incentives are responsible for the failure to cooperate.  
G e n e r a l  c o n c l u s i o n s                                   P a g e  | 195 
 
The experimental literature on the formation of international environmental agreements 
and the avoidance of catastrophic climate change is still at the beginning and needs 
further development. However, the experimental results so far support the view that 
small changes in the design of a particular agreement might not be enough but more 
radical changes might be needed. The ‘targets and timetables’ approach as implemented 
in all previous climate agreements does not show great promise for reducing global 
greenhouse gas emissions. The prospects for an effective global agreement are thin from 
all perspectives: real world experience, theory and experiments. This has three 
important consequences: First, countries are well advised to prepare for and adapt to 
climate change. Second, besides working on a first-best one-track agreement, they 
should aim for second-best solutions such as sectoral or small multi-track agreements. 
These institutions should be evaluated primarily according to their ability to address 
participation and compliance. This means on the one hand that they must be able to 
alleviate the free-riding incentives and, on the other, their distributional consequences 
must be acceptable for the relevant countries. Third, research and development and 
technological progress are essential to change the economics of climate protection and, 
therefore, to positively influence the prospects for a future global agreement. 
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